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Foreword 
Anonymisation is a subject that, on the face of it, is very technical and rather 
academic. However, it is of great – and growing - real-world significance. My office 
deals every day with the tension between access to information and personal 
privacy. Done effectively, anonymisation can help us to manage that tension.  
The ICO published its ‘Anonymisation: Managing Data Protection Risk’ code of 
practice in 2012. The work we did on that taught us two main lessons. Firstly, 
effective anonymisation is possible but it is also possible to do anonymisation 
ineffectively. Secondly, it isn’t always possible to draw the definitive personal / non-
personal data distinction that legal certainty in the field of data protection depends 
on.  
We have learnt that we have to deploy effective anonymisation techniques and 
assess re-identification risk in context, recognising that there is a wide spectrum of 
personal identifiability and that different forms of identifier pose different privacy 
risks. This authoritative and accessible decision-making framework will help the 
information professional to anonymise personal data effectively. The framework 
forms an excellent companion piece to the ICO’s code of practice.  
It is easy to say that anonymisation is impossible and that re-identification can 
always take place. It is just as easy to be complacent about the privacy risk posed by 
the availability of anonymised data. It is more difficult to evaluate risk realistically 
and in the round and to strike a publicly acceptable balance between access to 
information and personal privacy. The guidance in this framework will help 
information professionals to do that.  
The General Data Protection Regulation will be fully implemented across the EU in 
2018, following protracted and complex debate about – amongst other things – the 
nature of anonymisation and the status of pseudonymous data. The approach taken 
in the ICO Code of Practice and this framework is fully consistent with the GDPR. 
We must conclude that some individual-level data is personal data but some is not, 
depending on factors such as the nature of the data and the difficulty or cost of 
rendering it identifiable. Again, this may not make for the absolute legal certainty 
many would like, but it does provide for the flexibility we need to make sensible 
decisions based on the circumstances of each case.  
  
Given the development of increasingly powerful data sharing, matching and mining 
techniques – and a backdrop of strong political and commercial pressure to make 
more data available - it can seem inevitable that re-identification risk will increase 
exponentially. However, this framework demonstrates that the science of privacy 
enhancement and our understanding of privacy risk are also developing apace.  
It is essential that we continue to develop anonymisation and other privacy 
enhancing techniques as an antidote to the potential excesses of the big data era. The 
ICO has been one of the strongest champions of the privacy enhancement agenda, 
within the EU and beyond, and it will continue to be. Our work with the UK 
Anonymisation Network and our support for the development of the 
Anonymisation Decision-Making Framework is indicative of the continued 
importance of this field of informatics to the fulfilment of the ICO’s mission.       
 
Elizabeth Denham 
UK Information Commissioner  
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Preface 
The need for well-thought-out anonymisation has never been more acute. The drive 
to share data has led to some ill-conceived, poorly-anonymised data publications 
including the Netflix,1 AOL2 and New York taxi3 cases, underlining how important it 
is to carry out anonymisation properly and what can happen if you do not. 
This book has been developed to address a need for a practical guide to 
anonymisation that gives more operational advice than the ICO’s Anonymisation Code 
of Practice, whilst being less technical and forbidding than the statistics and computer 
science literature. The book may be of interest to an anonymisation specialist who 
would appreciate a fresh, integrated perspective on the topic. However, it is 
primarily intended for those who have data that they need to anonymise with 
confidence, usually in order to share it. Our aim is that you should finish the book 
with a practical understanding of anonymisation and an idea about how to utilise it 
to advance your business or organisational goals. To make this tractable we have 
focused on personal data and specifically on information presented in the form of a 
file or database4 of individual level records; we have – for this edition at least – set 
aside the specialist topic of data about businesses.5  
We present in full here for the first time the Anonymisation Decision-Making 
Framework, which can be applied, perhaps with minor modifications to the detail, to 
just about any data where confidentiality is an issue but sharing is valuable. 
However, the biggest demand for the framework is primarily from people and 
organisations dealing with personal data and so that is the focus of our exposition 
here.  
We assume the regulatory context of current (2016) UK law, and you should bear in 
mind that other legal jurisdictions will impose different constraints on what you can 
and cannot do with data. Across jurisdictions there are differences in the 
                                                          
1 See CNN Money (2010) http://tinyurl.com/CNN-BREACHES 
2 See Arrington (2006) http://tinyurl.com/AOL-SEARCH-BREACH 
3 See Atokar (2014) http://tinyurl.com/NYC-TAXI-BREACH 
4 Thus, at this present time we do not consider unstructured data. However, the principles of the ADF 
do apply to this type of data and we envisage widening the scope of the book to incorporate an 
examination of it in future editions.  
5 Business data has different technical properties and different legislation can apply to it.  
  
interpretation of data protection legislation and in the meaning of key terms such as 
‘personal data’. A reader outside the UK context should interpret the legal-facing 
sections of the book with this in mind. That said, the fundamental premise of 
anonymisation, that it is designed to control the risk of unintended re-identification 
and disclosure, will hold regardless of the legal context and therefore the principles 
that the framework provides should be universally applicable. We have in places 
included pointers to other jurisdictions where we could do that without making the 
text cumbersome and future editions may attend to this issue in a more thorough 
manner. 
The framework has been a long time in gestation. Its foundations are a twenty-year 
programme of research carried out at the University of Manchester, and the long-
standing relationship between the University of Manchester and the UK Office for 
National Statistics (ONS). More recently, the authors of this book have been partners 
in the UK Anonymisation Network (UKAN)6 which has driven forward the 
development of the framework and convinced us of the enormous demand for a 
book in this space. One aim of UKAN, and indeed this book, has been to integrate 
the many different perspectives on the topic of anonymisation and in particular to 
join up the legal and the technical perspectives. We would like to express gratitude 
to the contribution of the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), which 
provided the seed funding for the network and has been actively engaged with its 
development. 
Our view has always been that anonymisation is a heavily context-dependent 
process and only by considering the data and its environment as a total system 
(which we call the data situation), can one come to a well informed decision about 
whether and what anonymisation is needed. Good technique is important but 
without a full understanding of the context, the application of complex disclosure 
control techniques can be a little like installing sophisticated flood defences in the 
Atacama desert or, at the other end of the scale, not realising that building a house 
on the edge of a cliff is just a bad idea regardless of how well designed it is. 
Accepting the importance of context, it is also important to understand that a fully 
formed anonymisation process includes consideration of the ethics of data sharing 
and the importance of transparency and public engagement and you will find as you 
work through the book that the framework incorporates these elements too.  
                                                          
6 UKAN provides services including training workshops and clinics for those who need to anonymise 
their data. These services can be accessed via the network website: www.ukanon.net. 
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We have decided to release this book as a freely available open source book rather 
than through a traditional publisher as we feel that we have an important message 
that we wanted to ensure is disseminated as widely as possible. We hope that you 
find the book of value. We would welcome comments on the book at any time via 
our web site www.ukanon.net. The book is intended to be organic and we will be 
updating it periodically. 
  
Chapter 1: Introduction  
In this chapter we introduce the Anonymisation Decision-making Framework 
(ADF), explaining the thinking behind it and the principles on which it is founded. 
We outline how you might best use the ADF (given your skills and experience) in 
your anonymisation practice. But first, let us make explicit the three central terms 
featured in this book: anonymisation, risk and sensitivity. 
1.1 Anonymisation, risk and sensitivity 
A common error when thinking about anonymisation is to focus on a fixed end state 
of the data. This is a problem because it leads to much muddled thinking about what 
it means to produce ‘anonymised data’. Firstly, it exclusively focuses on the 
properties of the data whereas in reality whether data are anonymised or not is a 
function of both the data and the data environment. Secondly, it leads one into some 
odd discussions about the relationship between anonymisation and its companion 
concept risk, with some commentators erroneously (or optimistically) assuming that 
‘anonymised’ means that there is zero risk of an individual being re-identified 
within a dataset. Thirdly, viewing it as an end state means that one might assume 
that one’s work is done which in turn promotes a counterproductive mentality of 
‘release-and-forget’. 
In some ways, it would be better to drop the adjectival form ‘anonymised’ altogether 
and perhaps talk instead of ‘data that has been through an anonymisation process’. 
However, the constraints of the English language mean that this would sometimes 
lead to some quite tortuous sentences. So, in this book, we will use the term 
‘anonymised’ but this should be understood in the spirit of the term ‘reinforced’ 
within ‘reinforced concrete’. We do not expect reinforced concrete to be 
indestructible, but we do expect that a structure made out of the stuff will have a 
negligible risk of collapsing. 
This brings us in turn to the notion of risk. Since Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman’s seminal work in the 1970s, it has been clear that humans are quite poor 
at making judgements about risk and are subject to numerous biases when making 
decisions in the face of uncertainty (see for example Tversky and Kahneman (1974)). 
One aspect of this is the tendency to confuse the likelihood of an event with its 
impact (or disutility). To complicate matters further, where risks are dependent on 
human action, these biases themselves factor into the risk profile. So if we can 
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convince a data intruder that likelihood of a re-identification attempt succeeding is 
negligible then they are less likely to put the necessary effort in to attempt it and 
thus we have controlled the risk beyond what we have measured ‘objectively’.  
Thinking about the impact side of risk brings us to the third key concept, sensitivity, 
which tends to be connected with the potential harm of any confidentiality breach. 
However, as we will see, sensitivity is a larger concept than this and encompasses 
how the data were collected and what reasonable expectations a data subject might 
hold about what will happen to data about them.  
Anonymisation, then, is a process of risk management but it is also a decision 
making process: should we release this data or not and if so in what form? 
Considering all the elements involved, that decision can appear complex and rife 
with uncertainties. It does require thinking about a range of heterogeneous issues 
from ethical and legal obligations to technical data questions: bringing all these 
disparate elements into a single comprehensible framework is what this book is all 
about. 
1.2 The principles behind the ADF 
The ADF incorporates two frames of action: one technical, the other contextual. The 
technical element of the framework will enable you to think about both the 
quantification of re-identification risk and how to manage it. The contextual element 
will enable you to think about and address those factors that affect re-identification 
risk. These include the particulars of your data situation such as the data flow, legal 
and ethical responsibilities and governance practices, your responsibilities once you 
have shared or released data, and your plans if, in the rare event, things go wrong.  
The framework is underpinned by a relatively new way of thinking about the re-
identification problem which posits that you must look at both the data and the data 
environment to ascertain realistic measures of risk. This is called the data situation 
approach. Perhaps it seems obvious that the environment in which data are to be 
shared and released is important, but for many years the data confidentiality field 
has focused almost exclusively on the data themselves. Thus re-identification risk 
was seen as originating from, and largely contained within, the data. As a 
consequence, researchers and practitioners rarely looked beyond the statistical 
properties of the data in question. With a few notable exceptions (e.g. Duncan & 
Lambert 1989, Elliot and Dale 1999 and Reiter 2005) they have not concerned 
themselves with issues such as how or why a re-identification might happen, or 
  
what skills, knowledge, or other data a person would require to ensure his or her 
attempt was a success. As a consequence, the statistical models they built to assess 
re-identification risk, whilst statistically sophisticated, have at best been based on 
assumptions about the data context7 and at worst totally detached from any real-
world considerations.  
To address these failings there have been attempts to describe and theorise about 
context beyond the data. This has usually taken the form of intruder scenario 
analysis which we will consider in more detail later in chapter 2 in 2.3.1 and in 
chapter 3 component 6 of the ADF. Scenario analysis began the process of shifting 
attention away from the traditional question ‘how risky are the data for release?’ 
towards the more critical question ‘how might re-identification occur?’ The data 
situation approach that we take here builds further on this and broadens our 
understanding to include the actions of other key agents, other data within the 
environment and previously-neglected considerations such as the importance of 
governance processes. The basic premise is that you cannot guard against the threat 
to anonymisation unless you have a clear idea of what it is you are guarding against 
and this requires considering both data and environment. 
What this means for you is that your assessment and management of re-
identification risk should include reference to all the components of the ADF, 
including your data, other external data sources, legitimate data use and potential 
misuse, governance practices, and your legal, ethical and ongoing responsibilities. 
The ADF is a total system approach, and consists of ten components:  
1. Describe your data situation  
2. Understand your legal responsibilities 
3. Know your data 
4. Understand the use case 
5. Meet your ethical obligations 
6. Identify the processes you will need to assess disclosure risk 
7. Identify the disclosure control processes that are relevant to your data 
situation 
8. Identify who your stakeholders are and plan how you will communicate 
9. Plan what happens next once you have shared or released the data 
                                                          
7 Some privacy models such as differential privacy and k-anonymity do attempt to assess and control 
risk by comparing it to some theoretically parameterised environment – there is however nothing 
intrinsic in these models that requires engagement with the actual data environment. 
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10. Plan what you will do if things go wrong 
We will not say anything more here about these components as they are covered in 
some detail in chapter 3. What we will do is make explicit the five principles upon 
which the ADF is founded:  
1. You cannot decide whether data are safe to share/release or not by looking at 
the data alone. 
2. But you still need to look at the data. 
3. Anonymisation is a process to produce safe data but it only makes sense if 
what you are producing is safe useful data.  
4. Zero risk is not a realistic possibility if you are to produce useful data. 
5. The measures you put in place to manage risk should be proportional to the 
risk and its likely impact. 
Let us consider these principles in a little more detail.  
1. You cannot decide whether data are safe to share/release or not by looking at 
the data alone: This principle underpins the data situation approach outlined 
above, where risk is seen as arising from the interaction between data, people 
and (the soft and hard) structures that shape that interaction such as national 
policies on data sharing and access, the legal framework, IT systems, 
governance practices, cultural attitudes to data sharing and privacy etc.  
2. But you still need to look at the data: You need to know your data – which 
means being able to identify the properties of your data and assess how they 
might affect risk. This will feed into decisions about how much data to share 
or release, with whom and how.  
3. Anonymisation is a process to produce safe data but it only makes sense if 
what you are producing is safe useful data: You may wonder why we talk 
about the need to balance data utility with data safety in the anonymisation 
process. It is easy after all to think about anonymisation only in terms of 
producing safe data but if you do that you may well be taking a risk for no 
benefit. Remember, anonymisation is a means inseparable from its purpose of 
sharing or releasing data. Let us consider this further:  
o On the issue of data utility – there is little point in releasing data that do 
not represent whatever they are meant to represent. There are two 
possible outcomes that arise from low utility and neither are happy ones: 
(i) the data are of little or no use to their potential users and you will have 
wasted your time and resources on them, or (ii) the data could lead to 
misleading conclusions which might have significant consequences if, for 
  
example, the data are used to influence thinking or to make decisions 
which determine an outcome.  
o On the issue of data risk – low utility data may still retain some re-
identification risk but in the absence of demonstrable utility you will lack 
any justification for taking that risk.  
4. Zero risk is not a realistic possibility if you are to produce useful data: This is 
fundamental. Anonymisation is about risk management, nothing more and 
nothing less; accepting that there is a residual risk in all useful data inevitably 
puts you in the realms of balancing risk and utility. But this is the stuff of 
modern life – the trade-off of individual and societal level benefits against 
individual and societal level risks. This also brings into focus the issue of 
stakeholder engagement; there is no agreement on how to have a 
conversation with data subjects and the wider general public about this issue 
and there are not unfounded concerns about causing unnecessary worry by 
drawing attention to confidentiality risks. At the same time, it is worth 
recognising that people are capable of balancing risk and utility in much of 
their daily lives whenever they cross a road, drive a car etc.  
5. The measures you put in place to manage risk should be proportional to that 
risk and its likely impact: Following principle 4, the existence of risk is not a 
priori a reason for withholding access to data. However, a mature 
understanding of that risk will enable you to make proportionate decisions 
about the data, who should have access and how. So for example: 
o If data are detailed and/or sensitive it would be proportionate for you to 
look to control the ‘who and how’ of access by, for example, limiting 
access to accredited users working in a secure lab facility.  
o If the data are of minimal detail and not sensitive then limiting access to a 
secure setting is likely to be disproportionate and it would be better to 
consider a less restricted access option.  
1.3 Structure of this book 
In this chapter we have introduced some of the core concepts relevant to our 
approach to confidentiality and anonymisation. We have also provided a top level 
overview of the Anonymisation Decision-making Framework, explaining both the 
thinking behind it and the principles on which it is founded. The ADF we have said 
is a generic approach to the process of anonymisation which will help you to identify 
and address the key factors relevant to your particular data share or release 
situation. 
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In the next chapter we define anonymisation in much more detail and bring together 
the ideas and concepts required to understand and adopt the ADF. 
In chapter 3 we present the ADF, working through each component in detail. The 
approach taken is practical with worked examples and advice on how to 
operationalise each component of the framework. As we have prioritised 
accessibility over precision and completeness, some of the more technical aspects of 
disclosure risk assessment and control (for example synthetic data generation) are 
necessarily passed over but in many cases these are unnecessary and when they do 
prove useful it is generally better to work with an expert on their application. As 
with any complex topic there is always more to understand; this is an active research 
area and so the underlying science itself is still in development. You will see that we 
have made liberal use of footnotes. Our intention is that the book can be read and the 
framework understood without paying any attention to the footnotes at all – they are 
there for those who may want more detail. 
  
  
Chapter 2 About Anonymisation 
2.0 Introduction 
In this chapter we will consider in depth what anonymisation is and the elements 
that make up best anonymisation practice. We will consider how anonymisation 
relates to other concepts, and how it is embedded in legal and technical ideas and 
practices.  
2.1 Anonymisation and the law 
Anonymisation is a process to allow data to be shared or disseminated ethically and 
legally, thereby realising their huge social, environmental and economic value,8 
whilst preserving confidentiality.9  
An often misunderstood point is that anonymisation concerns keeping data 
confidential; it is not primarily about privacy. Privacy is a difficult to define, somewhat 
amorphous concept that implicates psychological notions like identity and 
autonomy, and depends on a locus of control which is contextualised by cultural 
norms. Confidentiality on the other hand relates directly to the collection and 
storage and transmission of information. Anonymisation processes may have 
privacy implications but they operate by maintaining confidentiality.  
Fienberg (2005) defines confidentiality as ‘a quality or condition accorded to 
information as an obligation not to transmit that information to an unauthorized 
party’. More specifically, in the context of personal data, the confidential matter is 
that these data relate to a particular person.10 As a data subject, I do not (usually) 
mind if a data user can see that there exists a person that has my attributes but I am 
much more likely to object if they can ascertain that that person is me. The whole 
exercise of anonymisation is premised on that distinction.  
                                                          
8 Often referred to as the triple bottom line (Elkington 1997). 
9 In some circumstances, non-anonymised data can also be shared but anonymisation usually makes 
sharing easier and wider dissemination of personal data without first anonymising it is usually not 
possible at all. 
10 Note this interpretation of confidentiality is specific to personal data. For example, in the sentence 
‘the details of company X’s new wonder product were confidential’ it is the details of the product that 
are confidential not the identity of company X. 
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All organisations collect some information from their clients/service 
users/members/employees as part and parcel of their activities and increasingly they 
share or even sell (at least some of) the data they collect. When this information 
relates directly to those persons as individuals then it is termed personal data.  
In the UK, the law most relevant to personal data and their anonymisation is the 
1998 Data Protection Act (the DPA), which enacted the 1995 European Data 
Protection directive. Other legislation that pertains to particular datasets and data 
sources such as the Statistical Registration and Services Act (2007) for official statistics, 
the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act (2005) for HMRC data and the Census 
(Confidentiality) Act (1991) for UK Census data, is also pertinent for anonymisation, 
but still approaches it via the notion of identifiability which is central to the DPA’s 
concept of personal data. 
In 2018, the new European Data Protection Regulation will come into force.11 This 
will be a significant change in both the content of the legislation and how it is 
enforced. However, both the textual definition of what personal data is and the 
functional role of anonymisation in data protection appear to be unaltered by the 
new regulation. For the remainder of this book, we focus on the UK’s Data 
Protection Act as the legislative framework in which anonymisation is deemed to 
take place. We will revisit this as part of our regular updates of this book.  
The DPA defines personal data as:  
Data which relate to a living individual who can be identified:  
(a) from those data, or  
(b) from those data and other information which is in the possession of, 
or is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller.12 
The living individual13 in question is often called the data subject.14 
                                                          
11 At the time of going to press the UK had just voted to leave the EU. The impacts of this are 
obviously unclear at this stage. However, it seems likely that the UK will need to adopt compatible 
legislation 
12 We will discuss the important notion of the data controller in section 2.1.2 below.  
13 It often surprises people that the data for deceased individuals are not covered by data protection 
legislation. However, other pieces of relevant legislation such as the Human Rights Act and the 
Statistics and Registration Services Act do not make this distinction and in general it is prudent to not  
base anonymisation and data sharing policy on it.  
14 Often, particularly in the context of censuses and surveys, you will also see the word ‘respondent’ 
used. For individual-level data the two may be synonymous but sometimes a respondent will also 
provide information that is directly or indirectly about 3rd parties, such as members of the same 
household. So one can be a data subject and not a respondent and vice versa. 
  
It is the second of these clauses - especially the crucial phrases ‘other information’ 
and ‘is likely to’ – that gives anonymisation its inherent practical complexity. But at 
the conceptual level, there are two simple questions that one needs to answer in 
order to understand whether data are personal or not: are the data about15 people 
and are people identifiable within the data? The combinations of answers to those 
questions give us four possible types of data as shown in Table 2.1. 
About People Non-Identifiable data Identifiable data 
Yes Anonymised Data Primary Personal data 
No Apersonal Data16 Secondary Personal Data 
Table 2.1. Four types of data depending on whether they are about people (or not) and whether they 
are identifiable (or not).17 
One thing that may not be immediately clear is what the category of secondary 
personal data is; how can data not be about people but still be personal? An example 
of such data is the data about fires that, in the UK, are managed by the Department 
of Communities and Local Government on behalf of the fire and rescue services. 
Despite not being directly about people, the key point to realise about these data is 
that fires happen in places – often people’s homes – and places are in turn associated 
with people. So whilst the data are not about people they may relate to them. If there 
is a close association between a place and a person – for example, the place is the 
person’s address – then the person can be associated with particular elements of the 
data, which therefore may be personal.18  
                                                          
15 We use ‘about’ here rather than the DPA technical term ‘related to’ deliberately. Data are about 
people if the data units are people. Data could relate to a person without being about them; for 
example a database of registered cars relates to the owners of those cars but the data topic is not 
people so the data is not about people.  
16 We introduce the term apersonal here. The reader might immediately wonder why we are not using 
the more familiar term non-personal. The point is to distinguish between data that are not to do with 
people from those that are to do with people but have been anonymised so that they are non-
personal. So apersonal data are always non-personal but not vice versa. 
17 A slight confusion can sometimes arise because, in this context, the terms identified and identifiable 
can be applied to both people and data. So we might say that some data are identifiable because a 
person could easily be identified within them.  
18 Deciding whether information that is not directly about a person, but is about some object with 
which they are associated, is personal or not can seem a little tricky. So the fact there was a fire at my 
house may well be personal data in respect to me but the fact that my house is 263 feet above sea level 
is not. The ICO refers to this as the focus of the information (Bourne 2015). Fires might be personal 
because they involve the actions of people and have consequences for them. The information about 
 
 10 
 
An interesting point to note is that in terms of volume the vast majority of data 
stored in computer systems are of the apersonal type, i.e. not relating to people. 
Astronomical data, meteorological data, food nutrition data, bus timetables, 
seismological data, stress readings for the Humber Bridge and lists of endangered 
species are all examples of apersonal data. Such data are clearly non-personal, and 
have little to do with humans. But what about the other forms of non-identifiable 
data?  
2.1.1 So, are anonymised data non-personal? 
Or alternatively, are the anonymised data that have been derived from personal data 
still personal? The straightforward answer to this would appear to be no, surely they 
are not because no-one can be identified in them – is that not the point of 
anonymisation? Unfortunately, the situation is more complex than this. Usually, 
following anonymisation, the original personal data still exist and this means that 
(except perhaps for the coarsest of aggregate data) the data controller will still be 
able to identify individuals within the anonymised data (using the original data as a 
reference19) and therefore it would seem that on a literal reading of the definition of 
personal data (cf. page 8) the data must still be personal. There are two ways of 
resolving this paradox: 
1. To say that the anonymised data are personal and therefore the question 
about whether to share or release them depends on whether the DPA 
provides another get-out (e.g. whether the share or release constitutes fair 
processing20). 
2. To say that the anonymised data are personal for the original data controller 
but non-personal for other users of the data. 
We hold the second of these positions as it directly ties the concept of anonymisation 
to the notion of the context of personal data (in this case, other sources of data that 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the elevation of a house above sea level is squarely and solidly about the house. The focus of the 
information is the house not the owner.  
19 In some data situations, the original data is destroyed – for example there is some legal or 
regulatory obligation to destroy the data or perhaps a guarantee to respondents that that will happen. 
Usually, the purpose of anonymisation in such situations is to allow some data to be retained whilst 
remaining compliant. The phrase irreversible anonymisation is sometimes used in these situations 
(meaning that the data controller can no longer re-identify the data). 
20 Fair processing is defined within the DPA as processing that meets one of a set of conditions (and 
also one of a separate set if the data are classified as sensitive). See UK: Information Commissioner’s 
Office (2016) pages 98-103 for more information. 
  
users have access to) and makes a clean separation between the complexities of data 
protection, such as the (essentially ethical) question of fairness, on the one hand, and 
the (essentially technical) question of identifiability on the other.  
Another reason for not favouring the first definition is that it leads to some 
unintended consequences. For example: suppose I am a researcher and I collect some 
data via an anonymous web survey (quite common these days). If the survey is 
properly anonymous then I will not be able to identify anyone in the resultant data 
and therefore the data are not personal, and I am not a data controller and I am free 
to publish the data. But organisation X which has access to auxiliary data may be 
able to use those data to identify individuals within the data I have published. In this 
interpretation of the DPA, I am not liable because I cannot identify anyone in the 
web survey data and therefore am not a data controller. This seems counterintuitive 
at best.  
In short, if you are considering whether data are anonymised and therefore non-
personal you can only answer that question in the context of a given perspective. If 
the data controller has other information that enables them to re-identify a person 
within dataset X but the user of the anonymised dataset does not (and is not likely 
to), the dataset X is personal data for the data controller but not the user.  
This interpretation is also shared by the UKs data protection regulator the ICO. 
However, in other jurisdictions the first resolution of the paradox is favoured. In 
those jurisdictions, data are deemed personal in and of themselves, irrespective of 
their context, if they are identifiable by a data controller. This is most clearly picked 
up in particular in the Article 29 Working Party of data protection regulators’ 
opinion on anonymisation:  
Thus, it is critical to understand that when a data controller does not delete the original 
(identifiable) data at event-level, and the data controller hands over part of this dataset 
(for example after removal or masking of identifiable data), the resulting dataset is still 
personal data. EU: Article 29 Data Protection Working Party; Opinion 05/2014 on 
Anonymisation Techniques page 9. 
A final point is that anonymising personal data is itself a form of data processing 
and therefore should not be seen as an escape clause from the DPA; as with all 
processing of personal data it must be compliant with the DPA. On the surface this 
may seem slightly esoteric. However, the key point is that anonymisation is not an 
end but a means and that one cannot separate the process of anonymisation from its 
purpose (which invariably is sharing or releasing data).  
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To understand this, consider the following, fairly conventional, scenario. 
Organisation X wants to release an anonymised version of dataset D. They go 
through a rigorous anonymisation process (and for argument’s sake let us say that 
we know that this was done perfectly). They release the anonymised dataset but 
retain a copy of the original data.  
At the point the decision is made to release the data those data are contained within 
the originating environment where they are personal. This is because the data 
controller has the means (the originating data) to re-identify them. This situation 
does not change post release;21 they are still able to re-identify the anonymised data. 
Therefore the anonymised data remain personal for them and the DPA still applies.  
Now, given that we are assuming perfect anonymisation, most of the principles of 
the DPA are clearly met.22 For example, principle 7 concerning data security is 
intrinsically met directly by the anonymisation process. Principle 5 will be met as 
soon as the purpose that the original personal data were collected has been achieved 
(and the original data are destroyed rendering the anonymised data non-personal 
for everyone) and principles 3, 4 and 6 can only be meaningfully applied to the 
original data. This leaves us with principles 1, 2 and 8. Principle 8:  
Personal data shall not be transferred to a country or territory outside the European 
Economic Area unless that country or territory ensures an adequate level of protection for 
the rights and freedoms of data subjects in relation to the processing of personal data  
is potentially relevant to any open data release as open data is normally globally 
published via the Internet and therefore available in all countries regardless of their 
DP laws and practices.  
Principle 2:  
Personal data shall be obtained only for one or more specified and lawful purposes, and 
shall not be further processed in any manner incompatible with that purpose or those 
purposes 
                                                          
21 This will not usually be true with organisation to organisation shares. Once the data has been 
shared then usually it will be sitting behind the receiving organisation’s fire wall and the data 
controller for the originating data will not have access and therefore cannot have reasonable means to 
re-identify the anonymised copy. However, this situation does not alter the substance of the argument 
that follows. 
22 For the full text of the principles and their intended interpretation see: 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29/schedule/1 
  
appears to have the potential to be tricky since it is often the case that anonymising 
data for release will not be included in the list of original purposes at the point of 
collection. However, the key point here is that although the (anonymised) data have 
been released the essence of what makes the data personal has not been disclosed. In 
other words, although anonymised data have been released, personal data have not 
been disclosed. This may seem a little paradoxical but a simple test illustrates the 
point: does any legal person exist after the release for whom the data are personal and for 
whom they were not personal before the release. If the answer is no then no disclosure of 
personal data has happened and that will be the case in the scenario we are 
describing here. 
This leaves us with principle 1 – which concerns the fairness of processing – and this 
we cannot avoid because as stated above the anonymisation (which cannot be 
separated from its purposes) is a form of processing. This means in practice that the 
data controller should have a justification under the DPA’s Schedule 2 (a legal 
basis)23 for the anonymised share or release. The justification for an anonymised 
share or release would usually be either: (i) it is necessary for administering justice, 
or for exercising statutory, governmental, or other public functions or (ii) that it is in 
accordance with the legitimate interests of the data controller or (iii) for the exercise 
of any other functions of a public nature exercised in the public interest by any 
person. In the vast majority of cases where release or sharing of anonymised data is 
being considered one of those justifications will apply.  
The role of anonymisation in this processing is to ensure that the data subjects’ 
legitimate interest in the confidentiality of their data does not override the data 
controller’s legitimate interest in sharing or releasing the data. However, what 
should be clear here is that the whole argument rests on the anonymisation process 
itself being thorough and rigorous. If it is not then the risk that personal data are 
disclosed will be non-negligible. 
2.1.2 User, processor, controller – the roles of the 
anonymisation process 
Understanding your legal status in respect of particular data is important as it will 
help you establish clearly what your responsibilities are and those of any other 
                                                          
23 And also a schedule 3 justification if the data are sensitive. 
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stakeholders during the anonymisation process. It may also be that the design of the 
process will affect the roles that different agents play.  
Let us begin by looking at the conditions under which you are considered a data 
controller and a data processor. The DPA defines a data controller as  
… a person who (either alone or jointly or in common with other persons) determines the 
purposes for which and the manner in which any personal data are, or are to be, 
processed. 
It may seem an obvious point but it is worth making explicit that there are two 
conditions in this definition:  
1. That a data controller determines the purposes and manner in which the data 
are processed.  
2. That the data are personal data.  
A data controller has overall responsibility for the why and how of data processing 
activities.24 These activities include (but are not limited to):  
o Making the decision to collect personal data in the first place and determining 
the legal basis for doing so.  
o Determining which items of personal data to collect and the purpose(s) for 
which the data will be used.  
o Determining whether to disclose data, and if so, to whom.  
o Determining the need for anonymisation given the data situation. 
Under the DPA, there can be more than one data controller for a given personal data 
product. This situation arises where multiple parties either ‘jointly’ or ‘in common’ 
determine the purpose for which, and the manner in which, the personal data are 
processed. The term ‘jointly’ refers to the situation where data controllers act 
together and equally in the determination of the processing of personal data. The 
term ‘in common’ refers to the situation where data controllers share a pool of 
personal data, each processing their share independently of the other controllers. 
In contrast to a data controller, a data processor does no more than process personal 
data in the way(s) decided by the data controller. Their processing activities may 
include for example storing the personal data, providing security, transferring them 
across the organisation or to another and indeed anonymising them.  
                                                          
24For a more comprehensive list of data controllers’ activities please see the ICO’s (2014a) Data 
Controllers and Data Processors:  http://tinyurl.com/ICO-CONT-PROC [accessed 30/05/2015]. 
  
Finally, for a person to be a user of some data but neither a processor nor a controller 
then such data are must be non-personal for that person and if the data are about 
people then they must be anonymised.  
Thinking about peoples’ roles with respect to some data can help structure 
anonymisation decision making. Let us take as an example the Administrative Data 
Research Network (ADRN) which provides researcher access to linked UK 
government administrative data through secure research centres. The original data 
owners of these data (the government departments) are data controllers and (since 
the data may be linked across from different departments) they will often be 
controllers in common. The individual Administrative Data Research Centres that 
make up the network and their associated trusted third parties are data processors. 
The mechanism by which the data are processed and accessed has been determined 
by the ADRN itself but the data owners decide whether to use that mechanism for a 
particular researcher/project. The researchers access the data under highly controlled 
conditions which make the risk of re-identification negligible, and therefore, because 
the data are functionally anonymous for them, they are users. 
Identifying whether an agent is a data controller (solely, in common or jointly), a 
data processor or user is not always straightforward. But identifying the agents 
involved in a given data situation and their (desired) roles can help you decide what 
anonymisation processes are necessary and who should conduct them.  
2.1.3 De-identification and anonymisation  
There is a lot of confusion between the two terms de-identification and anonymisation 
mostly arising from the fact that the former is usually a necessary but rarely 
sufficient component of the later.25 Here, we describe the two terms and outline some 
of the underlying issues that have led to the confusion.  
De-identification – refers to a process of removing or masking direct identifiers in 
personal data such as a person’s name, address, NHS or other unique number 
associated with them. De-identification includes what is called pseudonymisation.26 
                                                          
25 Unfortunately, in some writing on the topic, this is exacerbated by treating the two terms as 
synonymous.  
26 Pseudonymisation is a technique where direct identifiers are replaced with a fictitious name or code 
that is unique to an individual but does not of itself directly identify them.  
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Anonymisation – refers to a process of ensuring that the risk of somebody being 
identified in the data is negligible. This invariably involves doing more than simply 
de-identifying the data, and often requires that data be further altered or masked in 
some way in order to prevent statistical linkage.27 
We can highlight further the difference between anonymisation and de-identification 
(including pseudonymisation) by considering how re-identification might occur: 
1. Directly from those data.  
2. Indirectly from those data and other information which is in the possession, or 
is likely to come into the possession, of someone who has access to the data.28 
The process of de-identification addresses no more than the first, i.e. the risk of 
identification arising directly from data. The process of anonymisation, on the other 
hand, should address both 1 and 2. Thus the purpose of anonymisation is to make 
re-identification difficult both directly and indirectly. In de-identification – because 
one is only removing direct identifiers – the process is unlikely to affect the risk of 
indirect re-identification from data in combination with other data. 
It should be noted that in the description of both processes (i.e. de-identification and 
anonymisation) the purpose is to make re-identification more difficult. Both de-
identification and anonymisation are potentially reversible; the data environment in 
which you share or release data is of critical importance in determining reversibility. 
In other words, the data environment can either support or constrain reversibility 
which means you need to think very carefully about the environment in which you 
share or release data. For example, it may be entirely appropriate to release de-
identified data in a highly controlled environment such as a secure data lab but not 
at all appropriate to release them more openly, for example by publishing them on 
the Internet. The classic example of a failure of the data protection process to take 
into account the data environment is the release on the Internet of search queries by 
AOL in 2006 (see footnote 2). These were pseudonymised, yet people were clearly 
identifiable via common sense inference, such as if someone persistently searches for 
the name of a non-famous individual, it is likely to be that person himself. We will 
                                                          
27 Statistical linkage refers to a process that classifies pairs of records across different datasets as 
matched (deemed to correspond to the same population unit) or not matched (deemed not to 
correspond to the same population unit). 
28 These options are obviously suggested by the DPA’s definition of personal data, although the DPA 
refers only to the data controller we are talking here about anyone who has the data.  
  
be coming back to the notion of the data environment later but for a full discussion 
see (Mackey and Elliot 2013; Elliot and Mackey 2014). 
2.2 Types of anonymisation 
The term ‘anonymisation’ gets used in a variety of different ways and inevitable 
communication difficulties arise as a consequence. Elliot et al (2015) have identified 
four different usages: 
1. Formal Anonymisation 
2. Guaranteed Anonymisation 
3. Statistical Anonymisation 
4. Functional Anonymisation 
2.2.1 Formal anonymisation  
For data to be formally anonymised simply requires that direct identifiers (sometimes 
called formal identifiers) have been removed from the dataset or masked in some way. 
Direct identifiers come in five forms: 
1. Intentional Unique Identifiers: These are serial numbers that have been 
created with the explicit intention of identifying a person and for linking 
transactions. They are often used in multiple contexts and usually are associated 
with a person across his or her lifespan. Examples are UK National Insurance 
Numbers and US Social Security Numbers. 
2. Digitised Unique Biometrics: These are codifications of unique, or statistically 
very likely unique, characteristics of individuals, to be used intentionally as 
identifiers. Their use can be intrusive, and – because they are hard to disavow – 
are often used in security contexts. Examples include fingerprints, iris scans, gait 
recognition systems, DNA and handwritten signatures. 
3. Associational Unique Identifiers: These occur where some object which itself 
has a unique identifier is (strongly) associated with a person. Examples are a 
telephone number (particularly a mobile phone number), credit card number, 
static IP address or car registration number. They are invariably non-permanent 
but can exist for a while. General Unique Identifiers or GUIDs, which are used by 
Windows OS to identify software components and indeed users, and which in 
some cases can be semi-permanent, also fall into this category.  
4. Transactional Unique Identifiers: These are numbers which have been 
generated as part of some transactional process. They are not necessarily 
permanent. Examples are sessional cookies and dynamic IP addresses.  
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5. Functional Unique Identifiers (FUIs): This category is a borderline one. 
Technically, they are a form of indirect identifier. However, what distinguishes 
them is that they map onto the first part of the definition of personal data (‘can be 
recognised from these data’). The most straightforward example of an FUI is full 
name and address. FUIs will almost always be constructed out of more than one 
piece of information. They will also usually include the possibility of data twins 
(it might be that there are two people called ‘John Henry Smith’ living at address 
X), but these will be rare enough that we can treat FUIs as if they are unique.  
2.2.2 Guaranteed anonymisation 
For anonymisation to be guaranteed and irreversible there must in effect be zero risk 
of an individual being identified within a dataset given whatever assumptions one 
wishes to underpin the guarantee. This is the meaning of anonymisation that is 
usually employed within the security engineering literature (Ohm 2010; Dwork et al 
2006) and in particular through the theory of differential privacy, which aims to 
provide a privacy guarantee using algorithms that make very specific (and invariably 
extreme) assumptions about what a data user might already know about the 
population represented in the data. 
Ohm (2010) asserts that one can have anonymised data or useful data but not both 
and if one regards anonymisation as an irreversible process then he is correct. It may 
not be immediately obvious that this is true. So you might think for example that 
heavily aggregated data are ‘irreversibly anonymised’. However, a theoretical 
intruder who has almost complete knowledge of the population from which the 
aggregated data were drawn but who lacks one piece of information about one 
particular individual could utilise what they already know to discover the piece of 
information that they are lacking (this is called a subtraction attack which we will 
discuss further in section 2.3.4). You might argue that this is a contrived situation 
and we would entirely agree. The point here is not to suggest this approach is 
sensible – it is not – but rather to illustrate how Ohm’s assertion is a logically 
necessary consequence of the notion that risk can be removed from the process. 
However, we would argue that anonymisation should not be considered from this 
absolute standpoint.29 
                                                          
29 The distinction we aim at here is analogous to the distinction in European civil contract law 
between the duty to achieve a specific result (obligation de résultat), and the duty to use one’s best 
efforts (obligation de moyens). If one has an obligation de résultat, then there is a specific state that one is 
 
  
Let us consider Ohm’s position further using a simple analogy: we can have secure 
houses or usable houses but not both. If we assume that by secure we mean absolutely 
secure, then this is true. An absolutely secure house would lack doors and windows 
and therefore be unusable,.30 But that does not mean that all actions to make one’s 
house more secure are pointless, and nor does it mean that proportional efforts to 
secure my house are not a good idea. The deadbolt on my door may not help if a 
burglar comes armed with a battering ram or simply smashes my living room 
window but that does not mean that my lock is useless, merely that it does not (and 
cannot) provide absolute security. 
And so it is with data. One has to balance data utility with re-identification risk, of 
which there will always be some. Fortunately, the DPA does not require 
anonymisation to remove risk entirely, but rather demands that those sharing or 
disseminating data mitigate the risk of re-identification until it is negligible (UK: 
Information Commissioner’s Office 2012a).  
The problem with guaranteed anonymisation is that in order to achieve it, one 
usually has to so restrict the data that it is often rendered useless (as Ohm points 
out). For example, as Sarathy and Muralidhar (2011) demonstrate, when differential 
privacy techniques are applied to an analysis server,31 the net effect is that 
meaningful queries to the differentially private database are no longer possible. This 
finding is unsurprising when one considers that plausible re-identification attacks 
and meaningful data analysis both require data that differentiates population units, 
which differential privacy is designed to prevent. This tension is present with all 
data-focused anonymisation processes and sadly guaranteed anonymisation also 
guarantees data with little or no utility. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
contracted to bring about. If one has an obligation de moyens, one is obliged only to use best practice 
and due care to achieve a goal. Ohm writes as if the data controller, while anonymising, is under an 
obligation de résultat to produce an irreversible state of anonymity of the data, while we argue that the 
data controller is under an obligation de moyens to understand the methods of anonymisation, and the 
properties and context of the data, in order to employ his or her best efforts to prevent re-
identifications from the data. 
30
 Artist Rachel Whiteread’s concrete cast of the complete interior of a house makes this point quite 
nicely: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/House_%28sculpture%29 [accessed 30/5/2016]. Of course, as a 
work of art, this had no need for utility! 
31 An analysis server is a data environment where users do not see the actual data but instead submit 
syntax for analyses which are then run and then the researchers are sent the output (possibly after 
checking). 
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So in general, guaranteed anonymisation is not practical if one wants to share useful 
data – there will always be some risk associated with that activity. Risk naturally 
suggests a statistical treatment and this brings us to the third type of anonymisation. 
2.2.3 Statistical anonymisation 
The notion of statistical anonymisation is tied into a technical field called statistical 
disclosure control (SDC)32 which we discuss in more detail below. The basic tenet of 
SDC is that it is impossible to reduce the probability of re-identification to zero, and 
so instead one needs to control or limit the risk of disclosure events.33 This brings the 
notion of anonymisation into line with other areas of business risk management. One 
accepts that our actions and choices, responsibilities and constraints are embedded 
in a complex world which is impossible to predict in detail so one gathers the best 
information one can and optimises one’s decisions to maximise the expected benefits 
and minimise the risks.  
One could argue that both formal and guaranteed anonymisation are simply special 
cases of statistical anonymisation. Formal anonymisation is a mechanism for 
reducing the probability of re-identification below unity and guaranteed 
anonymisation is a mechanism for reducing it to zero. However, someone who 
releases or shares data that relates to individuals should have two goals: (i) to 
release/share useful data and (ii) for those data to be in a form which protects 
confidentiality (and thereby privacy). It should be clear from the foregoing that 
formal anonymisation will fail to achieve goal (ii), while guaranteed anonymisation 
will fail to achieve goal (i). Statistical anonymisation recognises that there is a lot of 
ground in between these two extremes. 
                                                          
32 In the US, SDC is referred to as statistical disclosure limitation (SDL); the title ‘Statistical Disclosure 
Control’ is most commonly used in Europe. You will also see the term statistical confidentiality used 
but this tends to be used to mean ‘the set of processes by which statistical data are kept confidential’ 
and is therefore more general.  
33 It should be noted here that disclosure control researchers distinguish between identification and 
attribution processes in a disclosure. The former indicates that agent X has found person Y in some 
(supposedly anonymised) data, the latter indicates that agent X has learnt something new about 
person Y. These two processes often co-occur but need not. This is somewhat confusing because the 
two processes are conflated in data protection law; thus in the Anonymisation Code of Practice the UK 
Information Commissioner says ‘Note that “identified” does not necessarily mean “named”. It can be 
enough to be able to establish a reliable connection between a particular data and a known 
individual’ (p.21). 
  
At this point it is worth introducing a hybrid technique called k-anonymisation. In 
some ways this method is an attempt to take the best features of the guaranteed and 
statistical approaches and combine them in a single method (which also combines 
risk assessment and control). Essentially, k-anonymisation works by guaranteeing 
that for a given set of key variables (X) there exists no combination of values (Xj) for 
which there are fewer than k data units; k is defined by the entity carrying out the 
anonymisation. The general principle is that if a user knows fewer than k individuals 
with the attributes Xj then precise re-identification is prevented. We will have more 
to say on k-anonymisation (and its companion concepts) later.34  
2.2.4 Functional anonymisation 
Unfortunately, assessing disclosure risk even with the simplest of data is far from 
trivial. Indeed, a whole research community has built up around the topic with its 
own journals and conferences. Much of the work in this field has focused on the 
statistical properties of the data to be released/shared, primarily because this aspect 
of the disclosure risk problem is by far the most tractable. A great deal of headway 
has been made; sophisticated statistical models have been developed which have at 
least facilitated identification probability assessments anchored in the properties of 
the data.  
However, as several authors (e.g. Paass 1988; Elliot and Dale 1999; Mackey 2009; 
Mackey and Elliot 2013) have pointed out, despite the advances in statistical 
disclosure control we are at best basing our measurement on only some of the 
determinants of the risk. There is a range of other issues: 
1. The motivation of somebody wishing to attack anonymised data in order to 
re-identify somebody within it (this will affect what happens and how). 
2. What the consequences of a disclosure are (which will affect the motivations 
of an individual to attempt a re-identification). 
3. How a disclosure might happen without malicious intent (the issue of 
spontaneous identification).  
4. How the governance processes, data security and other infrastructure for 
managing data access affect the risk. 
5. The other data/knowledge that might be linked to the data in question 
(without which disclosure/identification is impossible if the data have 
undergone de-identification).  
                                                          
34 We refer a reader interested in the technical discussion to Samarati and Sweeney (1998) and 
Samarati (2001), the thorough critique by Domingo-Ferrer and Torra (2008) and the recent review in 
the context of privacy models by Domingo-Ferrer et al (2016). 
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6. Differences between the data in question and the other data/knowledge (often 
referred to as data divergence). 
Bringing these considerations into the framework of statistical anonymisation creates 
the fourth type: functional anonymisation. This addresses the contextual factors which 
Mackey and Elliot (2013) refer to collectively as the data environment. And it is these 
concepts that we will be explaining in the course of this book.  
Although we have presented functional anonymisation as a separate type it does in 
fact overlap with other types and specifically it still requires the technical know-how 
that characterises statistical anonymisation. We will return to functional 
anonymisation and the data environment in section 2.4 after introducing some of the 
complexities of statistical disclosure control in more detail. 
2.3 Anonymisation and statistical disclosure control 
Statistical disclosure control is a complex topic and it is not our intention here to 
attempt to give a full airing to all the possibilities and nuances. If you want to dig 
deeper we would recommend you read one of the recent field summaries 
(Willenborg and De Waal 2001, Duncan et al 2011 or Hundepool et al 2012). Here, we 
sketch the ideas that are most important and useful for the anonymisation 
practitioner. 
2.3.1 Building disclosure scenarios 
A key component of a well-formed SDC exercise is the development of disclosure 
scenarios to ground risk analysis, specifying the risks semi-formally. Put simply, 
until you know what could happen, you are stuck with only a vague idea that the 
data are risky, and quite apart from being a stressful state of affairs this does not get 
you anywhere in practical terms. 
Broadly speaking there are two types of disclosure risk: inadvertent disclosure and 
disclosure occurring through deliberate action. 
Inadvertent disclosure and spontaneous recognition 
A simple example will suffice to illustrate the notion of spontaneous recognition. 
Living next to me is a young married couple – very young in fact, both are sixteen. 
Unfortunately, the woman dies in childbirth leaving the man a 16-year-old widower 
with a baby.  
  
Putting aside the sadness of this story, we do not suppose we will get many 
naysayers if we assert a belief that this combination of a small number of 
characteristics is extremely rare. Why is that? Well, we all have an intuitive 
knowledge of the population, biased perhaps by our own circumstances but reliable 
enough to enable us to assert with confidence that 16-year-old widows are unusual, 
16 year old widowers are likely to be very rare and 16 year old widowers with a 
young child even more so. Might there be a good chance that my neighbour is the 
only one in the UK, or at least in my area?  
Now suppose that I am using a de-identified dataset and I come across a record of a 
sixteen year old widower with a young child who lives in my area. I might assume 
that it is my neighbour. This then is spontaneous recognition: the unmotivated 
identification of an individual in a dataset from personal knowledge of a small 
number of characteristics.  
Of course such judgements are subjective and subject to availability bias, 
overconfidence effects and other forms of cognitive bias. So claims to have found 
someone can easily be misjudgements. Let us look at the example a little more 
objectively. At the 2011 census there were seven 16-year-old widowers in the UK. So 
my neighbour is not unique but an example of a rare combination of attributes. 
However, if one added in the fact that this person has a young child and included 
any sort of geographical indicator then the probability of the data actually singling 
out my neighbour would be quite high. So, theoretically, the risk of inadvertent and 
accurate recognition is non-zero. 
However, bear in mind here that the presumption of this scenario is that the 
recognition is inadvertent, and the lack of any prior motivation substantially reduces 
the privacy risk for two reasons.  
Firstly, the example is not so much of me finding a needle in a haystack but just 
happening to sit on one. The dataset has to be configured in such a way that the 
unusual combination of characteristics that my neighbour has appears 
simultaneously in my software window as I am browsing the data. For a large 
dataset the likelihood of such an event will be pretty low. 
Secondly, having recognised my neighbour, what am I going to do? If I decide to act 
on my discovery then this is no longer simply a case of spontaneous recognition but 
a particular type of deliberate attack called fishing. If on the other hand I do nothing 
then this might be a ‘so what?’ situation, in which no harm befalls my neighbour, 
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with minimal privacy impact. The meaning of the recognition will partly depend on 
what the dataset is about; if it is a dataset of criminals or sufferers from sexually-
transmitted diseases then simply being in the data is sensitive and me finding my 
neighbour in there might matter a lot. On the other hand, if it is a random sample of 
some country’s population then maybe spontaneous recognition matters less.  
Other factors which will indicate whether one need be concerned with spontaneous 
recognition are the size of the dataset, whether the user has response knowledge and 
who the users are.  
Dataset size can have a counterintuitive effect. A smaller dataset effectively 
decreases the size of the haystack so it increases the likelihood of coming across 
someone (if they are in there). 
Response knowledge; we will talk about this in more detail shortly. But simply put 
if I know you are in the dataset then I am more likely to spot your combination of 
characteristics and more likely to assume that it is you if I do so. 
Who the users are; with open data the users are potentially the whole world and if it 
is high utility data then the actual user base might be very large. The larger the user 
base the more likely a spontaneous recognition event will be. In some data situations 
there might be a relationship between the user and the data subjects (for example an 
academic doing research on student data) and this can increase the risk. 
One data situation where all three of these factors can come into play is the in-house 
survey and in particular the staff satisfaction surveys that are now commonplace in 
all sectors. The datasets tend to be small and drawn from a particular population 
with which the users of the data (the organisation’s management) have a 
relationship. The users know that many (or even all) members of staff will be in the 
survey. In this type of data situation spontaneous recognition can be a serious 
possibility. 
Deliberate attacks and the data intruder 
In SDC, the agent who attacks the data is usually referred to as the data intruder.35 As 
soon as you consider such a character as a realistic possibility rather than a shady 
abstraction, several questions immediately arise such as who might they be and 
what might they be trying to achieve by their intrusion? Considering such questions 
                                                          
35 Other terms that are used are ‘the attacker’, ‘the data snooper’ and ‘the adversary’. These are 
synonymous. 
  
is an important first stage in the risk management process. Elliot and Dale (1999) 
have produced a system of scenario analysis that allows you to consider the 
questions of who, how and why. This method involves a system of classification 
which facilitates the conceptual analysis of attacks and enables you to generate a set 
of key variables that are likely to be available to the data intruder. We have further 
developed this system for the purposes of the Anonymisation Decision-Making 
Framework. The classification scheme is as follows: 
INPUTS 
o Motivation: What are the intruders trying to achieve? 
o Means: What resources (including other data) and skills do they have? 
o Opportunity: How do they access the data? 
o Target Variables: For a disclosure to be meaningful something has to be 
learned; this is related to the notion of sensitivity.  
o Goals achievable by other means? Is there a better way for the intruders to get 
what they want than attacking your dataset? 
o Effect of Data Divergence: All data contain errors/mismatches against reality. 
How will that affect the attack? 
INTERMEDIATE OUTPUTS (to be used in the risk analysis) 
o Attack Type: What is the technical aspect of statistical/computational method 
used to attack the data? 
o Key Variables: What information from other data resources is going to be 
brought to bear in the attack?  
FINAL OUTPUTS (the results of the risk analysis) 
o Likelihood of Attempt: Given the inputs, how likely is such an attack? 
o Likelihood of Success: If there is such an attack, how likely is it to succeed? 
o Consequences of Attempt: What happens next if they are successful (or not)? 
o Effect of Variations in the Data Situation:36 By changing the data situation 
can you affect the above? 
This approach in scoping the who, why and how of an attack owes as much to 
criminology as it does to technical risk analysis.  
                                                          
36 Recall that a data situation concerns the relationship between some data and their environment. We 
discuss this in more detail below. 
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In order to make sense of this scenario-classification scheme you need to understand 
a set of basic concepts: key variables, data divergence, and response knowledge. We 
will go through each of these in turn explaining how they fit into the scenario 
classification scheme as we go. 
Key variables  
The pivotal element in the scenario analysis is the identification of the key variables.  
These are essential for the intruder to achieve re-identification and allow association 
of an identity with some target information. Key variables are those for which 
auxiliary information on the data subjects is available to the data intruder and which 
provide a ‘hook’ into the target dataset, allowing individuals to be matched. See 
Figure 2.1 for a schematic view of how this works. Ideally, from the intruder’s point 
of view, the coding method of a key variable must be the same on both the attack 
and target datasets, or the two must at least be harmonisable. 
Essentially, there are four sources of auxiliary information: (i) datasets containing the 
same information for the same (or sufficiently similar) population, (ii) information 
that is publicly available (e.g. in public registers or on social media), (iii) information 
obtained from local knowledge (e.g. house details obtained via an estate agent or by 
physical observation), and (iv) information obtained through personal knowledge 
(e.g. things I know about my neighbours or work colleagues). 
There is obviously a terminological overlap between the notion of a key variable and 
that of an indirect identifier. The distinction is that a key variable is specific to a 
particular scenario (for example a particular combination of datasets) whereas the 
term indirect identifier is focused on the dataset itself and which variables could be 
used as identifiers in any scenario. So in effect the set of indirect identifiers is the set 
of all possible key variables across all possible scenarios. But – and this is critical – 
one would very rarely (if ever) encounter a situation where one considered all 
potential indirect identifiers simultaneously as most scenarios will only involve a 
subset – the key variables for that scenario.37 
                                                          
37 We note that the k-anonymity literature uses the term quasi-identifiers to refer to both key variables 
and indirect identifiers which in our experience does sometimes lead to some confused thinking by 
practitioners; so the terminological separation is not just a matter of semantics. 
  
Figure 2.1: An illustration of the key variable matching process leading to disclosure. From Duncan et 
al (2011). 
Data divergence  
Another critical point in the scenario framework is consideration of data divergence. 
All datasets contain errors and inaccuracies. Respondents do not always supply 
correct data. Interviewers make mistakes in recording. Data coders transcribe 
incorrectly. Data items are missing. Missing or inconsistent values may be imputed 
using methods with no guarantee of accuracy. Data may be months or possibly years 
old before they are disseminated and characteristics will have changed since the data 
were generated. This is true of the target dataset as well as the auxiliary information 
held by an intruder. The combination of these will introduce the possibility of error 
into any linkage.  
Collectively, we refer to these sources of ‘noise’ in the data as data divergence. The 
term refers to two situation types (i) data-data divergence, or differences between 
datasets, and (ii) data-world divergence, differences between datasets and the world. In 
general, both types can be assumed to reduce the success rate of matching attempts. 
However, where two datasets diverge from the world in the same way, which we 
call parallel divergence, then the probability of correct matching is unaffected. This 
would be the case, for example, if a respondent has lied consistently or when two 
datasets both have out-of-date but identical data. 
Taking data divergence into account in a coherent way is complicated and it tends to 
mean that orthodox risk measures overestimate the risk (given the scenario). Elliot 
and Dale (1998) estimated that the effect in their particular study was to reduce the 
number of correct unique matches by as much as two thirds. This is one reason why 
it can be important to carry out intruder tests as well as data analytical risk 
assessments.  
 
 
Name Address Sex DOB .. 
Income .. .. Sex Age .. 
The identification file 
The target file 
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Notwithstanding the above remarks, a paradox of data divergence is that it is not a 
reliable protection of confidentiality. Firstly, for any particular individual-record 
pair there may be no divergence at all. Secondly, analysts are getting increasingly 
sophisticated in dealing with linkage in the face of ‘fuzziness’ – when we talk 
through the process of doing a penetration test in chapter 3 you will see that we 
attempt to tackle that issue.  
So the best way to think about data divergence is that it provides you with a little 
extra protection – a margin of error rather like the reserve in a car’s petrol tank – it is 
good as back up but not to be relied on.  
Response knowledge 
At its simplest level the issue of response knowledge can be captured by a single 
question: ‘Do you know I am in the data?’ If the answer to that is ‘yes’ then you are 
said to have response knowledge of me in respect of those data.38 In that case, one 
key element of uncertainty, whether the person is even in the data at all, is removed. 
In practice, response knowledge can occur in one of two ways: 
1. The intruder knows that (a) the data correspond to a population and (b) the 
target is a member of that population.  
2. The intruder has ad hoc knowledge about a particular individual’s presence 
in the data (e.g. my neighbour told me that she had been surveyed).39 
The second is relatively simple to understand and is particularly pertinent to an 
open data situation. The first is more complex as 1(b) can be nuanced. Consider a 
hypothetical anonymised dataset of the members of the Bognor Regis Bicycle Club. 
Straightforwardly, I could know that my target is in the club and therefore in the 
dataset. That is clear cut response knowledge but I could have other information 
about you which falls short of full response knowledge but is nevertheless 
                                                          
38 Of course you might be wrong – perhaps the information which tells you I am in the data is out of 
data or misattributed. Technically, response knowledge should be called something like ‘beliefs about 
particular population units’ presence in a particular dataset’ but it is not a very reader friendly 
formulation. This is part of a more general issue of data divergence and applies even to direct 
identifiers (I might think I know your name and address but I could be mistaken). We will discuss 
this general issue in more detail shortly.  
39 Another theoretical possibility is that the intruder has inside knowledge of the data collection 
process. This would imply a complex security breach involving a situation where the intruder did not 
gain access to the raw data but did have access to an anonymised version of the data. Although this 
should not be discounted it is obviously quite obscure and the key problem here is the security 
breach, not the anonymisation problem.  
  
informative. I could know that you live or work in Bognor Regis or that you are an 
avid cyclist or perhaps that you are a compulsive club-joiner. All of these constrain 
the super-population that contains the Bognor Regis Bicycle Club population and that 
in turn increases the effective sample fraction.40 As we will see in chapter 3 the 
sample fraction is an important element of the risk. 
2.3.2 Uniqueness 
The example above brings us to uniqueness, one of the fundamental concepts in 
disclosure risk assessment, which underpins much of the research on disclosure risk 
analysis. A record is unique on a set of key variables if no other record shares its 
combination of values for those variables. 
For disclosure risk purposes we need to examine two types of uniqueness on a set of 
key variables: population uniqueness—a unit is unique in the population (or within 
a population data file such as a census); and sample uniqueness—a sample unit is 
unique within the sample file.  
A simple example – using just two variables – should clarify the relationship. 
Imagine that there are twenty people living in a village and we have some data on 
their ages and sexes as shown in Table 2.2. Now if you peruse the table you will see 
that there are two people who have a unique combination of characteristics in the 
data, Jeffrey Magnolia and Jessica Black. Now imagine that we take a 50% random 
sample of this population. One possible sample is shown in Table 2.3; we have also 
de-identified this sample by replacing the name with a sample ID.  
If you peruse this table you will see that we have 4 records that are unique in the 
sample; the ones with sample IDs 3, 5, 9 and 10. Only one of these (number 10, the 
one corresponding to Jeffrey Magnolia) is actually unique in the population. The 
other sample uniques have statistical twins in the population – units sharing the same 
attributes. So, for example, we cannot tell whether record 9 corresponds to Jane 
Azure or Julia Beige. Jessica Black who is unique in the population is not in the 
sample. 
 
 
                                                          
40 The sampling fraction is the proportion of a population to be included in a sample. It is equal to the 
sample size divided by the population size. 
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Name 
Age 
group Sex 
Johnny Blue 0-16 Male 
Jenny Blue 0-16 Female 
Sarah White 0-16 Female 
Sam Brown 0-16 Male 
Julia Black 0-16 Female 
James Green 17-35 Male 
Peter Grey 17-35 Male 
Jemima Indigo 17-35 Female 
Jim Blue 17-35 Male 
Joshua White 17-35 Male 
Joan White 17-35 Female 
 Jill Brown 17-35 Female 
James Brown 36-64 Male 
Jessica Black 36-64 Female 
Joe Orange 36-64 Male 
John Black 36-64 Male 
Jacqui Purple 65+ Female 
Julie Beige 65+ Female 
Jane Azure 65+ Female 
Jeffrey Magnolia 65+ Male 
Table 2.2 Ages and sexes of all people living in ‘Anyvillage’ 
Sample ID  
Age 
group Sex 
1 0-16 Male 
2 0-16 Male 
3 0-16 Female 
4 17-35 Male 
5 17-35 Female 
6 17-35 Male 
7 36-64 Male 
8 36-64 Male 
9 65+ Female 
10 65+ Male 
Table 2.3 Ages and sexes of a 50% sample of the people living in Anyvillage 
In one form or another, these two concepts – sample and population uniqueness –
form the basis of many of the disclosure risk assessment methods for microdata (files 
of records about individuals). If a unit is population unique then disclosure will 
occur if an intruder knows it is population unique. Much of the methodology in this 
area concerns whether sample information can be used to make inferences about 
population uniqueness.  
  
The simplest inference is that given the sample file, if a record is not unique in the 
sample file it cannot be unique in the population, while a record that is unique in the 
population will be unique in the sample if it appears at all. This will not get the 
intruder very far but as we will see later not all sample uniques are the same. 
2.3.3 Attribution and identification 
Technically, statistical disclosure can occur through one of two distinct processes: re-
identification and attribution. Re-identification (or identity disclosure) is the process of 
attaching an identity to some data. Attribution (or attribute disclosure) is the process 
whereby some piece of information is associated with a population unit.  
The two processes can sound very similar but the distinction is quite important in 
terms of how disclosure risk is assessed for different types of data. In essence, 
identification means we find a person; attribution means we learn something new 
about them. Although the two processes often occur simultaneously, they can in fact 
occur separately.  
Formally, a disclosure happens when an attribution is made, not when a re-
identification happens. Accurate re-identification typically (but not always) leads to 
attributions, but attributions can happen without re-identification. For example, if I 
know that one of five of the records in a dataset corresponds to you and all of those 
records are of bank managers then I now know you are a bank manager even though 
I have not associated your identity with a particular record. 
In the UK, the ICO has made it clear that reliable attribution does count as re-
identification in their interpretation of the DPA: 
Note that ‘identified’ does not necessarily mean ‘named’. It can be enough to be 
able to establish a reliable connection between particular data and a known 
individual. UK: Information Commissioner’s Office (2012a p 21). 
This might seem a little confusing, but, in the above example, if I have learnt that 
you are a bank manager then in effect the datum ‘is a bank manager’ has been 
associated with you, and confidentiality has been breached. I may not know which 
of the five records are yours and therefore I cannot name the record that belongs to 
you. However, I do not necessarily need to be able to do that in order to find out 
something about you from the data.  
We will look at the mechanism for this in a little more detail in a moment. For now 
the key takeaway message is that any form of statistical disclosure counts as re-
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identification from the point of view of the DPA. So making your data non-
disclosive (in the context of its environment) will ensure that your processing is 
compliant with the DPA. 
2.3.4 Types of attack 
Re-identification attacks through linkage 
Re-identification through linkage is the canonical form of disclosure risk. The 
presupposition is that a data intruder has access to some information which contains 
formal identifiers for population units and a set of key variables which are also 
present on the target dataset. The key variables are then used to link the identifiers 
to the target information —in principle, this could be any information not already 
known to the data intruder but in practice, in the scenario framework, we assume 
that the information has some value in terms of their goal. This is shown 
schematically in Figure 2.1. 
Formal risk assessment for microdata41 releases usually requires us to understand 
the probability of the data intruder being able to make such linkages correctly.  
Attribution attacks 
Consider the tables of counts shown in Table 2.4. Suppose the population 
represented in this table is everyone at a workshop I am attending. Over drinks, I 
overhear someone saying that they earned over two million pounds in the last 
quarter. Now I can infer that person is a lawyer. This is positive attribution — the 
association of the attribute ‘is a lawyer’ with a particular person. Conversely, if I 
hear somebody talking about their students, I can infer that they do not have a high 
income. This is a negative attribution — the disassociation of a particular value for a 
variable from a particular population unit.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41 Datasets of records of individual population units. 
  
 
 
Occupation 
Annual income  
 
Total 
High Medium Low 
>250K pa 40-250K pa <40K pa 
Academics 0 100 50 150 
Lawyers 100 50 5 155 
Total 100 150 55 305 
Table 2.4: Table of counts of income levels for two professions from hypothetical population. From 
Duncan et al (2011). 
Note that, in effect, association and disassociation are different forms of the same 
process, attribution arising from zeroes in the dataset. The point to note is that the 
presence of a (non-structural)42 zero in the internal cells of a table is potentially 
disclosive.  
Subtraction attacks 
Now consider Table 2.5. The population in this table differs from that in Table 2.4 in 
one respect—we have one highly paid academic. Given this table, I can no longer 
make the inferences that I could from Table 2.4 (at least not with certainty). 
However, what about myself? I am a member of the population represented in the 
table and we can assume that I know my own occupation and income! Suppose that 
I am a highly-paid academic. Given this extra piece of knowledge, I can subtract 1 
from the high income academic cell in the table, which then reverts to Table 2.4 and I 
am back to the situation where I can make disclosive inferences from overheard 
partial information about particular individuals. 
 
 
Occupation 
Annual income  
 
Total 
High Medium Low 
>250K pa 40-250K pa <40K pa 
Academics 1 100 50 151 
Lawyers 100 50 5 155 
Total 101 150 55 306 
Table 2.5 Table of counts of income levels for two professions from hypothetical population. From 
Duncan et al (2011). 
                                                          
42 A structural zero occurs when a combination of attributes is impossible. For example, the number of 
three year old married people would, in the UK, produce a structural zero because of UK law. Non-
structural zeroes appear where there are possible combinations of attributes which happen not to be 
instantiated. So there might happen to be no sixteen year old married people in Anyvillage in my data 
but the existence of such a person is possible. 
 34 
 
We can extrapolate further. Consider a situation where I have complete information 
(in terms of the two variables contained in Table 2.5) about multiple individuals 
within the population. In effect such information represents a table of counts of the 
subpopulation of the individuals for whom I have complete knowledge. On the 
assumption that identification information is available for both that subpopulation 
and for any additional information I gain through overheard conversations (or other 
sources of data), I can subtract the whole of that table from the population table 
before proceeding. In principle, this could lead to more zeroes appearing in the 
residual table. The ‘low-paid lawyers’ cell would be particularly vulnerable to 
further subtraction and this illustrates a further crucial point: whilst zero counts are 
inherently disclosive, low counts also represent heightened disclosure risk, because 
they make it easier to obtain sufficient information external to the aggregate table to 
enable subtraction to zero than high cell counts. 
Inference attacks 
Beyond the subtraction to zeroes there is another sense in which low cell counts 
constitute a risk. Consider again Table 2.5. Now recall that it is not possible, without 
external information about the population represented in the table, to make 
inferences about any given individual with certainty. However, imagine again that I 
overhear someone at the workshop boasting about their high income. Whilst I 
cannot say with certainty that this individual is a lawyer, I can say so with a high 
degree of confidence. From the table, the conditional probability that a randomly 
selected person is a lawyer given that they are a higher earner is greater than 0.99. 
This is inference – the capability of a user of some data to infer at high degrees of 
confidence (short of complete certainty) that a particular piece of information is 
associated with a particular population unit. Such inferential capacity could also in 
principle be derived from statistical models and other statistical output.  
Depending on circumstances, this inferential knowledge may be good enough to 
meet the data intruder’s goals. Deciding in any categorical sense what level of 
certainty of inference constitutes a problem is impossible. The best approach for 
dealing with this issue is to understand whether an inference at a particular level 
would be a success for the intruder and then whether that inference would cause 
harm to a data subject. This reiterates the necessity of well-formed disclosure 
scenarios. 
  
Differencing attacks 
A difference attack is possible with variables for which there are multiple different 
plausible coding schemes for a variable, where the categories in those coding 
schemes are not nested but instead overlap. This situation may occur where there are 
separate requests for tables or maps with different codings potentially allowing 
more information to be revealed about those in the overlaps than intended from a 
single table. Although it could happen with any variable the issue most commonly 
comes up with Geography.  
The end result of this is that whilst a table may be considered safe in isolation, this 
may not be the case for multiple tables when overlain with one another. 
Complex attacks 
The attacks mentioned above are the simple ones. There are more complex 
operations that a sophisticated intruder can try, often with lurid names that can 
confuse and befuddle: table linkage, mashing attacks, fishing attacks,43 reverse fishing 
attacks and so forth. It is outside the scope of this book to go into the details of these 
but suffice it to say that all of these involve bringing together multiple data sources. 
In practice if one covers the simple attacks then the complex ones also become more 
difficult to execute. However, you must also bear in mind that if you release multiple 
data products from the same personal data source into the same environment then 
you will be increasing the risk and you therefore need to proceed with caution. One 
way in which this comes up is where both microdata samples and aggregate whole 
population counts are released from the same underlying dataset. This is a common 
practice with censuses. To give a simple illustration, let us return to our hypothetical 
sample dataset in table 2.3 and add another variable, ‘has cancer’, to it (see Table 2.6 
below). Now if I know a person who is Male and 65+ who lives in Anyvillage then I 
might suspect that it is case 10, but it is a 50% sample so I cannot be sure that my 
acquaintance is even in the data. 
However, suppose that the data controller also publishes the Table 2.7 on its web 
site. On its own, the table looks fairly innocuous – but by combining this with the 
microdata to which the data controller has allowed me access I am able to ascertain 
                                                          
43 Fishing attacks should not be confused with Phishing. Phishing is fraudulently obtaining personal 
authentication information (usually passwords) by pretending to be a third party (often a bank). A 
fishing attack on the other hand is the identification of an unusual record in a dataset and then 
attempting to find the corresponding entity in the world. 
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that my acquaintance has cancer. This example is obviously quite simplistic. With 
real data situations the interactions between different data products drawn from the 
same data source can be more subtle. To reiterate the take home message here: be 
very careful if you are considering releasing multiple data products from the same 
data source. 
Sample 
ID  
Age 
group Sex 
Has 
cancer 
1 0-16 Male No 
2 0-16 Male No 
3 0-16 Female No 
4 17-35 Male No 
5 17-35 Female No 
6 17-35 Male Yes 
7 36-64 Male No 
8 36-64 Male No 
9 65+ Female No 
10 65+ Male Yes 
Table 2.6: Hypothetical 50% microdata sample of the people living in Anyvillage 
  
Sex 
Age group 
0-16 17-35 36-64 65+ Total 
Female 3 3 1 3 10 
Male 2 4 3 1 10 
Total 5 7 4 4 20 
Table 2.7: Crosstabulation of people living in Anyvillage by age group and sex. 
2.3.5 Types of formal disclosure risk assessment 
Broadly speaking there are two types of disclosure risk assessment: Data Analytical 
Risk Assessment and penetration testing. The two approaches have complementary 
advantages and disadvantages. 
Data Analytical Risk Assessment (DARA) 
This is sometimes referred to as statistical disclosure risk assessment. It covers a 
large range of techniques from the very simple (counting uniques or identifying 
small cells) to more complex ones involving constructing statistical or computational 
models.44 What they have in common is that they take the dataset in question as an 
                                                          
44 We will not go into the details of the modelling approaches here and would refer the interested 
reader to Hundepool et al (2012) for a recent technical review.  
  
analytical object, treating disclosiveness as a property of the data and attempting to 
identify the level of that property latent in the data.  
Done well, DARA should be grounded in scenario analysis. However, even with this 
in place, there are several disconnects between the analysis and what would happen 
in a real attack; most importantly no external data are involved in DARA. Having 
said that, if the analyst is mindful that (no matter how sophisticated the techniques) 
they are only producing proxy measures for the real risk then DARA can be very 
informative.  
In chapter 2 we will run through one approach that you can take to DARA. 
Penetration tests 
Another way of assessing disclosure risk, detailed in two of our case studies, is what 
we refer to as penetration testing (also known as intruder testing). The idea of 
penetration testing is to replicate what a plausible motivated intruder might do (and 
the resources they might have) to execute a re-identification and/or disclosure attack 
on your data. 
The ICO have characterised what they refer to as a ‘motivated intruder’ as someone 
who is relatively competent, who has access to external data resources such as the 
internet and public documents, and is willing actively to make enquires to uncover 
information. They are not assumed to have specialist knowledge or advanced 
computer skills, or to resort to criminality. You can of course use a different set of 
assumptions about the type of knowledge skills and resources that an intruder has if 
to do so makes sense within your own scenarios. 
There are essentially four stages to a penetration test: (i) data gathering; (ii) data 
preparation and harmonisation; (iii) the attack itself; and (iv) verification. The first 
stage tends to be the most resource-intensive whereas (ii) and (iii) require the most 
expertise. We go into these in more detail in chapter 2. 
There are three core advantages of intruder testing as a risk assessment method 
compared to DARA approaches: 
1. It mimics more precisely what a motivated intruder could do. 
2. It will explicitly take account of data divergence. 
3. It is based on real data gathering and real external data. 
In other words it is grounded. Against this, it has one important disadvantage: it will 
be tied very tightly to one particular exercise and therefore does not necessarily 
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represent all of the things that could happen. This disadvantage is the flip-side of its 
advantages and indeed is an issue with all testing regimes: one trades off 
groundedness against generality and so in practice one should combine data 
analytical techniques with intruder testing rather than relying solely on either one.  
2.4 Functional anonymisation and the data situation 
The foregoing discussion should suffice to illustrate that anonymisation is a complex 
topic with many different components and that simply considering one aspect in 
isolation could lead to difficulties, and a non-functional solution.  
Functional anonymisation considers the whole of the data situation, i.e. both the data 
and their data environment. When we protect confidentiality we are in essence 
hoping to ensure that anonymised data remains anonymous once it is shared or 
released within or into a new data environment and therefore functional 
anonymisation has to consider all relevant aspects of this situation.  
We need to address the disclosure problem in this way because it is meaningless to 
attempt to assess whether data are anonymised without knowing what other 
information is or could be co-present. As we have seen, this is explicit in the 
definition of personal data in law and yet practitioners often attempt to judge 
whether data are personal or not using absolute criteria (the non-relative properties 
of the data themselves). This is based in part on the misapprehension that 
anonymisation can be absolute without mangling the data so badly that it has no 
utility whatever and in part on being overly focused on the data themselves. If 
anonymisation is to be a useful tool for data and risk management, one has to 
specify its circumstances. Thus the only sensible response to the question ‘are these 
personal data?’ is another question: ‘in what context?’ or more specifically ‘in what 
data environment?’ 
How, then, might we formalise the notion of a data environment to allow such 
questions to be answered? Formally, we posit that a data environment is made up of 
four components: data, agency, governance processes and infrastructure. 
1. Data: What (other) data exist in the data environment?45 How do they overlap 
with or connect to the data in question? This is what we need to know in 
                                                          
45 Amongst all the challenges that anonymisation brings this question is probably the one that causes 
those who are responsible for it the most stress and lost sleep. At best, any answer to the question will 
be partial. The inexorable increase of the quantity of data ‘out there’ means this is necessarily so. 
However, it is important to keep this in perspective. Firstly, for nearly forty years data controllers 
 
  
order to identify what data (key variables) are risky, and can be used for 
statistically matching one dataset with another thereby improving the 
conditions for statistical disclosure.  
2. Agency: We consider agents as capable of acting on and in the data 
environment. It may seem like an obvious point but it is one worth 
emphasising – there is no risk of a data confidentiality breach without human 
action or misdeed.46  
3. Governance processes: We use the term here broadly to mean how users’ 
relationships with the data are managed. This includes formal governance 
(e.g. laws, data access controls, licensing arrangements and policies which 
prescribe and proscribe user behaviour) through de facto norms and practices 
to users’ pre-dispositions (e.g. risk aversion, prior tendency towards 
disclosure, etc.). 
4. Infrastructure: We use this term to consider how infrastructure and wider 
social and economic structures shape the data environment. Infrastructure can 
be best thought of as the set of interconnecting structures (physical, technical) 
and processes (organisational, managerial, contractual, legal) that frame and 
shape the data environment. Infrastructure includes information systems, 
storage systems, data security systems, authentication systems and platforms 
for data exchange.  
A straightforward example of a data environment that can be described using all of 
these features is a secure data centre. It has data, data providers, a user community 
and context-specific physical, technical, organisational, and managerial structures 
that determine what data goes in, how data is stored, processed, risk-assessed and 
managed, the format in which data comes out, who the user community is, and how 
it can interact with those data. Data environments can of course be looser in form 
than a secure controlled data centre. An environment might be defined by regulation 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
have been releasing data that has been through anonymisation processes, resulting in only a small 
number of problems, almost all caused by very poor anonymisation decision making. Secondly, there 
are some simple things that you can do which will mean that you move beyond simple guesswork 
and that will put you firmly in the best practice camp. We will discuss these further in chapter 3, 
component 6. 
46 The development of AI and machine learning may soon make this categorical statement less certain. 
However, the question about when and whether non-human entities may count as agents in the sense 
that we employ here (and indeed more generally be included in humanity’s moral universe) is clearly 
outside the scope of this book, and takes us to the heights (or depths) of philosophy. For the present, 
if we only concern ourselves with human agency, we will not be missing any pressing practical 
issues.  
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and licensing that allows (specific) users access to data under a licence agreement 
which stipulates what can and cannot be done with them. Such an environment 
cannot be as tightly controlled as the secure data centre environment, but it does 
allow for some control which is not present when, for example, data are published 
on the internet.  
Environments exist inside other environments. The secure setting might sit within a 
bigger organisational data environment and the organisation in turn exists within 
the global environment. One of the aims of governance and security infrastructure is 
to prevent data leaking into or from these larger environments. A high level of 
confidence in security implies that correspondingly less attention needs to be given 
to the wider environment when considering risk. Obviously if you are publishing 
data openly then you will not have that luxury. 
Now that you have an understanding of what a data environment consists of and 
might look like, you can begin to think about the notion of environment in relation 
to your own data products and how you might want to share and or release them. 
This brings us the concept of a data situation, a term intended to capture the idea of 
the relationship between data and their environment. What we are really interested 
in is in helping you to describe and understand your own data situation(s).  
Data situations can be static or dynamic. In static data situations, the data 
environment is fixed, whereas in dynamic data situations it is subject to change. Any 
process of sharing or releasing data creates a dynamic data situation, as does a de 
facto change in the data’s current environment (for example the relaxation or 
tightening of security processes). Once the share or release is complete then the 
environment fixes again and the data situation may revert to being static.47 
By mapping the data flow from the point at which data are collected to the point 
after which they are shared or released you will be able to define the parameters of 
your data situation.  
                                                          
47 Data situations can be static and dynamic, but we should also consider that data themselves can be 
static and dynamic too. Dynamic data are data that are being constantly updated through a data 
stream and a data stream is one type of dynamic data situation. The key point here is that in a 
dynamic data situation the data are moving relative to their environment. Dynamic data create a de 
facto dynamic data situation but so does the movement of static data. 
  
So to reiterate, functional anonymisation is a process which controls disclosure risk 
by considering the totality of a data situation. We discuss this as a practical concept 
in chapter 3. For a deeper discussion of the theory see Elliot et al (2015).  
2.5 Anonymisation solutions 
In this section we review the various options you have to reduce the risk of 
disclosure from your data down to a negligible level; in other words to carry out 
functional anonymisation. These options fall into two groups, those focused on the 
data and those focused on the data environment. Normally you will need both. 
Before we move on to discuss the solutions in detail, we first want to discuss the 
unavoidable trade-offs that you will need to make as part of your anonymisation 
process.  
2.5.1 Risk-utility and other trade-offs 
Because anonymisation is about producing safe, usable data, we need to understand 
the trade-off between the two. Often the information that makes data risky is what 
makes it of interest to bona fide analysts. However, that is not always the case and as 
we will see in chapter 3, one of the important parts of functional anonymisation is 
considering the use case. Why are you sharing or disseminating these data and what 
information is necessary to achieve that end?  
Let us look at the example of the release of microdata from the 2001 UK census. A 
survey of users and publications identified that the highly-detailed industry variable 
in the 1991 census microdata had been used only occasionally whereas the less 
detailed ethnicity variable was heavily in demand, with users wanting more detail. 
In 2001 the industry variable was reduced massively in detail and the ethnicity 
variable was increased from 10 to 16 categories. The net effect was a reduction in 
measurable disclosure risk (as the reduction in risk arising from the loss of detail on 
the industry variable outweighed the increased risk arising from the increased detail 
on the ethnicity variable) but an increase in effective utility (as many users benefited 
from the increase in detail on ethnicity and fewer suffered from the loss of detail on 
industry). Things rarely work out that neatly and available resources may restrict 
one’s capacity to carry out anything as extensive as the user survey in this example 
but nevertheless carrying out a data user needs analysis is an important component 
of all anonymisation processing. 
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A second important trade-off is a three-way balancing of data environment risk (risk 
associated with issues like security, the number of users, governance, etc.), 
disclosiveness (the properties of the data, given the environment, which make it 
possible or not to re-identify somebody) and the sensitivity of the data. As is 
hopefully clear by now, total risk in a data situation is a function of all three of these 
so that if one increases then the others must be decreased to compensate (if one is to 
maintain risk at the same functional level). So, for example, if you are comparing a 
dataset containing mundane information with a second containing sensitive health 
information, then the environmental and disclosure controls on the latter should, all 
things being equal, be stronger than on the former. Or if one is thinking of releasing 
a dataset that was previously only available under special licence as open data, then 
one must increase the disclosure control applied to the data and/or decrease the 
sensitivity of the data (by, for example, removing sensitive variables). 
This is just common sense but it does suggest a useful insight. In a dynamic data 
situation, if the data in the original environment are regarded as sufficiently safe 
(this will normally be so) and if overall risk, taking those three components into 
account, in the destination data situation is no higher than in the origin data 
situation, then the destination data situation can also be regarded as safe. This 
conceptualisation is called comparative data situation analysis and is particularly useful 
for data sharing. 
Comparative analysis can also be useful if a gold standard dataset exists which has 
been shared or released in a similar manner to your intended release or share 
without problems. One such gold standard dataset is census microdata, the record 
level datasets released from a population census, an example of which we discussed 
above. In the UK, samples of census microdata have been released under end user 
license since 1991. As part of the preparation work for these releases, extensive and 
detailed work on the disclosure control for these datasets is carried out for several 
years before and after each census. International experts are consulted. Rich and 
deep technical analyses are conducted. Penetration tests are carried out. To date, 
there have been no re-identification issues (that anyone is aware of). So, if one has a 
comparable data situation to that of the release under licence of these microdata, one 
has an available comparison to a tried and tested data situation and can glean insight 
from the intensive work that was done. If the risk levels in your data situation are no 
higher than that, then one can be reasonably confident that they are safe enough. 
  
2.5.2 Data-focused solutions 
Data-focused anonymisation solutions require that the data to be released or shared 
are altered in some way. Usually key variables are removed, obscured or 
aggregated. Sometimes the same thing is done to those target variables likely to 
tempt an intruder in order to reduce their sensitivity. We divide these solutions into 
two types of control: metadata-level controls (sometimes called ‘non-perturbative 
methods’ or ‘non-perturbative masking’) where the overall structure of the data is 
changed and data-distortion controls (sometimes called ‘perturbative methods’) where 
the data are changed at the level of individual values for individual cases. We will 
discuss each in turn. 
Metadata-level controls 
Controls at the metadata level work with the overall structure of the data. The key 
components of such controls are the sampling fraction, choice of variables, and the 
level of detail of those variables. In many ways these are the key tools for carrying 
out practical anonymisation; they are simple to understand and use, do not distort 
the data and are transparent in their effects. 
Sampling  
For surveys, the sample fraction is specified by the study design and so its choice 
often rests outside disclosure control. However for other forms of data there is some 
value in considering sampling. It cuts down the risk associated with response 
knowledge by creating uncertainty that a particular population unit is actually 
represented in the data, so increasing the probability of false positive matches. Even 
a 95% random sample creates uncertainty and hardly makes a dent in the analytical 
power of the data.48 
Impact on risk: Sampling is one of the most powerful tools in the toolbox. The key 
point is that it creates uncertainty that any given population unit is even in the data 
at all. 
                                                          
48 You might wonder what level of sampling fraction is sufficient to impact effectively on response 
knowledge. There is no absolute firm line, because it will partly depend on other elements in the data 
situation. However, we have never encountered a use of more than 95% samples and in some (more 
open) data situations the sampling faction would probably need to be under 50% in order to be 
effective. 
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Impact on utility: The impact of sampling is modest; essentially it will increase the 
variances of any estimates and reduce statistical power. However, if a user wants to 
analyse small sub-populations the sampling may reduce their capacity to do this. 
Choice of variables 
An obvious mechanism of disclosure control is excluding certain variables from the 
released dataset. The data controller can (i) reduce the number of key variables to 
which a plausible data intruder is likely to have access, or (ii) reduce the number of 
target variables. These choices flow naturally from the scenario analyses described in 
Section 2.3.1. With microdata, the choice is whether a variable appears in a dataset or 
not. With aggregate data, the choices are about which variables will be included in 
each table. For point-to-point data shares the variable selection will be driven by the 
requirements of the user although in practice these may be more negotiable than 
might initially be apparent.  
Impact on risk: The impact of variable selection on risk very much depends on the 
variables selected. If key variables are de-selected the re-identification risk will be 
reduced. The effect here is to reduce what Elliot and Dale (1999) call key power; the 
capacity of a set of key variables to discriminate between records and produce both 
sample and population uniques. If target variables are de-selected the sensitivity of 
the data is lessened and the potential impact of any breach reduced. 
Impact on utility: If a variable is critical to a user’s analytical requirements then de-
selecting that variable will obviously disable the analysis. With releases one is 
considering how widespread the use is likely to be and whether the goals of release 
can be met through a more modest variable selection. 
Level of detail 
Decisions over level of detail complement those over choice of variables. Here you 
should consider categories with small counts and determine whether merging them 
with other categories would significantly lower disclosure risk with minimal impact 
on the informational value of the data. Not surprisingly, many data users would like 
the maximum level of detail possible on every dataset. But some variables, especially 
geography and time, can be particularly problematic. Area of residence is a highly 
visible component of an individual’s identity, and so geographical detail is often 
constrained and data are released at coarser detail than users would like. Similarly, 
time-based variables, such as exact date of birth, can be straightforwardly 
identifying when combined with other variables. 
  
Impact on risk: The effect of changing the detail on variables is similar to that of de-
selecting variables. It is mainly a mechanism for reducing key power. If a variable 
has some categories that might be considered sensitive then sensitivity can be 
reduced by merging these with other categories. 
Impact on utility: The impact on utility is similar but more subtle than the impact of 
removing whole variables. Some variables can be more important than others. 
Purdam and Elliot (2007) carried out a survey of users to establish the impacts on 
their analyses of such measures. On most obvious aggregations there was some loss 
of utility, users reporting that the analysis that they had carried out on the data 
would no longer be possible. 
Distorting the data 
The main alternative to metadata controls are various forms of data distortion, 
which we call perturbation. These techniques manipulate the data in order to foil re-
identification/subtraction strategies so that an intruder cannot be certain that any 
match in a re-identification attack is correct or that any zero recovered through 
subtraction attack is a real zero. In this section, we will look at methods of 
perturbation that are commonly used for disclosure control.  
Data swapping  
Data swapping involves moving data between records in a microdata set. A 
particular form of this, often called ‘record swapping’, involves swapping the 
geographical codes of two records.  
Impact on risk: Data swapping like most data-focused controls increases 
uncertainty. However, as Elliot (2000) showed, the impact on general risk measures 
is quite modest. It comes into its own in situations where multiple data products are 
being released from a single data source. For example, a sample of microdata with 
coarse geography (level 1) and aggregate population tables of counts for fine 
geography (level 2) is a common set of census outputs. Modest data-swapping 
between level 2 areas within the level 1 areas means the microdata itself is 
unperturbed. However, the perturbation in the aggregate data will reduce the risk of 
subtraction attacks and make any attempt to link the fine geography. 
Impact on utility: Even done well, the impact on data utility can be significant and it 
will often affect relationships between variables in an arbitrary and unpredictable 
manner. For this reason, it is not used routinely in data situations where a single 
data product is involved.  
 46 
 
Overimputation  
Overimputation involves replacing real values with ones that have been generated 
through a model. In order for this to work without badly distorting the data, it may 
be necessary to allow the original values to be modelled back in. A critical decision 
when overimputing will be what you tell the user. There are numerous options. You 
can choose whether to tell them that the data has been overimputed, and if you do 
then you can also choose whether or not to tell them how many values have been 
imputed, the model that has been used to do that imputation or even the actual 
values that have been imputed. 
Overimputation can be attractive if you are already using imputation to deal with 
missing values. 
Impact on risk: It is difficult to generalise about the risk impact of overimputation as 
it depends on the mechanism that is used to decide on the new value, how 
transparent you are about what you have done and how much overimputation you 
have done. 
Impact on utility: This really depends on how good a model you have used to 
produce the over imputed values.  
Rounding  
Rounding is a technique most commonly used with tables of counts. In the simplest 
form all the counts are rounded to the nearest multiple of a base (often three, five, or 
ten). Counts which are a multiple of the base number remain unchanged. Normally, 
the margins are rounded according to the same method of the internal cells. 
Therefore, in many cases this method does not yield an additive table.49 
One method of de facto rounding which also has some presentational advantages is 
to release tables of percentages rather than actual counts. Take for example Table 2.8. 
Looking at this table, we immediately know that any black person living in Anytown 
earns less than £20 per hour. 
                                                          
49 An additive table is simply one where the row, column and grand totals are correct. When one 
rounds the values in a table that may well cease to be true. 
  
 
Table 2.8: A fictitious table of counts showing the pay per hour for residents of Anytown broken 
down by ethnic group. 
Compare this with table 2.9 which presents the same information expressed in terms 
of row percentages. There are two points here. First, we can no longer tell that the 
number of black people earning >£20 is zero. In fact the range of possible values here 
is anywhere up to 16. Second the impact of presenting the table this way is minimal, 
in terms of what might be considered the underlying message of the data about the 
wage differential. 
 
Table 2.9: A fictitious table of counts showing the banded pay per hour for residents of Anytown 
expressed as percentage of the total number of residents of 4 ethnic groups. 
Impact on risk: Rounding can be very effective in reducing risks when considering 
individual tables of counts. Smith and Elliot (2008) demonstrate this with data from 
the UK neighbourhood statistics. Care must be taken to consider the interactions 
between multiple outputs and particularly what you are doing about the issue of 
additivity and consistency between marginal totals in different tables. 
Impact on utility: For many purposes rounded frequencies are sufficient and using 
percentages as a form of rounding can be an even more digestible way of presenting 
information.  
Cell suppression  
Cell suppression is a statistical disclosure control technique that can be implemented 
in various forms whereby the data are only partially released. In one sense, releases 
of aggregate data are themselves primary examples of suppression, since they are 
Ethnic Group <8.00 8.00-9.99 10.00-14.99 15.00-20.00 >20.00 Total
White 10021 19981 49504 38769 1987 120262
Black 1012 876 466 381 0 2735
Asian 1115 1781 1465 1235 116 5712
Other 200 286 134 83 66 769
Total 12348 22924 51569 40468 2169 129478
Pay per hour (£ sterling)
Ethnic Group <8.00 8.00-9.99 10.00-14.99 15.00-20.00 >20.00 Total
White 8% 17% 41% 32% 2% 93%
Black 37% 32% 17% 14% 0% 2%
Asian 20% 31% 26% 22% 2% 4%
Other 26% 37% 17% 11% 9% 1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Pay per hour (£ sterling) - n=129478
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partial releases of the underlying microdata (or what is sometimes called ‘the full 
table’). If I release two one-way frequency tables, but not the combined table then I 
am, in effect, suppressing the cross-classification of those two variables. Cell 
suppression is effectively a more targeted form of this. 
Take Table 2.8 again. One alternative is to release Table 2.10 (where the Xs denote 
the suppressed cells). Note that we cannot simply suppress the disclosive cell (black, 
>20) as simple arithmetic would allow an intruder to recover it so we must also make 
what are called complementary suppressions. Another possible suppression pattern 
is shown in Table 2.11.  
 
 
Table 2.10: A fictitious table of counts showing the pay per hour for adult residents of Anytown 
broken down by ethnic group with cells suppressed in order to reduce disclosure risk. 
 
Table 2.11: A fictitious table of counts showing the pay per hour for adult residents of Anytown 
broken down by ethnic group with cells suppressed in order to reduce disclosure risk. 
A key point here is that in 2.10 both the users and the intruder can still make 
inferences about the contents of the suppressed cells. This is not the case in 2.11 
because the grand total is suppressed. On the other hand the grand total may well be 
a piece of information that is published elsewhere and if so it would be simple to 
unpick the suppressions. The only way to prevent that would be to ensure that the 
grand total is never published anywhere which may be both impractical and 
undesirable. For that reason, the pattern in Table 2.10 will generally be preferable. 
Ethnic Group <8.00 8.00-9.99 10.00-14.99 15.00-20.00 >20.00 Total
White 10021 19981 49504 38769 1987 120262
Black 1012 876 466 381 X X
Asian 1115 1781 1465 1235 116 5712
Other 200 286 134 83 66 769
Total 12348 22924 51569 40468 X X
Pay per hour (£ sterling)
  
Why do we say that we can still make inferences about the suppressed cells in Table 
2.10? Well, for each of the suppressed cells the value is bounded by the other 
information in the table. Put simply, for each cell there is a limited range of possible 
values – referred to as bounds. The bounds for Table 2.10 can be seen in Table 2.12.50  
 
Table 2.12: A fictitious table of counts showing the pay per hour for adult residents of Anytown 
broken down by ethnic group showing the bounds for the cells suppressed in Table 2.11. 
Impact on risk: Suppression can be effective in hiding disclosive cells. However you 
should be aware of the actual intervals that are being implicitly published. As with 
rounding, care also needs to be taken when releasing multiple tables as it may be 
possible to unpick the suppressions even if that is not possible when considering 
each table on its own.  
Impact on utility: Users tend to strongly dislike cell suppression. Working with 
tables with suppressed cells is harder work than say the same tables with rounded 
values. 
Value Suppression 
Suppression can also be used for microdata where particular variables can be 
suppressed for particular cases. For example if you had a 16 year old widower with a 
child on your dataset you might suppress the age on that case – mark it as missing 
data in effect. This is an alternative to, and arguably more transparent than, 
overimputation.  
K-anonymisation 
K-anonymisation was developed by Samrati and Sweeney (1998) and is a hybrid 
disclosure risk assessment and disclosure control technique. In essence, it defines a 
measure of safe data: 
                                                          
50 The example shown here is relatively straightforward. However, precise bounds calculations can be 
quite complicated. See Dobra and Fienberg (2000, 2001) and Smith and Elliot (2008) for a discussion of 
the methods required do this.  
Ethnic Group <8.00 8.00-9.99 10.00-14.99 15.00-20.00 >20.00 Total
White 10021 19981 49504 38769 1987 120262
Black 1012 876 466 315 - 381 0 - 66 2735
Asian 1115 1781 1465 1235 116 5712
Other 200 286 134 83 - 149 0 - 66 769
Total 12348 22924 51569 40468 2169 129478
Pay per hour (£ sterling)
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A dataset is regarded as k-anonymised if – on all sets of key variables – each 
combination of possible values of those variables has at least k records that 
have that combination of values.  
This is relatively easy to understand and to implement. There are available open 
software tools that can semi automate the process.51 However, its simplicity can be 
beguiling and the user should be aware that there is no method inherent to the k-
anonymity model for identifying either the ‘correct’ level of k or the combinations of 
the variables that should be considered. Both of these require an understanding of 
the data environment. Without such understanding, the context is not represented, 
and the sufficiency of the anonymisation can only be estimated from the properties 
of the data themselves, which as we have argued misses the point. It also implicitly 
assumes that either you have a population file or that the intruder has response 
knowledge (otherwise the k is simply a sample k which could be very misleading 
and may lead to over-aggregation52) and there is no easy way of adjusting the 
method to deviate from those assumptions. 
Another issue with k-anonymity is that it does not allow for attribution disclosure. 
So if a record shares key attributes with k-1 other data units, that may not help you if 
all k units share a value on some sensitive attribute. So in Table 2.13 we have k-
anonymised the combination of age and sex to k=3 (by in this case merging the 36-64 
and 65+ categories). Unfortunately, because all males in the 36+ group have cancer, I 
can still infer that any 36+ year old male has cancer.  
Person number 
Age 
group Sex Has cancer 
1 0-16 Male No 
2 0-16 Female No 
3 0-16 Female Yes 
4 0-16 Male No 
5 0-16 Female No 
6 0-16 Male Yes 
7 17-35 Male No 
8 17-35 Female Yes 
                                                          
51 See for example ARX http://arx.deidentifier.org/downloads/ (accessed 19/3/2016) or μ-ARGUS 
http://neon.vb.cbs.nl/casc/..%5Ccasc%5Cmu.htm (accessed 19/3/2016) 
52 The degree of aggregation required to achieve the desired level of k will become more severe as the 
number of data units decreases. So if one is only focused on the data (and not the underlying 
population) then a sample dataset would be more heavily aggregated than the equivalent population 
dataset which is clearly counterintuitive unless you are assuming response knowledge. 
  
Person number 
Age 
group Sex Has cancer 
9 17-35 Male No 
10 17-35 Male Yes 
11 17-35 Female No 
12 17-35 Female No 
13 36+ Male Yes 
14 36+ Female No 
15 36+ Female No 
16 36+ Male Yes 
17 36+ Female No 
18 36+ Female Yes 
19 36+ Female No 
20 36+ Male Yes 
Table 2.13 Hypothetical population microdata for the people living in Anyvillage 
To deal with this problem the concept of l-diversity was introduced which imposes a 
further constraint where each equivalence class (group of data units sharing the 
same attributes) must have multiple values on any variable that is defined as 
sensitive (or in our terms a target variable). Unlike k-anonymity there are various 
different definitions of l-diversity. The simplest is that there has to be at least l 
different values for each sensitive variable within each equivalence class on the key 
variables. 
But it too can lead to counterintuitive outcomes. So in Table 2.14 we have achieved l-
diversity of 2 but arguably this is a more problematic table rather than less partly 
because we now know more precisely the type of cancer that the 65+ men have, and 
partly because that is true for anyone who we happen to know has cancer but do not 
know which type. 
Person number 
Age 
group Sex Cancer type 
1 0-16 Male N/A 
2 0-16 Female N/A 
3 0-16 Female Leukaemia 
4 0-16 Male N/A 
5 0-16 Female N/A 
6 0-16 Male Bone Marrow 
7 17-35 Male N/A 
8 17-35 Female Breast 
9 17-35 Male N/A 
10 17-35 Male Leukaemia 
11 17-35 Female N/A 
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Person number 
Age 
group Sex Cancer type 
12 17-35 Female N/A 
13 36+ Male Liver 
14 36+ Female N/A 
15 36+ Female N/A 
16 36+ Male Prostate 
17 36+ Female N/A 
18 36+ Female Breast 
19 36+ Female N/A 
20 36+ Male Prostate 
Table 2.14 Hypothetical population microdata for the people living in Anyvillage 
To deal with this and other problems with l-diversity a third notion, t-closeness, has 
been introduced. This states that the distribution-sensitive variables within each 
equivalence class should be no further than the threshold t from the distribution 
across the whole dataset.  
It would be reasonable to say at this stage that we have moved some distance away 
from the neat and simple idea of k-anonymity. Even if you are using a software 
package to do the heavy lifting for you, you are still going to need to understand 
what k, l, and t actually mean for your data and how this relates to what the intruder 
might be able to do. The risk here is that you make arbitrary decisions led by the 
privacy model rather than the data situation. We are not averse to the use of privacy 
models. If used carefully with full awareness of the meaning of the data, k-
anonymity and its companion concepts can be useful tools in some data situations. 
However, they are not magic bullets, being neither necessary nor sufficient.  
2.5.3 Environment-based solutions 
Environment-based solutions essentially control data users’ interactions with the 
data in some way to reduce the degrees of freedom of one or more (and usually all 
four) of the elements of the data environment (other data, agents, governance 
processes and infrastructure). The key point to remember is that one cannot make a 
judgement about whether data are anonymised or not without reference to their 
environment. The implication of this is that by the operation of environmental 
controls one can anonymise the data just as effectively as through controls on the 
data themselves. 
Following Duncan et al (2011), environmental controls can be broadly characterized 
as answering ‘who’, ‘what’, and ‘where and how’ questions: 
  
o Who has access to the data? 
o What analyses may or may not be conducted? 
o Where is the data access/analysis to be carried out and how is access 
obtained? 
These questions are interrelated – a decision about one has implications for the 
others. We will consider each in turn. 
Who can have access? 
The ‘who’ question is essentially all about agent control. In crude quantitative terms 
the risk level of 10 people accessing your data is considerably smaller than if you 
open it up to 10,000. Beyond the simple additive effect of more people contributing 
some quantum of risk there is the additional effect that opening up access 
necessarily implies more relaxed governance. With 10 people it is possible to think 
about vetting procedures, but vetting 10,000 will inevitably be less sensitive and 
more routine.  
This raises the question of how the data controller identifies those classed as ‘safe 
people’; is there a method that establishes those individuals or organisations that the 
data controller should trust and those that he or she should not? At a high level, 
organisations or individuals with a track record of good practice in data security and 
stewardship may be given greater data access rights than those without. Often, 
restricted access conditions stipulate that users must have specified credentials to get 
access to data. Here are some criteria by which a data controller might assess a 
potential data user. 
1. Whether he/she is associated with some organisation that can assure 
compliance with the data controller’s data access requirements.  
2. If the proposed use is for research then the researcher is able to demonstrate 
the ability to do research of scientific merit.53 
3. Whether he/she has undergone some sort of ‘safe user’ training. In the UK a 
consortium of research data centres has recently developed nationally-based 
training for the certification of researchers. Attendance at this training and 
passing a subsequent test is a requirement for data access.54 
                                                          
53 It may not seem immediately obvious why this is in the list. However, remember that we are in the 
game of risk management and there has to be some benefit to counterbalance the risk. Sharing data 
(and therefore taking a risk) for a piece of work with no value would not meet this requirement.  
54 The UK Statistics and Registration Services Act (2007) defines the notion of the ‘approved 
researcher’ and approved projects which – as implemented – covers much of this ground. Similarly, 
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As in all anonymisation matters the key is proportionality. The degree to which agent 
controls should be applied will be related to the disclosiveness and sensitivity of the 
data and inversely to the degree of other environmental controls. 
What analysis is permitted? 
Governance control can constrain the projects that can be undertaken with the data. 
This may be in the form of categorically prohibiting certain types of analysis or may 
require a project approvals process. For example, the UK Administrative Data 
Research Network55 has a formal project approvals panel. Potential users of the 
service have to convince the panel that the project has scientific merit, is feasible, will 
have public benefit and have a negligible impact on privacy. 
A related restriction is controlling the output. In a strongly controlled environment, 
some sort of output control is usually necessary. The intuition here is that if the data 
themselves are disclosive (in an open environment) then analytical outputs will also 
have the potential to be disclosive. Outputs are after all simply a form of data and so, 
as we will discuss in chapter 2, the publication of the results of analyses (which is 
usually what is intended) creates a dynamic data situation.  
In all output checking, what is in essence being checked is whether it would be 
possible to recover (some of) the underlying data from the output. As a simple 
example, with risky tabular frequency data one typically would not permit 
unrestricted requests of multivariate tables of counts,56 since a sequence of such 
requests can be used to recover the original data. So, if a user were to request such 
cross-tabulations then the request would have to be denied. However, the problem 
goes beyond this situation. For example, using any regression model in combination 
with residual plots, it is possible to recover some of the original data used to 
generate the model. At this point, developing valid output checking processes that 
could be automated is an open research question. Therefore, output needs to be 
checked manually by data centre staff with some expertise.57  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
data resources such as the UK’s ADRN (see below) invariably have policies covering issues such as 
accredited users, feasibility of projects, breaches policy and procedures etc. See for example, 
https://adrn.ac.uk/using-the-network/documentation.  
55 www.adrn.ac.uk [accessed 30/5/16] 
56 These are cross-tabulations of two or more variables.  
57 Recently, progress has been made with automating at least some of the functionality of output 
checking (see for example Thompson et al (2013) and O’Keefe et al (2013)). However, it would be fair 
 
  
One way to reduce the burden on the output checkers, used by, for example, ONS’s 
virtual microdata laboratory58 is to define a very conservative class of outputs as 
‘safe’ and then leave it to the user to demonstrate that anything not on the list is also 
safe. 
Where and how can access be obtained? 
In many ways the where and how questions are the key drivers in determining the 
type of environment that you are working in. There are four modes of access that are 
currently used for disseminating data for use outside of organisational boundaries: 
1. Open access 
2. Delivered access 
3. On-site safe settings 
4. Virtual access 
Open access 
Open access (or what can be called unrestricted access) has always been used for 
publishing some census tabulations and headline administrative data. An instance of 
free access is the UK’s Neighbourhood Statistics Service (NSS).59 Neighbourhood 
Statistics are intended as public use data. NSS imposes no restrictions on who can 
access the data, or on what they can do with them. Also, there is usually no 
monitoring of users or what they are doing. Another mechanism by which data can 
become open is a freedom of information request. These requests are in effect a 
request to make the data open and web sites – such as My Society’s 
www.whatdotheyknow.com – ensure that FOI requests are published. 
Until 25 years ago, the dissemination medium of such data was paper-based, usually 
in the form of thick volumes of tables. However, web delivery is now far more 
common, and this has opened up datasets for much wider use. In the UK there is 
significant pressure arising from both demand and government policy to make more 
government data available openly. This has led to the development of the Open 
Government Licence60 by The National Archives. This licence specifically does not 
apply to personal data/information. The point of this is to underline that open data 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to say that this is work in progress and by no means does it give full coverage of all possible types of 
output. 
58 See Office for National Statistics (2016) for more detail. 
59The UK's Neighbourhood Statistics Service http://www.data4nr.net (accessed 22/5/15) provides local 
area indicators derived from administrative records of multiple government agencies. 
60 See National Archive (2016) 
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environments are really only appropriate to data that are either apersonal or have 
been through an extremely robust anonymisation process that ensures with a very 
high degree of confidence that no individual could be re-identified and no statistical 
disclosure could happen. 
Delivered access 
Delivered access is a more restricted form of access, in which access to the data is 
applied for and the data are delivered to the user, most commonly through an 
Internet portal or possibly via encrypted email. The former is common in cases 
where delivery is potentially to a community of many users (the UK Data Archive61 
is an example of this). The latter is perhaps more common where the data situation is 
a single site-to-site share. It is important not to forget that the transfer medium is 
itself an environment, and that therefore one needs to model potential media as data 
environments as well in order to decide the appropriate means of transfer. 
Usually, as in the example of the Data Archive, the process of applying for a copy of 
the data requires the user to specify what they are to be used for and invariably he or 
she is required to agree to specified conditions on a licence for data access. We 
discuss such licences below. 
On-site safe settings 
On-site safe settings are regarded as the strongest form of restricted access, usually 
including a high level of security infrastructure control. The data user applies for 
access to the data in a particular location — often in the offices of the data controller 
or otherwise at a research data centre (RDC) that has been established by the data 
controller.62 Often, the users are required to analyse the data on a dedicated 
standalone computer and are restricted in the software that they may use. There are 
also often numerous governance controls in place. For example the user may:  
1. Not be permitted to take in data transport devices such as USB drives or 
mobile phones.  
2. Not be allowed to copy down anything that appears on the screen. 
3. Be required to log in and out of the facility. 
4. Only attend at pre-booked days and times. 
                                                          
61 http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/ (accessed 30/5/16). 
62 Examples are the Administrative Data Research Centres in the UK (www.adrn.ac.uk), the US 
Federal Statistical Research Data Centres (http://www.census.gov/about/adrm/fsrdc/locations.html) 
and the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal Employment Agency 
(http://fdz.iab.de/en.aspx). 
  
5. Be required to sign a user agreement stipulating that they will adhere to 
conditions of access such as those specified in (1)-(4) above and undertake not 
to attempt to identify any individuals from a de-identified dataset.  
The user will be allowed to take away some analytical output, but only after it has 
been checked by output checkers for disclosiveness.  
On-site safe settings may be considered as less than ideal by researchers because 
(1) travel to one of these sites is expensive, (2) the facility is only open at certain 
hours, (3) computing facilities may be unfamiliar or inadequate, (4) Internet access 
may not be available, and (5) it requires users to work in unfamiliar surroundings. 
However it is worth remembering that such arrangements facilitate research on 
vitally important but sensitive topic areas that might not be possible in other types of 
settings. 
An alternative approach (used for example by the ONS Longitudinal Study)63 is that 
the researcher submits the syntax for their analysis software to a dedicated unit 
which – if it approves it – then runs it. However, this rather awkward approach is 
being superseded by virtual access systems.  
Virtual access 
Virtual access is now widely regarded as the future of research data access. It 
combines many of the advantages of the physical safe setting with much of the 
flexibility of having a copy of the data on one’s desktop.64 There are two variants on 
the virtual access theme: direct access and analysis servers.  
Direct virtual access uses virtual remote network-type interfaces to allow users to 
view, interrogate, manipulate and analyse the data as if it was on their own machine. 
There are two critical differences between direct virtual access and delivered access. 
Firstly, output is typically checked in the same manner as in an on-site safe setting. 
Secondly, there is still no possibility of a user directly linking the accessed dataset to 
another dataset (because dataset uploads are not possible) and this restricts the 
number and type of disclosure scenarios that the data controller needs to consider.  
                                                          
63
 See Office for National Statistics (2016b).  
64 An intermediate hybrid approach is where safe rooms or ‘pods’ are installed at user institutions as a 
semi controlled medium for virtual access. So the user will have to go to the local safe room, but this 
will involve minimal travel and is therefore less restrictive than an on-site lab. This is being explored 
as a method for allowing researchers to have access to administrative data within the UK. 
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Analysis servers go one step further in not allowing direct access to a dataset while 
allowing the user to interrogate it. In such systems data can be analysed but not 
viewed. Usually, there is a mechanism for delivering the analysis (for example 
through uploading syntax files for common statistical packages or, occasionally, 
through a bespoke interface). The analysis server will return the results of the 
request for analysis, usually after they have been checked for disclosiveness. From 
the data controller’s viewpoint, the advantages over direct virtual access are twofold: 
(i) because the user cannot see the data the risk of spontaneous recognition of a data 
unit is all but removed, and (ii) there is no risk of the screen being seen by somebody 
who is not licensed to use the data. The disadvantage from the user’s point of view is 
that it is more difficult to explore the data.65  
Licensing 
Another governance control tool a data controller has is licensing, often used in 
conjunction with other restricted access mechanisms. Licences can be used as a pro 
forma to be signed by a set of users or in a bespoke data sharing agreement for site-
to-site shares. Some common themes in such licensing agreements are: 
1. Specification of those permitted access (agent controls). 
2. Data security requirements (infrastructure controls). 
3. Restrictions on use, particularly prohibition against linking with other files 
and on deliberate re-identification (other data and governance controls). 
4. Requirement to destroy the data once the use is complete (governance controls). 
The function of licensing is threefold: 
1. It clearly distinguishes between those individuals or organisations the data 
controller trusts and those that it does not.  
2. It is a framework for specifying the conditions under which access can occur.  
3. It can specify sanctions or penalties should the individual/organisation 
transgress on those access conditions. 
It is possible to have licensing at graded levels, with different users having access to 
data with different levels of disclosure risk (and therefore presumably different 
levels of data utility). In the UK, the ONS currently makes a distinction between 
public, research and special licence levels of access. In such a regime, an 
inexperienced researcher might be subject to stricter conditions than a professor of 
                                                          
65 For a useful discussion of the different types of virtual access systems and why a data controller 
might choose one over another see O’Keefe et al (2014).  
  
long standing. So, as a general mechanism for the dissemination of data for research 
purposes it might be criticized on fairness grounds. 
By including some infrastructure and governance controls the licence allows the data 
controller to maintain some control over the security of the data and can also 
provide guidance to the data user regarding good practice. If the data are being 
provided to the user at their site then various physical and computer security 
conditions might be required. Here is an example of a set of requirements that might 
be included in a licence for a single site-to site-share: 
1. Data must be stored in a dedicated secure data lab. 
2. There must be an independent locking system (unmastered) to the data 
storage area. 
3. There must be extra security at all possible primary and secondary points of 
entry, extra locks on doors, bars on windows, etc. 
4. Data must be stored on a standalone machine.  
5. Multiple passwords are required to access the data.  
6. Devices such as external disc drives/USB ports must be disabled.  
7. Output must not be removed from the data lab and must be destroyed when 
finished with. 
8. Entry to the data lab must be limited to particular staff. 
9. Log books must be kept of access. 
As well as providing actual security, imposing such conditions may also be intended 
to change the mind-set of the user, who will hopefully react to them by being more 
security-aware. The flip side of this is that these conditions may place awkward 
obstacles in the researcher’s usual research method.  
Another type of commonly employed licence condition asks the user to agree to 
restrictions on what they can do with the data – in particular, not linking it with 
other datasets that contain direct identifiers. 
Function 3 of the licensing process involves the sanctions that can be applied to users 
or their organisations for non-compliance with the licence conditions. In order to 
serve as deterrents for non-compliance, they must be enforceable. Typical sanctions 
are fines and removal of the right to access the data. For example, from the Statistics 
Canada Research Data Centres Program: ‘Researchers whose projects are approved 
will be subject to a security check before being sworn in under the Statistics Act as 
“deemed employees.” Deemed employees are subject to all the conditions and 
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penalties of regular Statistics Canada employees, including fines and/or 
imprisonment for breach of confidentiality.’; Statistics Canada (2015). 
The threat of sanctions will be taken most seriously if the data user or their 
organisation is subject to a security audit by the data controller. While an audit can 
be costly to both the data controller and the user, a licence without such a stipulation 
may not be taken seriously. 
Overall, licensing can be a useful way to decrease disclosure risks for certain uses of 
a disclosive dataset by researchers, especially when explicit or implicit sanctions can 
be invoked. Although it is commonplace for users to have to sign access agreements 
for routine data access requirements, beyond giving the user cause for reflection at 
the point of access there is little or no enforceability in such agreements. The 
question of whether agreements that are not directly enforceable have real impact is 
of course a major question in many areas of society. Answers will vary depending on 
history, social context, existence of informal controls, etc.  
Summary 
Environment-based controls do provide the potential to reduce the risk of disclosure 
significantly, possibly more so than can be achieved for the same utility impact by 
manipulating the data themselves. All of these controls affect at least one of the four 
elements of the environment (other data, agents, governance processes and 
infrastructure) and ultimately disrupt the ability of a (malevolent) user to connect 
identification data to anonymised data. 
2.6 Why ethics is an important issue in 
Anonymisation  
It is not always immediately obvious why ethical considerations have a role to play 
in the process of anonymisation. Most readers will understand that the processing of 
personal data is an ethical issue but once data are anonymised are our ethical 
obligations not dealt with? This is an understandable confusion which arises in part 
from a conflation of legal and ethical constraints. Legally, functional anonymisation 
is sufficient but this might not be true ethically. There two primary reasons why we 
need to consider ethics beyond the law: 
1. Data subjects might not want data about them being re-used in general, by 
specific third parties or for particular purposes. 
2. We are not dealing with zero risk.  
  
Before discussing this further, we will place a caveat on what we are about to say. 
The ethics of privacy, data sharing and data protection are hugely contested and this 
element of the framework is necessarily the most subjective and pre-theoretical. The 
reader may well have a different view about what is important, particularly about 
the thorny issue of consent. However we believe the ideas that we present here are 
consistent with the general approach we are taking and provide a practical method 
for incorporating ethical thinking into anonymisation decision making. 
There is growing evidence that data subjects are concerned not just about what 
happens with their personal data but also about the anonymised data derived from 
their personal data.  
On this point Iain Bourne from the ICO notes:  
We do hear – for example from telecoms companies – that customers are increasingly 
objecting to their data being used for x y and z even in an anonymised form – and I don’t 
think they draw a personal data/non-personal data distinction and why should they? I 
predict that this form of consumer objection will become much more of an issue. (Bourne 
2015). 
There may be many reasons why data subjects object to the reuse of their data. For 
example I might be unhappy about my data – even anonymised – being reused by a 
particular type of organisation (perhaps an extreme political group, arms 
manufacturer or tobacco company). Perhaps I do not want my data to be reused to 
make a profit for someone else, or I may be simply unhappy that I have not been 
asked. 
For example, O’Keefe and Connolly note the possibility of moral objections to 
particular re-use:  
The use of an individual’s health data for research can be viewed as participation by that 
individual in the research. An individual may have an objection to the purpose of the 
research on moral grounds even when there is no risk of identification or personal 
consequences. (2010: 539). 
Or data subjects may object to a data reuse on the grounds that it serves a perceived 
narrow (self) interest or because it has no clear benefit for them or the wider public. 
For example the Wellcome Trust (2016) state:  
Overall, the research showed that most people were extremely wary of insurance and 
marketing companies using anonymised health data. These companies were seen to be 
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acting against the interests of individuals, motivated by their own private interests with 
little or no public benefit. (2016:2). 
Or an objection to data reuse might simply arise because the data subject gave their 
data for one purpose and you have used it for a different purpose. 
In short, there are numerous reasons why data subjects might object to their data 
being reused. This brings us to the thorny issue of consent. In principle consent is a 
straightforward idea. You ask the data subjects ‘can I do X with your data?’ and they 
say yes or no. However, in practice the situation is much more complicated than this. 
Firstly, consent is layered. Secondly, the notion of consent is interlaced with the 
notion of awareness. This produces what we refer to as a scale of information 
autonomy. Consider the following questions: 
1. Are the data subjects aware that their data have been collected in the first 
place? 
2. Have the data subjects consented to the collection of their data? 
3. Were the data subjects completely free to give consent to the collection of their 
data or have they agreed to collection because they want something (a good 
or service) and are required to hand over some data in order to obtain it? 
4. Are the data subjects aware of the original use of their data? 
5. Have the data subjects consented to the original use of their data? 
6. Have the data subjects consented in general to the sharing of an anonymised 
version for of their data? 
7. Are the data subjects aware of the specific organisations that you are sharing 
their anonymised data with? 
8. Have they consented to your sharing their data with those organisations? 
9. Are the data subjects aware of the particular use to which their anonymised 
data are being put? 
10. Have they consented to those uses? 
The more ‘no’s that you receive from the above list, the less autonomy the data 
subjects have. What does this mean in practice? Put simply, as the data subjects 
become less autonomous the less able are they to take responsibility for what 
happens to their data and therefore the greater your own responsibility. We shall see 
how this plays out in your anonymisation process in component 5 in the next 
chapter. 
Of course the astute reader will have noted that not all (and possibly none) of the 
questions have straight yes or no answers. Awareness is a nuanced concept. For 
  
example, take question 1; I might be generally aware that I am being caught on 
CCTV every day but not know about every (or even any) specific instance of that. Or 
I might be aware that I have been caught but not know what happens to the film 
next and so on. Similarly I may have de facto consented to a particular piece of data 
processing but not have understood what I have consented to. Am I, in fact not even 
aware that I have consented? So awareness and consent interact.  
What does this complex autonomy soup actually mean? You might be expecting us 
to say at this point that you should be seeking informed consent if at all possible but 
we are not going to do that. Given the current state of the information society this is 
both impractical and undesirable. Obtaining consent of any sort is complex. 
Obtaining real informed consent would – just as a starting point – require re-
educating the whole populace and even then giving consent for every piece of 
processing for every piece of data is not something that most, if not all, people are 
going to engage with consistently (if you have never ticked the box to agree to T&Cs 
on a web site without having first read them, please get in touch with us as we 
would like to know what that is like). This is not to say that well thought out consent 
processes do not have their place – they most certainly do – but they are not a 
panacea. 
Ok so what is the point here? It is simply this: if you pose the questions above and 
the answers are mostly in the negative then your data situation is more sensitive. 
The notion of a sensitive data situation is key here; it is a connecting concept which 
enables clearer thinking about ethics and the reuse of (anonymised) data. We will 
come on to what you need to do about sensitive data situations shortly but is there 
anything else that heightens sensitivity? 
Beyond explicit consent, the question of whether a particular share or release 
conforms to the data subjects’ reasonable expectations is also important. 
Nissenbaum’s (2004, 2010) description of privacy is useful here. She describes 
privacy not as a right to secrecy nor as a right to control ‘but a right to appropriate 
flow of personal information’ (2010:127). To help tease out the appropriate flow, and 
what your stakeholders expectations may be, we draw (loosely) on Nissenbaum’s 
concept of contextual integrity. Contextual integrity is a philosophical approach for 
understanding privacy expectations in relation to the flow of personal information 
and can usefully be applied to shed light on why some flows of personal data cause 
moral outrages. This approach uses the notion of context, roles and data (to be 
transmitted) as a framing tool for evaluating whether a flow of data is likely to be 
considered within or outside of (i.e. violating) expectations.  
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We argue that the principles of the concept ‘contextual integrity’ can usefully be 
applied to the flow of anonymised data for the purpose of helping practitioners to 
make well thought out and ethically sound decisions about how they reuse data.  
To untangle this complex notion for practical use you will need to think about the 
terms of roles and relationship between you and the proposed receiver of your 
anonymised data, and the purpose of the share/release. The complexity of the 
questions you will have to ask yourself will depend on the complexity of your data 
situation. But here is how they might look for a simple site-to-site share of data:  
1. Do you (the sending organisation) have a relationship with the data subjects?  
2. Does the receiving organisation have a relationship with the data subjects?  
3. Do you and the receiving organisation work in different sectors?  
4. Is your organisation’s area of work one where trust is operationally important 
(e.g. health or education)?  
5. Is there an actual or likely perceived imbalance of benefit arising from the 
proposed share or release?  
Here the more questions you answer yes to, the more sensitive your data situation is. 
Finally, the data themselves can have properties that make the data situation more 
or less sensitive. Three questions capture the main points here: 
1. Are some of the variables sensitive?66  
2. Are the data about a vulnerable population? A vulnerable group is one where 
its members lack capacity (partial or full) to make informed decisions on their 
own behalf. Examples of vulnerable groups include children, adults with 
mental impairments or subpopulations constructed out of a category that 
would itself be considered sensitive – for example a minority ethnic group or 
AIDS sufferers. 
3. Are the data about a sensitive topic? The topic area might be considered 
sensitive rather than, or as well as, the variables within the anonymised 
dataset because, for example, it involves particular public interest issues, or 
ethically challenging issues.  
                                                          
66 The UK Data Protection Act (1998) identifies the following as sensitive: (a) The racial or ethnic 
origin of the data subject, (b) Their political opinions, (c) Their religious beliefs or other beliefs of a 
similar nature, (d) Whether they are a member of a trade union, (e) Their physical or mental health or 
conditions, (f) Their sexual life, (g) The commission or alleged commission by them of any offence, or 
(h) any proceedings for any offence committed or alleged to have been committed by him, the 
disposal of such proceedings or the sentence of any court in such proceedings. This list is widely 
regarded as being insufficient and out of date; financial information is, for example, absent. A simple 
litmus test is: would a reasonable person regard these data as sensitive? 
  
Again here, the more questions you answer yes to, the more sensitive your data 
situation.  
So we have three components of data situation sensitivity: consent, expectations and 
data. These components interrelate. So trust questions (expectation sensitivity) will 
be more significant where the data are about a vulnerable population (data 
sensitivity).  
Underlying this notion of sensitivity is one of potential harm. The notion of harm is 
commonly measured in quantitative/economic terms such as financial loss but it is 
also recognised that it can be felt in subjective ways such as loss of trust, 
embarrassment or loss of dignity. Harm might also occur at the individual, 
organisation or societal level. The latter two might arise because of knock-on 
consequences of a reuse of data that violates expectations (whether it is formally a 
privacy breach or not) and leads, for example, to the shutdown of data access and 
societal benefit not accruing because people become less likely to respond to 
surveys, provide accurate data etc. You should not underestimate harm at these 
levels – it means that all organisations who deal with data have a collective interest 
in everyone getting reuse right. 
Harm felt subjectively is recognised in law – e.g. Article 8 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights stipulates that everyone has the right to respect for his 
or her private and family life, home and correspondence. Article 12 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) goes even further: ‘No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to 
attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of 
the law against such interference or attacks.’ The concept of ‘a right to a private and 
family life’ encompasses the importance of personal dignity and autonomy and the 
interaction a person has with others, both in private and in public.  
Hopefully you can see how the notion of data situation sensitivity allows us to gain 
traction on the somewhat intangible notion of potential harm and that by asking 
yourself questions about consent, awareness, expectations and the data, you are able 
to formulate a practical understanding of the concept. In chapter 3, component 5 we 
will examine how it is possible to apply this in your own data situation. 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter we have introduced the key concepts that you need to understand the 
anonymisation decision-making framework. This has covered quite a breath-taking 
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range of topics from the law and ethics through to statistics and notions of risk and 
likelihood. This interdisciplinary collection of ideas, concepts and techniques forms 
the toolbox that you will need to use but hopefully, as you have worked through the 
chapter, you have picked up on the key take home message: anonymisation is a 
tractable problem.  
The key unifying concept underlying our approach is the data situation; the 
relationship between some data and its environment. Although this is in itself a 
complex concept, grasping it will enable you to understand the necessary 
components of any anonymisation decision making that you have to do. In the next 
chapter we will use these concepts working through the framework component by 
component. 
  
  
Chapter 3: The Anonymisation 
Decision-Making Framework  
3.0 Introduction 
In chapter 2 we described the core concepts that underlie the notion of 
anonymisation. We also established the need for structured guidance for 
anonymisation decision-making, to enable data custodians to make robust, 
principled decisions about the data they are responsible for. In this chapter, we 
describe the Anonymisation Decision-Making Framework (ADF), which meets this need.  
The ADF is made up of ten components, and we will describe each of these 
components in detail in this chapter:  
1. Describe your data situation  
2. Understand your legal responsibilities 
3. Know your data 
4. Understand the use case 
5. Meet your ethical obligations 
6. Identify the processes you will need to assess disclosure risk 
7. Identify the disclosure control processes that are relevant to your data 
situation 
8. Identify who your stakeholders are and plan how you will communicate 
9. Plan what happens next once you have shared or released the data 
10. Plan what you will do if things go wrong 
These ten components comprise three core anonymisation activities: 
o A data situation audit (components 1-5). This activity will help you to 
identify and frame those issues relevant to your data situation. You will 
encapsulate and systematically describe the data, what you are trying to do 
with them and the issues thereby raised. A well conducted data situation 
audit is the basis for the next core activity. 
o Risk analysis and control (components 6-7). Here you consider the technical 
processes that you will need to employ in order to both assess and manage 
the disclosure risk associated with your data situation.  
o Impact management (components 8-10). Here you consider the measures that 
should be in place before you share or release data to help you to 
communicate with key stakeholders, ensure that the risk associated with your 
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data remains negligible going forward, and work out what you should do in 
the event of an unintended disclosure or security breach.  
How you use the framework is likely to depend on your level of knowledge and 
skills as well as the role you play in your organisation. Some might use it for 
knowledge development purposes, to understand how a privacy breach might occur 
and its possible consequences, or to develop a sound understanding of the important 
issues in the anonymisation process. Others might use it directly to support their 
management of the risk of a privacy breach, to reduce it to a negligible level.  
Anonymisation is not an exact science and, even using the ADF at this level, you will 
not be able to avoid the need for complex judgement calls about when data is 
sufficiently anonymised given your data situation. The ADF will help you in making 
sound decisions based on best practice, but it is not an algorithm; it is an approach 
whose value depends on the extent of the knowledge and skills you bring to it. You 
may still need expert advice on some parts of the anonymisation process, 
particularly with the more technical risk analysis and control activity. However, 
even in such a situation the ADF can still be very useful; you and your expert will 
have more fruitful discussions, make quicker progress and will be more likely to 
produce a solution that works for you if you properly understand your data 
situation. Consider the ADF as a member of your team; it will not solve all your 
problems, but will provide graded support appropriate to your own level of 
expertise.  
A final point before we launch into describing the framework in detail: in all 
likelihood you will need to adapt the framework to suit your own needs. Whether 
you use the ADF to expand your knowledge or to support decision-making, it is 
important to recognise that it is not a simple check list that you can run through in a 
linear fashion and tick off as you go down the page. All the important considerations 
are there but you will need to think how they relate to and impact on each other. 
Some aspects may be more important than others for your data situation. Most 
importantly, in applying the framework you should keep clear in your mind that the 
objective is to disseminate safe useful data.  
3.1. The data situation audit 
 The data situation audit is essentially a framing tool for understanding the context 
of your data, and therefore to help scope the anonymisation process appropriately 
for you to share your data safely. It will help you to clarify the goals of the process 
  
and will enable the more technical aspects of the anonymisation process 
(components 6 and 7 of the ADF) to be planned and conducted more rigorously. 
Component 1: Describe your (intended) data situation 
In chapter 1 we introduced the term data situation to refer to the relationship between 
some data and their environment. So for example, your organisation itself will 
constitute an environment, whilst any proposed share or dissemination would 
constitute another environment. These environments will have different 
configurations of the same core features: people, other data, infrastructure and 
governance structures. 
Data situations can be static or dynamic. A static data situation is where there is no 
movement of data between environments; a dynamic data situation is where there is 
such movement. By definition all data shares or dissemination processes take place 
within dynamic data situations in which data are intentionally moved from one 
environment to another. A dynamic data situation might be relatively 
straightforward involving the movement of data from just one environment to 
another environment. Often though, it is more complex involving multiple 
environments.67 
At this stage we want to familiarise you with the idea of data moving between 
environments. Whilst data environments can be thought of as distinct contexts for 
data they are interconnected by the movement of data (and people) between them. 
As we have said previously, by mapping the data flow from the point at which data 
is collected to the point after which it is shared or released you will be able to define 
the parameters of your data situation. We will illustrate this idea further using two 
examples of data flows across environments. 
Data situation: simple share  
In the first example we look at the data flow across environments involving data that 
have been subject to anonymisation. 
Imagine that PubT (a franchised public transport provider) collects personal data 
from its customers relating to public transport usage. PubT plans to share an 
                                                          
67 Actually there are more variations in data situations than this distinction allows. We do not here 
consider issues arising from multi party computation for example. However for the purposes of 
exposition we will restrict ourselves to the relatively simple case of a unidirectional 
sharing/dissemination process. 
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anonymised version of the data with the Local Authority of Barsetshire which wants 
to use it to support (better) provision of public transport. PubT anonymises the data 
by removing the direct identifiers, i.e. the customers’ names and addresses, and by 
aggregating the detail on several key variables. However, it leaves some key 
variables – which are of particular interest to Barsetshire – unchanged. In this 
environment PubT is the data controller for this data because it determines the 
purposes for which, and the manner in which, the data are processed. Call this 
environment 1. 
Barsetshire signs a contract with PubT which (i) enables it to analyse the data (for a 
purpose other than that for which it was collected), (ii) proscribes it from sharing or 
releasing any part of the data without the prior agreement of PubT and from holding 
the data for longer than a specified time period and (iii) requires Barsetshire to keep 
the data securely and safely destroy it once it has finished using it. After this contract 
is signed, the anonymised dataset is passed to Barsetshire, so call Barsetshire’s 
arrangements environment 2.  
Figure 3.1: Data flow between two environments 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the intentional movement of data from environment 1 to 
environment 2. The data flow between PubT and Barsetshire defines the parameters 
of the data situation. By using a contract to stipulate how the data can be processed 
and accessed, PubT is placing controls on governance processes and infrastructure 
within environment 2 and thereby controls the disclosure risk associated with the 
data situation. The (anonymised) data within Barsetshire’s environment is 
considered low risk even though it contains some detailed key variables. This is 
because the environment is restricted – few people have access to the data and their 
use of the data is clearly defined and managed. Conversely, in this scenario the data 
would not be considered safe within a less restricted environment, such as an open 
  
access environment, because no such control restrictions would be in operation. This 
may seem obvious, but failure to understand the basic point that data releases need 
to be appropriate to their release environment is the primary cause of the well-
publicised examples of poorly anonymised datasets such as the AOL68, Netflix69 and 
the New York taxi driver70 open datasets. 
Data situation: simple share with secondary open release 
Consider this example further and imagine Barsetshire would like to release part of 
the data openly. For example, it might want to publish aggregate cross-tabulations of 
public transport use by key demographics as part of a transparency initiative. 
Aggregate outputs are still data and so such a release extends and indeed 
complicates the data situation. The 3rd environment in the chain is the open 
environment. The new picture of the data flow is shown in Figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2: Data flow between multiple environments 
The data flow between PubT, Barsetshire and the open access environment defines 
the parameters of Barsetshire’s data situation for the anonymised public transport 
data. 
Barsetshire, as stipulated in its contract with PubT, cannot release the anonymised 
data given to it in its original form without permission from PubT. This is because 
PubT is the data controller for the (personal) data and as such retains full data 
protection responsibilities for it (we shall look at this further in component 3 below). 
Prior to releasing any data, Barsetshire should carry out a disclosure risk audit of the 
open access environment71 and then further anonymise the intended disseminated 
                                                          
68   See Arrington (2006) http://tinyurl.com/AOL-SEARCH-BREACH  
69  See CNN Money (2010) http://tinyurl.com/CNN-BREACHES 
70  See Atokar (2014) http://tinyurl.com/NYC-TAXI-BREACH 
71 In component 6 of the ADF we set out how you can go about assessing the risk associated with the 
open data environment. This includes examining what other data sources might be available and 
sketching out the ‘who’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ of a potential statistical disclosure.  
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data product as necessary given the likely use case(s) (this is covered in component 4 
of the ADF).  
Data situation: simple share with secondary controlled release  
In this example we look at the data flow across environments involving personal and 
de-identified data. Imagine that Barsetshire collects public health data for its area. It 
has powers under statutory law to share (some of) the public health data with the 
Department of Social Affairs (DoSA) to support its work on health promotion and 
disease prevention. The data share is formalised under a data sharing agreement 
(DSA)72 which stipulates both Barsetshire and DoSA as data controllers in common 
for those data. This means both organisations have full data protection 
responsibilities. We call Barsetshire council environment A. 
The DoSA as part of its remit for health promotion (and in accordance with its 
agreement with Barsetshire) creates a de-identified subset of the data and makes it 
available within a secure setting for reuse by approved accredited researchers. The 
DoSA is environment B.  
The secure setting is designed in such a way as to ensure that the de-identified data 
are functionally anonymous. It places restrictions on who can access the data, on 
how they can be accessed, and on what auxiliary information can be brought in and 
out of the secure lab environment. The secure lab is environment C. 
An approved accredited researcher carries out her data analysis in the secure lab 
producing statistical output, such as regression models, that she will need to write 
up for her research. These outputs are first checked by secure lab staff to ensure that 
they are not disclosive, so they are passed as ‘safe’. The researcher duly writes up 
and openly publishes her research, which contains some of the analytical output. 
The publication of the research is a fourth environment, which we call environment 
D. 
                                                          
72 A data sharing agreement should set out a common set of rules to be adopted by the organisations 
involved in the share. It should cover such issues as: (i) the purpose(s) of the share; (ii) the recipients 
of the share and the circumstances in which they will have access; (iii) the data to be shared; (iv) data 
security; (v) retention of shared data; (vi) sanctions for failure to comply with the agreement. For 
further information see UK: Information Commissioner’s Office (2011).  
 
  
  
 
Figure 3.3: Movement of data across data environments 
As in the first example, one of the key issues which we particularly wish to highlight 
is that data in one environment may be considered sufficiently anonymised (for 
example the de-identified data in the secure setting), but in a different environment 
(such as the researcher’s publication) this may no longer be the case at all. Hence in 
this example the researcher’s analytical outputs have to be checked and verified as 
‘safe’ by the secure lab before she can take the data away with her. 
It is worth stressing that whilst a data situation might be complex, it should not be 
considered a problem so intractable that you feel it safer not to even consider sharing 
or releasing your data. Of course, that might be the conclusion that you come to after 
you have worked through the ADF but it should not be the starting position. You 
should not lose sight of the enormous range of benefits that can and do come from 
sharing and opening data.  
 74 
 
Component 2: Understand your legal responsibilities  
Now that we have put some flesh on the idea of a data situation it should be 
apparent that the movement of data across multiple environments complicates the 
question of who is responsible for data and more specifically: what is your role in 
respect of those data? Are you data controller, processor or user? The key to 
resolving this is to: (i) know where the data have come from and under what conditions 
and (ii) know where they are going and under what conditions. The ‘conditions’ you 
need to take account of are: 
1. The status of the data in each data environment in the data situation, whether 
they are personal, de-identified or anonymous data.  
2. The data provenance, i.e. who decided to collect the data (including what data 
and who it is about), established the legal grounds for doing so and 
determined the means for processing it. 
3. The enabling conditions for the share or release of the data (in an anonymised 
form), i.e. how is that processing fair and lawful?  
4. The mechanism for a data share or release, e.g. a data sharing agreement or 
contract, or an end user or open licence. 
Despite the complexity of the questions here, many situations can be subsumed 
under two common models of processing responsibilities, which we will outline 
shortly and which cover questions 1-4.  
Data status: are my data personal?  
To consider this, let us remind ourselves of the definition of personal data given in 
chapter one. Personal data are data which relate to a living individual who can be 
identified (a) from those data, or (b) from those data and other information which is 
in the possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the data controller. 
Article 29 Working Party’s 2007 opinion on ‘personal data’ identifies four main 
building blocks underpinning this description. It is worth looking briefly at these 
building blocks as they make explicit some of the inherent ambiguities that stem 
from applying an abstract concept to real world situations. They are as follows: ‘any 
information’; ‘relating to’; ‘identified and identifiable’ and ‘natural persons’. We 
shall look at each in turn.  
Any information – The Working Party notes (and we concur) that this phrasing calls 
for a wide interpretation, and includes any sort of statement about an individual. 
The statement may be objective, such as someone’s health, employment status or 
  
qualifications, or subjective, such as an opinion or assessment like ‘John Smith is a 
good employee’. For information to be personal data it need not be true or proven. 
Relating to – This means the information is about an individual. The relation may be 
direct, for example their exam transcript in their school file, medical test results in 
their hospital record or a CV in their employment file. This is clear, but when the 
relation is indirect it can become complicated because, depending on the 
circumstances, indirect information may or may not be personal data. For instance, 
the valuation of a property (directly about an object, of course, not a person) may be 
considered as personal data if it is used to determine the way in which that person is 
treated, if for example it is used for setting the level of taxes. ‘Data relates to an 
individual if it refers to the identity, characteristics or behaviour of an individual or 
if such information is used to determine or influence the way in which that person is 
treated or evaluated’ (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 2007:10). 
Identified and identifiable – A person is considered to be identified if within a 
group of persons they can be distinguished from all others in the group. A person is 
identifiable where the conditions exist to identify them. As discussed at some length 
in chapter 2, within the ADF we consider whether a person is identifiable or not to 
be heavily contextualised. The advantages of this approach is that it disambiguates 
the technical processes that you will need in component 7; the cost is that you will 
need to do more work at this stage identifying who the agents are and whether the 
data are personal for them. 
Lastly, the concept of natural persons – The protection afforded by the rules of the 
Directive applies to natural persons (that is, to human beings) and more specifically 
living persons. In some circumstances, there are two further legal considerations that 
extend this in the UK. The first concerns the Statistics and Registration Services Act 
(2007), which expands the protection to include any body corporate for the purposes 
of official statistics. The second concerns medical records of deceased persons. As we 
know the DPA protects the personal data of living persons only as deceased persons 
under the Act are no longer considered data subjects. Although there are no clear 
legal obligations of confidentiality to deceased persons in the UK, for medical data 
the Department of Health and the General Medical Council have deemed that there 
is an ethical obligation to ensure that confidentiality continues to apply to these data 
after death. This is supported by the Scottish Freedom of Information Act (2002, 
section 38) which classes medical records of deceased persons as personal data. 
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To summarise, there are no unequivocal rules about how to determine what 
constitutes personal data. However, by working through the four key components of 
the definition in the DPA and the EDPD (‘any information’, ‘relating to’, ‘identified 
and identifiable’ and ‘natural persons’), it is usually fairly straightforward to make a 
decision one way or the other. We shall now move on to consider in more detail the 
issue of processing roles.  
Model 1: Single controller  
This is the simplest model of data processing responsibilities. 
Imagine that Barsetshire LA decides to collect and hold personal data from its 
service users, and determines the legal basis for this. It agrees to share a subset of the 
personal data with the Agency of Public Sanitation (APS) for the purpose of 
supporting APS’s public service work. Barsetshire has procured its service users’ 
consent for the share. The share is formalised with a written contract73 which 
stipulates how APS can process the data, specifying how the data can be used, 
whether they can be (further) disclosed, under what conditions and to whom. Under 
this contract, APS’s processing responsibilities are limited to determining how it will 
hold the data and keep it secure. 
The model described here, in Figure 3.4, illustrates the most straightforward 
processing relationship between two organisations. Barsetshire is the data controller, 
having determined the manner in which, and the purposes for which, the data are 
processed. As such it retains overall responsibility for the data. APS’s responsibilities 
are related to ensuring it does not breach the conditions of its contract with 
Barsetshire and particularly its data security undertakings. However the legal 
responsibility for compliance with the DPA falls directly on Barsetshire (the data 
controller) not APS (the data processor). Barsetshire cannot pass on its responsibility 
to APS and has a duty to ensure that APS’s security arrangements are at least 
equivalent to its own as well as taking reasonable steps to ensure that these are 
maintained, for example by regularly auditing APS. In terms of enforcement, even if 
APS were considered negligent because, for example, it did not follow agreed 
security measures, the ICO cannot take action against it, although Barsetshire could 
pursue a civil action for breach of contract. On the other hand, if APS were to 
                                                          
73 The DPA requires that when a controller discloses personal data to a data processor it uses a written 
contract rather than a data sharing agreement. This is so only the controller can exercise control over 
the purpose for which and the manner for which personal data can be processed.  
  
deliberately use the data for its own purposes (which would also break the terms of 
its contract with Barsetshire), it would both become a data controller in its own right 
and is likely to be in breach of the first principle of the DPA and the ICO could take 
enforcement action against it (see UK: Information Commissioner’s Office (2014a) 
Data Controller and Processor Guidance).  
 
 
Figure 3.4: Model 1 
Model 2: Pluralistic control (‘jointly with others’) 
Our second is a more complex model of data processing responsibilities and 
involves situations where there is more than a single data controller. 
Pluralistic control involves data controllers working together in different forms and 
combinations (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2010). The notion of together 
may involve data controllers acting jointly and equally in determining the purpose 
and means for a single processing operation or it may be more complex than this; it 
may take the form of a looser relationship where data controllers share only purpose 
or means. Let us look further at this using an example. 
Imagine that the Department of Social Affairs (DoSA) along with the Local 
Authorities (LA) of Barsetshire, Rabsetshire, Arbsetshire (and all other LAs in 
England and Wales) determine the purpose and legal basis for collecting data on 
public transport usage at an individual level. The DoSA determines the means, 
including determining what data should be collected and the manner in which it 
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should be stored and managed (via a shared portal), as well as who can have access 
to it. Because the LAs are involved in determining the purpose of the processing 
operation (although not the means) they are considered joint data controllers with 
the DoSA, for the data in question. As the sharing is systematic and large-scale, all 
parties sign up to a data sharing agreement covering the means of the processing 
operations. This agreement74 stipulates that the DoSA takes responsibility for 
establishing and managing the shared portal whilst the LAs take responsibility for 
collecting and uploading their data to it. This ensures that it is clear who is 
responsible for compliance with the DPA for which (and all) aspects of the 
processing operation.  
Figure 3.5: Model 2 
Let us extend this example further and imagine that, as outlined in the data sharing 
agreement, the DoSA makes a de-identified subset of the data available to approved 
accredited researchers (because there is a compelling public benefit case for reusing 
the data for research purposes). The data are made available in a secure lab run by a 
third party. Under the control conditions of the secure lab, the data these researchers 
will access are functionally anonymised. The lab, like APS in the previous example, 
                                                          
74 Parties acting jointly have a degree of flexibility in distributing and allocating responsibilities 
among themselves as long as they ensure full compliance. The distribution of responsibilities needs 
also to be reasonable in order to be enforceable. For further information, see EU: Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party (2010) and UK: Information commissioner’s office (2014a).  
  
has processing responsibilities for the de-identified data which are formalised in a 
contract stipulating the conditions under which they should be securely held and 
accessed by researchers. The DoSA and LAs retain full data protection 
responsibilities.  
Of course there are many variations of the pluralistic model. The key is to remember 
that even where data processing relationships are complex, responsibilities for 
compliance with the DPA should be clearly allocated. In determining how best to do 
this the general principles remain: know where the data has come from and how and why 
it was collected and under what conditions and know where the data is going and under 
what conditions.  
Component 3: Know your data  
When thinking about whether, and how, to share or release your data safely, a key 
consideration will obviously be the data themselves. In this section, we set out a top 
level examination of data focusing on the data’s type and properties. Identifying 
these features will be relevant for both components 6 and 7 of the ADF later. Also it 
is possible at this stage to make some straightforward decisions which will simplify 
the more detailed processes you will go through later. But the main purpose of this 
component is to get a picture of the data in much the same way that a data analyst 
might explore a dataset before starting to build a multivariate model. 
As we will illustrate, the data features status, type and properties are central to the 
issue of anonymisation, whilst other points are useful indicators as to the general 
level of risk75 you might assign to your dataset. In more detail:  
1. Data subjects: Who are the data about and what is their relationship with the 
data? 
2. Data type: What form are your data in, e.g. statistics or text? What level of 
information about the population do the data provide, e.g. are they microdata 
or aggregated? 
3. Variable types: What is the nature of each variable within the data? For 
instance, are they direct identifiers, indirect identifiers or targets? 
4. Dataset properties: What are the top level properties of the dataset, e.g. its 
age, quality, etc.? 
                                                          
75 We use the term ‘general level of risk’ to describe a system for categorising risk. It provides no more 
than a guide about risk levels i.e. low risk, medium risk, high risk. This is considered further on in 
this section.  
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We consider now each of these features in turn and in doing so highlight their 
relevance to the question of anonymisation. 
Data subjects 
In most cases, who the data are about is a straightforward question. However, as we 
demonstrated in section 2.1, data can be indirectly about people when they are 
directly about something else (in the example we used the topic was house fires). 
However, you should also be mindful that data which is directly about one group of 
data subjects may also be indirectly about another group; for example patient record 
data for a particular GP practice could indirectly be about the practice’s GPs (e.g. 
their prescribing practices).  
You should also consider here whether the data subjects in the collective represent a 
vulnerable group and the extent to which the data subjects have given consent to 
any of the data processing involved in your data situation and/or the extent to which 
they are aware of it. We will consider these issues more centrally in component 5. 
Data type: what type of data do I have and what type of data should I 
share/release? 
If you have collected your own data about people then it is likely to be in the form of 
individual unit records, or microdata. Such data are commonly stored in digital 
databases as single records of information where the rows represent a single 
population unit (person, household, etc.) and the columns represent the information 
(variables) you have collected about them. For the purpose of sharing or releasing 
data you may decide not to make available an anonymised version of the microdata, 
but instead to aggregate your data and make it available as an anonymised table, 
graph or map. To assist you in making decisions about what type of data to share or 
release let us consider the particular disclosure risks associated with each.  
For aggregate data, particularly for small geographical areas, such as for example a 
census output area or postcode sectors, attribution disclosure76 and disclosure by 
differencing are considered to be particular problems. See Smith and Elliot (2008) 
and Duncan et al (2011) for a discussion of these problems.  
For microdata, re-identification disclosure is a particularly challenging problem. This 
is because of the difficulty of determining which variables or combination of 
                                                          
76 This is where there are zeroes present or where they are inferable in some combination of the 
variables in the aggregated data. 
  
variables might make an individual unique in a dataset and therefore stand out as 
vulnerable to re-identification (we consider this further in the next subsection). 
Variable type: what types of variables are in my dataset? 
Variables can be direct or indirect identifiers, or targets. Most datasets will have a 
mix of all three types. 
A target variable is usually one that a reasonable person would consider to be 
sensitive and that is not widely available. Identifying the target variables will inform 
you about likely harm that will arise from a disclosure and may also inform the 
construction of disclosure scenarios (see component 6). 
At this stage you are not attempting to form fully specified scenarios but simply 
explore the data, sorting variables into appropriate types. Some variables might be 
obvious identifiers – for example sex and age are routinely included in most key 
variable sets; others you may not yet be sure about. The purpose of this is to get 
some idea of the scope of the anonymisation problem.  
As described in section 2.2.1, direct identifiers are any attributes or combination of 
attributes that are structurally unique for all persons in your data, such as unique 
reference numbers like NHS numbers or social security numbers. In most dynamic 
data situations you will suppress (or possibly pseudonymise) the direct identifiers as 
a first step. Therefore, being clear about which variables are direct identifiers is 
important. 
An indirect identifier in contrast can be any attribute (or set of attributes) that, whilst 
not structurally unique, are likely to be unique for at least some individuals in your 
dataset and in the world. An example of indirect identifiers might be the 
combination of age, marital status and location variables. Whilst these are not 
immediately obvious identifiers, if we return to the example of the sixteen year old 
widower and imagine one is living in rural Scotland this rare combination of 
attributes is likely to make him unique and thus at greater risk of re-identification. 
The important point is that rare combinations can crop up and create a risk of 
someone spontaneously re-identifying them.  
Sensitive data – Sensive data is thought to increase re-identification risk because 
(i) it is more likely to be targeted because it is interesting, and (ii) the impact (and 
potential harm) of a disclosure may be greater. 
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‘Sensitive data’ encompasses a wide range of information and holds a special 
position in the DPA which means that even when data are being processed for 
secondary use, if they are classed as sensitive an additional reason to process the 
data is required (see Schedule 3). Within the DPA, the definition of ‘sensitive’ is 
based on a list of categories which are widely regarded to be an incomplete list of 
what might intuitively be covered (financial data for example is notably absent).77 So 
you may consider that there are other categories of data which are sensitive and 
identifying. For example, McCullagh’s (2007) research on the issue of data sensitivity 
suggests that the current categories used by the DPA need to be brought up to date 
with 21st century developments in areas such as IT and biometrics. However, rather 
than adding more categories to the list of what is sensitive data, McCullagh argues 
for a different approach focusing on harms or likely harms.78 Relatedly, Simitis  
contends that personal data becomes sensitive according to its context, arguing that 
‘any personal datum can, depending on the purpose or the circumstances of the 
processing be sensitive’(1999:5) So one’s address is for most people a fairly 
innocuous piece of information but for somebody on a witness protection scheme it 
becomes highly sensitive. This line of reasoning implies that you should think 
carefully about all categories of data you plan to share or release. 
The overarching point is that if you are dealing with sensitive data then the risk is 
higher both in terms of the likelihood of a deliberate attempt to access the data and 
the impact of an attempt if successful. As well as impacts on the data subjects, 
unintended disclosure of sensitive personal data is also likely to be more damaging 
to the data controller than disclosure of non-sensitive data, because the impact on 
public trust and reputation is likely to be greater. If you do not have the data 
subjects’ consent to release or share an anonymised version of the data then the risk 
to your organisation’s reputation if there was a subsequent breach is amplified 
further. To put it another way, if you do not have consent then your overall data 
situation is more sensitive. 
                                                          
77 In the EU member states, the list will be expanded when the European General Data Protection 
Regulation comes into force. 
78 It is noteworthy that this notion has begun to gain traction in some jurisdictions. For example, the 
recent Singaporean personal data protection act (2012) includes a provision that ‘An organisation may 
disclose personal data about an individual… if the disclosure is for archival or historical purposes and 
if a reasonable person would not consider the personal data to be too sensitive to the individual to be 
disclosed at the proposed time’. (Schedule 4 clause 1 r). 
  
Dataset properties: what are the properties of my dataset?  
The properties of a dataset can potentially increase or decrease the risk of disclosure. 
We say potentially because, as acknowledged, we are at this stage doing no more 
than getting to know data without reference to the data environment.  
The use of a general risk indicator, such as the one described below, merely acts as a 
guide to help you think about which data properties require particular attention 
when you are doing further analysis. It is not a substitute to the requirement for a 
careful analysis of your data, but a precursor.  
Data properties include: quality, age, data detail, coverage and structure. We look 
now at each of these and outline how and why they may affect disclosure risk. 
Data quality: It is generally accepted that all data will contain some level of error. 
Error can originate from the data subject, data collector and/or the data collection 
process (Bateson 1984). The aim as a data holder is to ensure that the error level in 
your data is small; after all there is little point in sharing or releasing data that does 
not represent whatever it is supposed to represent because it is distorted by the (low) 
quality of the data. 
However, ironically a small level of error, inherent in all data, has some advantages 
as it offers some degree of natural data protection (Duncan et al 2011). 
Age of data: It is generally understood that the older the data79 the harder it is to 
identify people correctly from them. This is because people’s information may 
change over time as, for example, they move location, change jobs or get married. 
Thus older data may acquire a basic level of data protection because of the issues 
associated with divergence as discussed in chapter 1.  
Hierarchical data: This is data that contains information for members of a group 
who are linked with one another and is a common source of disclosure risk in 
business data. The data are considered more risky because they provide (more) 
information that might make a data subject unique in a dataset and as such 
potentially identifiable. For example, the combination of age and sex of all members 
of a household will be unique for most households above a relatively modest size 
(Duncan et al 2011). 
                                                          
79 The other (reverse) problem with older data relates to an increased risk of associating incorrect 
information with people identified within a dataset because the information is out of date. 
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Longitudinal data: This is data about a defined population which is collected over 
time and linked. These are considered riskier because of the potential to capture 
potentially unique changes in information over time such as changes to one’s 
marital, economic, employment and health status and location that stand out 
amongst other longitudinal patterns. Again this may increase the likelihood of a data 
subject being unique in a dataset and as such potentially identifiable.80 
Population or sample data: Population data includes census data and data for all 
people in a particular group such as benefit claimants or hospital patients. It is 
considered more risky because there will be little uncertainty as to who is 
represented in the dataset.  
Capturing the data features 
In Appendix E you will find a template for capturing the above features and perhaps 
recording any top level actions that you might make. For example, you could decide 
that you will release a flat rather than hierarchical file or that date of birth will be 
recoded to single year of age. These decisions simplify the technical work required 
(in components 6 and 7). Your framing for this capture of features will be the use 
case, to which we now turn.  
Component 4: Understand the use case 
In determining the use case for your data you need to understand three things: 
1. Why: Clarify the reason for wishing to share or release your data 
2. Who: Identify those groups who will access your data 
3. How: Establish how those accessing your data might want to use it 
Working through these three points will help you with decisions about both what 
data you can safely share or open and what is the most appropriate means by which to do 
this. 
Firstly, you should be clear about your reason(s) for sharing/opening, because your 
actions will:  
1. Require resourcing which, in all likelihood, you will need to justify. 
                                                          
80 Analytically, longitudinal data could be treated as longwave – i.e. the slowest form of – dynamic 
data (data that updates over time). In practice however they are analysed as static datasets and 
therefore in most data situations the longitudinal element is treated as another property of the 
dataset. It does however lead to some different intrusion scenarios as it is necessary to consider the 
likelihood of an intruder also having access to longitudinal data. 
  
2. Carry a risk so you need to be able to perform a rigorous cost/benefit analysis.  
There are numerous reasons for disseminating data. Perhaps it provides useful 
information for stakeholders or about your organisation, offers new 
insights/perspectives on a topic, offers a benefit to particular groups, supports the 
more effective/efficient use of a service, or maybe you have received an FOI 
(freedom of information) request. Thinking through why you are disseminating your 
data automatically brings in the other two questions, the ‘who’ and the ‘how’ of 
access.  
Your potential users may be a single organisation, a defined group or several 
different user groups. You may decide to provide different data products via 
different dissemination routes.81  
Direct consultation with your potential data users is one method for understanding 
the use case and can take many forms. Whilst it is not within the remit of this 
chapter to talk about user engagement in detail it is worth noting that a variety of 
methods is available such as interviews, focus groups, web surveys or a call for 
written feedback, the last of which you could administer directly through a website 
or via a third party. The exact nature of the type of activity you might carry out will 
depend on the number and type of users and the drivers of the programme to 
share/release. Are they internal or external to your organisation? Are you 
responding to a contractual or statutory obligation, or are you trying to increase the 
utility of your data? Is it a drive for transparency and good will, or do you hope to 
provide an income stream?  
However you decide to engage with your users, it is helpful from the outset to 
identify who they are and how they will use your data, although this is not always 
possible as the use case may emerge over time. Certainly data released for one 
reason and for a particular user group may over time be used serendipitously for 
purposes not first envisaged and by new groups of users. Whilst you may not be 
able to initially determine all possible uses for your data, you should try to keep 
abreast of how they are being used. How you can go about doing this is discussed in 
component 9 below.  
                                                          
81 If you make available different data products via different dissemination routes you will need to 
take account of the risk of disclosure for each in combination with the others. See component 6 for 
further discussion. 
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That there will be some benefit to the reuse of data is axiomatic in today’s ‘big data’ 
climate. The demand for data seems insatiable. So clarifying the questions to be 
answered by your data, or what needs it is hoped they will meet, is a good place to 
start when thinking about exactly what data to release and how it should be 
specified.  
Once you have determined the sort of data product that your users want or need (or 
what data product is likely to be useful to a wider audience), you then have to think 
about how best to share or release it. Remember the central objective is to 
disseminate safe and useful data. There is a trade-off between risk associated with 
the environment and the utility of the data themselves. Broadly speaking the less 
controlled the access environment, the less detailed and less useful (all things being 
equal) the data must be in order to ensure safety. Let us consider briefly some of the 
options for sharing and releasing data.  
Data sharing: This may (though not always) involve the movement of data from one 
organisation to a partner or associated organisation where there is some sort of 
established relationship between those organisations. Whether or not there is 
already a relationship between the organisations proposing a share, data shares 
should always be formalised and managed using a contract or sharing agreement 
which (i) makes clear who is responsible for what and (ii) ensures fair processing, 
usage and retention of the data.82 By using a contract or DSA you can manage (some 
of) the disclosure risk associated with the data share. 
Data release options: See chapter 2 for discussion of this topic. Suffice it to say that 
whilst there are several data release options available, which one you choose 
depends on the data you plan to release, their sensitivity, and the proposed usage of 
them. As a general rule, the more you restrict access to your data the greater control 
you have over how they are used. Conversely, a more liberal regime usually means 
you relinquish more control, and hence you need to think about restricting the 
(detail in) data themselves. Allowing greater access to your data does not 
automatically produce high risk, as long as your data are sufficiently anonymised 
given the release environment.  
It is worth noting that in applying the risk-utility concept83 you will need to think 
beyond the impact of anonymisation techniques on your data. Think also about what 
                                                          
82 See UK: Information Commissioner’s Office (2011) for the UK regulator’s position on this. 
83 See Duncan et al (2001) for the original exposition of the risk utility framework. 
  
the application of a particular technique might mean to your users. For example, 
complex methods may not be appropriate for data that you plan to make widely 
available because non-specialist users may not understand their impact on the data. 
We discuss this issue below in component 7. 
To recap, establishing the use case for your data will help you think about what data 
you could share or release and how to do that safely. In determining these things 
you will need to balance data utility and data protection. This balance is a well-
recognised trade-off and what essentially makes the task of producing safe, useful 
data challenging. 
Component 5: Meet your ethical obligations  
As we stated in chapter 2, acquaintance with the ethical issues related to the reuse of 
data should not deter you from sharing or releasing data. We outline in this 
component how you can go about meeting your ethical obligations whilst 
maximising the value of your anonymised data. 
Consent and other means 
Where possible, seek consent from data subjects for what you intend to do with their 
data once anonymised. Although, as we stressed in chapter 2, consent is not a 
panacea you are in a much stronger position ethically if you have it than if you do 
not. However, if seeking consent, do think carefully about the assurances you give to 
data subjects about what will happen to their data. You should respect the assurance 
you give because, if your organisation gives certain assurances to your data subjects 
and then breaks them, then you are not processing data fairly and therefore are in 
breach of principle 1 of the DPA. 
When consent has not been sought, you might want to consider being as transparent 
as possible, and engaging with stakeholders where practicable. 
Transparency of actions 
To be transparent, at the very least explain simply and clearly to your data subjects 
how you reuse data with a description of your rationale. This could be done for 
example on your website, during any public facing event, or in relevant publications, 
or you could undertake to explain on request to interested parties. 
Stakeholder engagement 
Consulting with your stakeholders is a useful exercise, an effective way of 
understanding your data subjects’ views on your proposed data sharing/release 
 88 
 
activities and addressing their concerns. However, it can be resource intensive and 
so you might consider undertaking it only after you have run through other options 
and if there is potential for concerns to arise. It is also worthwhile looking at how 
similar organisations in your sector are sharing data and whether any concerns have 
been raised about their practices. Finally a growing amount of survey and focus 
group work has been done on data subjects’ views on data sharing and reuse, 
particularly in the health sector; we recommend that you look at this to help inform 
your thinking.  
The importance of good governance  
Key to ensuring you meet your ethical responsibilities either as a data controller or 
data processor is good governance. On a broad level governance is about the 
organisation of your data processing activities formalised in principles, policies, and 
procedures for data security, handling, management and storage, and share/release. 
To underpin this you should have a clear picture of what the flow of data looks like 
within your organisation and what your processing responsibilities are. 
In practical terms this includes (but is not limited to) the following factors. 
Governance and human resources  
o Identify a person in your organisation who will be responsible for authorising 
and overseeing the anonymisation process and ensure that they have the 
necessary skills and knowledge to do this. 
o Ensure that all relevant staff are suitably trained and understand their 
responsibilities for data handling, management, sharing and releasing.  
Governance and internal structures 
o Establish principles, policies and procedures for acting as a data controller. 
o Establish principles, policies and procedures for sharing data including how 
you will monitor future risk implications for each share (see component 10). 
o Establish principles, policies and procedures for releasing data including how 
you will monitor the future risk implications for each release (see component 
10).  
o Establish a comprehensive record-keeping system across all your operational 
activities related to your data protection policies and procedures to ensure 
there is a clear audit trail.  
o Undertake a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for all your data products 
and/or across your organisation as a whole. 
  
o Establish principles, policies and procedures for identifying and dealing with 
cases where anonymisation may be problematic to achieve. You should also 
consider at what point in the process (in dealing with a difficult case) you 
should seek external help and advice from bodies such as the ICO or expert 
groups such as UKAN. 
o Establish principles, policies and procedures for dealing with data breaches. 
Depending on your organisation’s particular needs you may choose to 
develop separate policies related to different potential data breaches, or 
develop a single policy. Whichever you chose you will need to consider how a 
breach might occur and how you will respond to it.  
The what and how of a data breach 
1. Define a data breach. 
2. Identify the types of data breach relevant to your data situation. 
3. Identify those factors likely to lead to a breach, such as the loss of an 
unencrypted disc taken out of the workplace or the accidental emailing of 
data to the wrong person. Thinking through a range of possible breach 
scenarios can be very useful in helping you identify how a breach might arise 
from your usual processing activities, as well as what errors, procedural 
violations or malicious intent may also occur.  
4. Establish measures to limit/avert those factors likely to lead to/facilitate a 
breach.  
5. Establish how you will address violations of these measures.  
Responding to a data breach 
We address this issue in detail in component 10 of the framework below, but note 
that it includes the following areas: 
1. The containment of a breach. 
2. Assessing and dealing with any ongoing risk. 
3. Notification of a breach.  
4. Review and learning lessons. 
Governance and horizon scanning 
o Keeping up-to-date with any new guidance or case law that clarifies the legal 
framework surrounding anonymisation. For example you could regularly 
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view the UKAN website84 which provides information on anonymisation, and 
the ICO85 website which provides information on data protection. 
o Talking to other organisations in your sector to share best practice. You might 
want to consider going to events such as the ICO Annual Data Protection 
conference to keep up to date with current issues and networking with other 
people working in data protection. 
Ensure Privacy Impact Assessment is embedded in your organisation 
It is considered best practice to think about and embed privacy into the design of 
your data processing activities right from the start. Although it is not a legal 
requirement under the DPA to undertake a Privacy Impact Assessment there are 
many good reasons for having one when you process data. It will (i) help you be 
aware of and address any particular privacy issues, (ii) ensure the transparency of 
your activities, (iii) promote trust in what you do, and (iv) help you to comply with 
the DPA and any other relevant legislation. For further information see the ICO’s 
Guide to Conducting Privacy Impact Assessments code of practice (UK: Information 
Commissioner’s Office; 2014b). 
3.2 Disclosure risk assessment and control 
Risk assessment and control should usually be an iterative, not linear, process. There 
is rarely a single possible solution; the risk analysis might suggest changes to the 
data specification which, once experimentally applied to the data, require a fresh risk 
analysis. Furthermore, there are several types of risk assessment, and you should be 
strategic in how you apply them. Some are quite resource intensive and therefore 
should only be applied to near-final versions of the data if they are needed at all 
(assuming your budget is limited). 
This process will be constrained by the use case and the resources available. As ever, 
our goal is to produce data that meets the requirements of the use case. The use of 
resources to address potential problems should be proportionate to the impact of a 
breach. 
                                                          
84
 www.ukanon.net 
85
 www.ico.org.uk 
  
Component 6: Identify the processes you will need to go 
through to assess disclosure risk 
Risk assessment is a crucial step in the process of producing safe useful data, helping 
you to: 
o determine whether your data should be shared or released at all;  
o determine how much disclosure control should be applied; and 
o think about the optimum means for sharing or releasing your data. 
In practice this can be very complex and risk assessment is probably the most 
difficult stage of the anonymisation process, requiring judgement and expertise on 
the part of the data practitioner. The complexity is partly because it is not evident 
what additional relevant information might be taken into account and how different 
factors might affect risk. As such factors include the motivation of the intruders, the 
efforts to which they might go, and the techniques they might use, it is clear that 
such factors can never be definitively specified. It is also unknowable what 
information might become publicly or privately available in the future, from sources 
other than yourself, which might be used to link with the data you wish to release to 
reveal identity. Notwithstanding these inherent limitations, there are steps you can 
take to assess the disclosure risk associated with your data and the share/release 
environment. 
We introduce a four-part process for assessing disclosure risk. The first two 
procedures are always necessary, while the third and fourth may or may not be 
required depending on the conclusions drawn after conducting the first two.  
1. Incorporation of your top level assessment to produce an initial 
specification. 
2. An analysis to establish relevant plausible scenarios for your data situation. 
When you undertake a scenario analysis, you are essentially considering the 
how, who and why of a potential breach. 
3. Data analytical approaches. You will use data analytical methods to estimate 
risk given the scenarios that you have developed under procedure 2. 
4. Penetration testing, which involves validating assumptions made in 2 by 
simulating attacks using ‘friendly’ intruders. The ICO recommends carrying 
out a motivated intruder test as part of a practical assessment of a dataset’s risk. 
This can be both informative and good practice but takes skill and expertise as 
well as time and resources.  
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Incorporating your top level assessment 
We described in component 2 how to undertake a top level assessment of disclosure 
risk by identifying those features of your data that can potentially increase or 
mitigate risk. Let us remind ourselves of those features. 
Data quality May offer some data protection 
Age of data Older data are less risky  
Hierarchical data  Increases risk 
Longitudinal data Increases risk 
Population data Increases risk. Conversely sample data offers some protection. 
Sensitive data Potentially increases the risk and impact of a disclosure 
Key variables  The core of the re-identification problem  
Microdata  Re-identification disclosure is a particular problem 
Aggregate data  Attribution disclosure and disclosure by differencing are 
particular problems 
Table 3.1: Risk-relevant features 
This top level analysis enables you to identify where you need focus your attention 
in the technical analysis that follows. At this stage you can also simplify the dataset. 
Anything that you can do to reduce the complexity of the data will in turn reduce 
the complexity of the technical analysis that you have to conduct at the next stage. 
It might be now that you identify a sensitive variable that is not needed for the use 
case – take it out. Your default assumption should be that if it is not needed then it 
should be deleted. If the data are hierarchical, is the preservation of that property 
required for the use case? Being hierarchical will often magnify the risk markedly, 
and you may have to compensate with some heavy controls elsewhere in the data. 
Could the data be simplified to a non-hierarchical structure? 
Are there any variables with a lot of detail? If so, is that much detail really necessary 
for the use case? Frequency tables and descriptive statistics also need to be looked at. 
Are there variables whose distribution is highly skewed – say with one category 
which contains most of the cases and a dozen small categories. Can the small 
categories be merged? Are there any continuous variables on the dataset which 
might be rounded or banded?  
Such brutality to the data may seem blunt or even draconian but remember that 
whatever you do you will not eliminate the risk. The more data you release, the 
  
riskier it will be, so if a risk is unnecessary for the use case, do not take it.86 Initially, 
removing low-utility/high-risk features will not impact on the overall utility. 
Eventually though you will hit a point of diminishing returns, where a utility 
reduction will start to become evident and then it is necessary to move on to the 
second procedure. 
Scenario analysis  
As outlined in chapter 1, the purpose of scenario analysis is to ground your 
assessment of risk in a framework of plausible events. If you use the Elliot and Dale 
framework outlined in section 2.3.1 then you will run through a series of 
considerations using simple logic to arrive at a set of key variables. In constructing 
these you need to consider all the sources of the data that the would-be intruder 
might have access to. Below are examples of other sources of data that may be 
relevant when developing your scenarios of disclosure.  
o Public sources of data: including public registers, professional registers, 
electoral registers, land registry, estate agents’ lists, newspaper reports, 
archived reports and announcements, parish records and vital statistics such 
as birth, death and marriage records. 
o Social media and other forms of found data: including data generated by the 
data subjects themselves in online interaction and transaction (‘found data’). 
This runs from deliberate self-publication (CVs, personal websites), to 
material where the goal is primarily interactive (social networking sites). 
Needless to say this is a growing source of publicly available information and 
Elliot et al (2015) demonstrate that it is plausible to attack an open dataset 
using a combination of social media data and other publicly available sources. 
o Other similar data releases: including releases from your partner 
organisations and other organisations in your industry or sector.87 
                                                          
86 One factor to bear in mind here is the nature of sharing/dissemination you are working with. If you 
are in a data situation where you will be dealing with a series of multiple bespoke data requests, then 
performing a risk analysis and editing process with each individual request could be quite onerous. It 
may be simpler to produce a single dataset that meets the negligible risk criterion in any conceivable 
use case. However, the disadvantage of this approach is that it will inevitably be a lowest common 
denominator dataset and some users may not be able to access the data they want. As ever there is a 
balance to be struck here. 
87 Ideally if multiple organisations were releasing open data on the same population then they would 
co-ordinate their anonymisation processes. However, in most cases in practice, such an undertaking 
will be very difficult. The importance of other releases will be greater if the data generation processes 
are similar, the time of collection is similar and if there is partial overlap of variables. This set of 
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o Official data releases: including data releases from the Office for National 
Statistics (in the UK), government departments and agencies and local 
authorities. 
o Restricted access data sources: including the resources of any organisation 
collecting data. At first it may seem difficult to imagine how you would know 
what is in such data sources but they can often be the easiest to find out about. 
Why? Because although the data are hidden, the data collection instruments 
are often public. They include the forms that people have to complete in order 
to access a service, join an organisation or buy a product. If you can access the 
forms used to gather data, then you can make a pretty good guess about what 
data are sitting on the database that is fed by the form. For the task of 
generating key variables that should be sufficient. 
It is easy to become overwhelmed by the feeling that there is too much data out there 
– where do I even start? Certainly doing a full scenario analysis is very time-
consuming and beyond the resources that many organisations are likely to have 
available. Fortunately, for many data situations a full analysis will be 
disproportionate. This will be particularly true where you are working in a tried and 
tested area. If other organisations have been releasing similar data for a while 
without any apparent problems then your resources that you need to devote to this 
element can be more modest. 
One tool that can cut down the amount of time required at this stage is the standard 
key set. Standard keys are generated by organisations carrying out ongoing data 
environment analysis (scanning the data environment for new data sources). You 
should be aware that standard keys are generic and are set up primarily for use with 
licence-based dissemination of official statistics and will not be relevant to every data 
situation. However, the standard keys can be useful because, if your data are not 
safe relative to these standards, then in itself that indicates that you may have a 
problem, even before you consider non-standard keys. A set of standard keys can be 
found in Appendix A.  
So what in practice can you do if you are not carrying out full scale data 
environment and scenario analyses? The simplest approach is to carry out thought 
experiments that make the imagined adversary more specific.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
circumstances will usually only arise when the organisations are closely related. This, in principle, 
allows key extension; as both datasets are anonymised we are not here talking about direct re-
identification, but the fusion of two anonymised datasets could make both more vulnerable. 
  
For example, imagine that you are a local authority wanting to release a dataset of 
social care service users as open data. Suppose the dataset contains 7 variables: age 
(banded), sex, ethnic group, ward (LA subdivision), service accessed, the year that 
service was first received, and type of housing. 
Now imagine a data intruder who draws on publically available information to 
attack a dataset that you have released as open data. Run this scenario through the 
Elliot and Dale framework. In particular, think of a plausible motivation and check 
that this passes the ‘goal not achievable more easily by other means’ test. In this 
example you might end up with inputs something like this: 
o Motivation: what is the intruder trying to achieve? The intruder is a 
disgruntled former employee who aims to discredit us and, in particular, our 
attempts to release open data. 
o Means: what resources (including other data) and skills do they have? 
Publically available data, imagine that they are unemployed, have unlimited 
time, but do not have access to sophisticated software or expertise for 
matching. 
o Opportunity: how do they access the data? It is open data so no problems at 
all.  
o Target variables: which service(s) individuals are using.  
o Goals achievable by other means? Is there a better way for the intruders to 
get what they want than attacking your dataset? Possibly, but discrediting 
our open data policy would be effective. 
o Effect of data divergence. We believe our dataset to be reasonably accurate. 
However, we are only publishing data that is at least one-year-old. The 
intruder’s data will be less reliable. This will create uncertainty for the 
intruder but not enough to rely on. 
Once you have a plausible scenario then look through the standard keys set to see if 
any of those correspond meaningfully to the total information set that the intruder 
might have. In this case the standard key B4.2 looks relevant. If we cross reference 
the list of variables under that key with the list that we are considering releasing, 
that gives us the following intermediate outputs: 
o Attack type: what is the technical aspect of statistical/computational 
method used to attack the data? Linkage of data about individuals living 
within our local authority derived from publicly available information to 
records in the open data set. 
o Key variables:  
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• Ward 
• Ethnic group  
• Age (banded) 
• Sex 
These key variables can then be used as a starting point for the technical disclosure 
risk assessment. If you are taking this approach then it is wise to construct more than 
one scenario. The number that you will need will depend on the totality of the data 
situation and specifically who will have access to the data and the complexity of the 
data in question. With this situation we are talking about open access but relatively 
simple data. With open data we will often want to also assess the nosy neighbour 
scenario (see Elliot et al 2016 for a rationale for this), which would suggest adding 
type of housing to the list of keys, but would also mean that we were simulating an 
attack by an unsophisticated intruder who was just trying to find a single specific 
individual (rather than any high-certainty match from a host of possibilities). 
Of course if your data does not nicely fit into the format of the standard keys then 
you are going to have to do some work to populate this framework yourselves. You 
should avoid focusing too closely on apparent vulnerabilities in the data. For a good 
analysis of the pitfalls of doing this, see, for example, Sánchez et al’s (2016) critique 
of de Montjoye et al’s (2015) account of the uniqueness (called ‘unicity’ by de 
Montjoye et al) of small strings of credit card purchases. Uniqueness – and 
particularly data uniqueness – does not in itself re-identify anybody. Uniqueness 
does indicate vulnerability but if there is no well-formed scenario through which 
that uniqueness can be exploited then no re-identification can happen. On the other 
hand a sophisticated intruder might focus on those vulnerabilities to carry out a 
fishing attack. It comes down to whether there is a well formed and feasible scenario 
where they would be motivated to do that. 
So create your scenarios, generate your key variables and then carry them through to 
your risk assessment.  
Data analytical risk assessment (DARA) 
Having gathered the low hanging fruit of data reduction, and generated your sets of 
keys now you are ready to move on to carry out a data analytical risk assessment 
(DARA). We would always recommend that you get expert advice at this stage even 
if only to ratify what you have done. However, much can be done without external 
help, and the more that is done in-house, the richer the conversation that you can 
have with independent experts, including communicating your specification of the 
  
problem to them, and interpretating their findings and recommendations. In this 
section, we will set out a process that could be performed in-house, without (i.e. 
before) consulting anonymisation experts.  
File level risk metrics 
The first step in the DARA is to obtain a file-level measure of the risk. There are 
quite a few of these and selecting the right one can be a bit of a Chinese puzzle in 
itself. There are three key questions whose answers will guide you: 
1. Is your data a sample or a population?  
2. Does your scenario assume response knowledge and if so at what level? 
3. If it is a sample then is it (approximately) a random sample? 
By ‘population’ here we do not just mean the UK population (although that would 
be one example). For the purposes of statistics, a population is a complete set of 
objects or elements that share a particular characteristic of interest. For example, if 
your data are about all the members of the Bognor Regis Cycle club or all claimants 
of a certain benefit then these are a population (the word ‘all’ is the indicator here).  
As we have discussed, response knowledge is a simple idea but it can be complex to 
apply. In some scenarios you may want to assume an intruder with ad hoc but full 
knowledge about a particular individual. For others you may want to consider a 
situation where the super-population (i.e. a larger set from which the population is 
drawn) is constrained. Perhaps I know that Bognor Regis cycle club members all 
have to live in Bognor Regis and own a bicycle; if I also know that you have those 
characteristics then I know that the probability of you being in the sample is 
considerably higher than I would estimate if I did not have that knowledge. 
Response knowledge scenarios with microdata 
First, consider the situation where your intruder has full response knowledge (to 
remind you, that is knowledge that a record corresponding to a particular known 
population unit is present in the microdata). This is the simplest case to assess. You 
need to identify how many unique combinations of the key variables you have in 
your dataset. This can be done simply using a spreadsheet or statistical package.  
On the UKAN website you will find a set of CSV files that accompany this book 
which can be opened in a spreadsheet system or statistical software. These files 
contain example synthetic data that have been generated using some simple models, 
but which look like census data to give you something to practice on. Appendix B.1 
gives instructions for calculating the number of uniques using Excel and Appendix 
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B.2 gives some syntax for use with statistical package SPSS. You can adapt either of 
these to your own data. In the example in the appendix, the key variables that we 
have used are age, sex, marital status, ethnic group, type of housing, tenure, number 
of cars, and whether the house has central heating. This corresponds to the type of 
things that neighbours might routinely know about one another. You might want to 
play around with other combinations of variables. 
In the example data, using the “nosy neighbour” key we find that over 17% of the 
records are unique. What would such a result imply? Simply put, if our intruder has 
response knowledge for any of the individuals whose records are unique on those 
characteristics then they are at high risk of being re-identified. The only protection 
that these records have is the unreliable possibility of data divergence. Given that 
nearly 1 in 5 of the records in our dataset have this status we might decide that that 
is too high. 
Faced with unique patterns in your population dataset what are your options? 
Essentially you have three choices: (i) give up now and do not release/share the data; 
(ii) proceed to apply disclosure control (see component 7 below); or (iii) if you still 
want to persist with your proposed release/share then you will need to carry out 
intruder testing (which we discuss shortly). If you go for option (ii) and you decide 
to apply data-focused, rather than environment-focused, disclosure control, then you 
will need to revisit this step once your data-focused control mechanisms have been 
applied, in order to reassess the risk.  
Scenarios involving microdata without response knowledge 
What if my file is not a population and my scenario analysis does not suggest 
response knowledge? Here you have a sample. There is a simple method known as 
data intrusion simulation (DIS)88 which can help here. DIS provides a statistic which 
is straightforward to understand: the probability of a correct match given a unique match. 
In other words it tells you how likely it is that a match of auxiliary information 
against a record that is unique within the sample dataset is correct.89 However, if you 
are looking at a strongly non-random sample then this step is a little trickier and you 
should consult an expert. Using the same data as the uniques test above, Appendix 
                                                          
88 For a full technical description of the DIS method see Skinner and Elliot (2002). A brief explanation 
and some examples showing how it works are shown in Appendix C. 
89 A technical point; this method does assume that your sample is random, although in fact it is robust 
with respect of some degree of variance from random. 
  
D.1 contains the instructions you need for implementing DIS in Excel and the SPSS 
syntax can be found in Appendix D.2.  
The output of the DIS process is a measure of risk taken as the probability that a 
match against a unique in your dataset (on your selected key variable set) is correct. 
Essentially this takes account of the possibility that a unique record in a sample 
dataset may have a statistical twin in the population that is not represented in the 
sample.  
For scenario keys of any complexity the outcome will not be zero risk. You knew this 
already of course, but quantifying risk immediately raises the question about how 
small a probability you should be aiming for. We cannot give you a single threshold 
because unfortunately there is no straightforward answer. Here instead in Table 3.2 
is a set of rough guidelines for helping you think about your output. Given a 
particular quantitative output of the DIS process, we have mapped that onto a 
qualitative category on the assumption that the data are non-sensitive, and coupled 
with that an indication of the type of environmental solution that might be suitable. 
If the data are sensitive, then we need to shift down the table by one or even two 
categories, so that a DIS output of 0.03 should be treated as signalling a moderate 
risk (or even a high risk if the data are very sensitive), instead of the low risk it 
would signal on non-sensitive data. As ever in this field, context is all. 
<0.001 Very low  
0.001-0.005 Low Open data maximum 
0.005-0.05 Low End user licensed data maximum 
0.05-0.1 Moderate Restricted user licensed data maximum 
0.1-0.2 High On line remote access solutions maximum 
>0.2 Very high Highly controlled data centre solutions only 
Table 3.2: classification of output from the DIS algorithm 
To stress again, these are only for ball-park guidance but (assuming that your 
scenario analysis has been thorough) they should serve to indicate whether your 
overall level of risk is proportionate to your proposed solution. 
If you have an unfavourable result at this stage, and you are out of your risk comfort 
zone (given the receiving data environment), what do you now do? The simplest 
solution at this stage is to apply aggregations to some of your key variables and/or 
sub-sample your data. Both of these will reduce the probabilities you have 
generated. Another alternative is to change the environment to one that is a lower 
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risk category. You may also revisit your use case. What constraints on data and 
environment are consistent with the needs of the use case? 
One question that might arise is whether the above categorisations of DIS are a little 
on the conservative side. If the intruder only has a 1 in 5 chance of being correct, 
does that represent sufficient uncertainty regardless of the environment? If the risk 
was spread evenly across the file or if it were impossible for the intruder to pick out 
unusual records then that might be true but unfortunately, as noted earlier, some 
records are visibly more risky than others, vulnerable to fishing attacks or 
spontaneous recognition. This will be true even if you are broadly in your comfort 
zone.  
Record level risk metrics 
Conceptually, understanding disclosure risk at the record level is very simple: 
unusual combinations of values are high risk. Unfortunately, identifying all the risky 
combinations in a dataset is not straightforward and deciding what to do about them 
perhaps even less so. It might be at this point in the proceedings that you decide to 
call in the expert, but if you carry on there are some things that you can do that will 
at least have the happy side-effect of familiarising you with the data and their 
properties.  
How does one define a risky record? There are many answers to this question and it 
is still an active research area. Yet focusing on the concept of uniqueness reveals two 
simple pragmatic principles:90 
1. The more information you need to make a record unique (or to ‘single it out’) 
the less unusual it is. 
2. The more information you need to make a record unique (or to ‘single it out’) 
the more likely that any match against it is prone to data divergence 
increasingly the likelihood of both false positive and false negative matches. 
The first principle is primarily relevant to scenarios where there is sample data and 
no response knowledge. The second is relevant when either your data are 
population data or your scenario assumes response knowledge. 
Start with principle 1. The basic idea is as follows. You have performed scenario 
analysis and generated a set of key variables. Say, for argument’s sake, that you have 
                                                          
90 For those that want to dig a bit deeper, there is some science underpinning this approach which is 
reported in Elliot et al (1998, 2002) and Haglin et al (2009). 
  
eight of them.91 Principle 1 says that if a record is unique in your data on, say, three 
of those variables it is more unusual than if you need values for all eight variables to 
make it unique. One way to think of this is that each time you add another variable 
to a key you divide the population or sample into smaller groups. Eventually 
everyone will be unique, so uniqueness itself is not such a big deal; the unusual 
people are those who are unique on a small number of categories.  
The second proposition is in some ways simpler. Essentially each piece of 
information you have in your set of key variables carries with it the possibility of 
divergence. So each variable that you add to a key increases the probability of 
divergence for any match against that key. For sample data in scenarios without 
response knowledge, that has to be weighed against the informational gain from the 
additional variable. For population data or response knowledge scenarios the 
informational gain is irrelevant – a unique is a unique – but the impact of divergence 
is important and a sophisticated intruder will focus on individuals who are unique 
on a small number of variables.  
Given these two principles, we can set out a rough and ready way of picking out 
unusual records. There is software available called SUDA92 that can produce a more 
sophisticated version of this but understanding the principles first is still useful.  
We will assume that you have an eight variable key, so you need to search for 
uniques on small subsets of those eight variables. We assume also that you have 
access to a statistics package. 
1. First run all of the two variable cross tabulations. Do you have any uniques? If 
you do then identify the records that they belong to (filtering will do the trick 
here). These records are unusual enough to be noteworthy. 
2. Now find the smallest non-unique cell in all of the two-way cross tabulations 
that you have run. Filter your datasets on that combination of values. Then 
run frequency tables on the remaining six variables. Are there any uniques in 
those frequency tables? If there are, then they will also be candidates of 
                                                          
91 The astute reader may have noted that it is not just the number of variables that matters, but also 
the properties of those variables, most notably the number of categories, the skewness of the variable 
and correlations with other variables. However, these basic principles are sound and even this 
simplification will improve decision-making. We are considering steps that can be taken in-house, 
before calling in an expert consultant, and at some point it will be sensible to leave the complexities to 
them. 
92 Elliot and Manning (2003); available at: http://www.click2go.umip.com/i/software/suda.html. 
(accessed 30/5/2016). 
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interestingly unusual records (though probably not as unusual as the ones 
you identify in stage 1). 
3. Repeat step 2 with next biggest non-unique cell in the two-way cross tables 
and continue repeating until you have reached a threshold (a cell size of 10 is 
a good rule of thumb). 
4. Repeat steps 1-3 for each key variable set that you have. 
This takes you as far as covering the 3-way interactions. In principle you can repeat 
the exercise with the 4-way interactions but that can involve a lot of output. 
Nevertheless, if your sample size in a response knowledge scenario is reasonably 
large then it might be important to do this.  
Now you have a list of unusual records. What can you do with that? Well firstly, you 
can do a subjective assessment of the combination of values – do any of the 
combinations look unusual? You are likely to have knowledge of the general 
structure of the population, as you have a professional interest in the data, and that 
will undoubtedly help here. Perhaps present them to your colleagues to get a sanity 
check. Such subjective analysis is obviously not perfect and subject to all sorts of 
biases but nevertheless it can be informative (everyone would tend to agree 16 year 
old widowers are rare for example). If you have records that definitely appear 
unusual then you almost certainly need to take further action.  
It is also important to consider how many records you have marked out as unusual. 
Is it a large portion of the size of your data file? If you have a relatively small 
number of records (relative to the file size), say less than 1%, then it might be 
possible to deal with them by techniques that involve distorting the data, which we 
consider in component 7 below. If the proportion is larger than that, then a more 
sensible approach is to carry out further aggregation and rerun the above analysis. 
However, a cautionary tale will explain why it is also important to avoid knee-jerk 
reactions. A few years ago one of the authors was carrying out some work on behalf 
of a statistical agency identifying risky records within a longitudinal dataset, using 
the risk assessment software SUDA. The analysis threw up some odd patterns with 
some really high risk records. A bit of exploratory analysis revealed that these were 
records where the individuals had changed sexes several times in the space of a year 
or had reversed the ageing process. In other words they were the result of errors in 
the data. Arbitrary data errors will often lead to unusual looking records so not all 
unusual records are actually a risk and, more importantly, this sort of noise in the 
data generation processes does itself provide a handy side benefit of ‘natural 
  
protection’ against intruders using fishing attacks (finding unusual records in the 
data and then attempting to find the equivalent unit in the population). 
Penetration tests  
There are essentially four stages to a penetration (pen) test: (i) data gathering; 
(ii) data preparation and harmonisation; (iii) the attack itself; and (iv) verification. 
The first stage tends to be the most resource intensive and the second and third 
require the most expertise. In general, external expert involvement will be helpful, 
even if you have the expertise yourself, to bring the perspective of an independent 
attacker. 
Data gathering involves going out in to the world and gathering information on 
particular individuals. Exactly what that will look like will depend on the nature of 
the scenario that you are testing but would typically involve at least some searching 
of the Internet. The intruder test reported in Elliot et al (2016) gathered information 
on 100 individuals, taking about three person-months of effort. That test also 
included a second augmented attack using data purchased from the commercial data 
broker CACI. 
A key point in this process is to decide whether one is assuming that the intruder has 
response knowledge or not – which will have been indicated by the scenario 
analysis. If so then the data holder will provide the matcher with a small sample of 
random formal identifiers (usually name and residential address), drawn from the 
dataset. If not then the simulated matcher will usually adopt the stance of finding 
unusual looking records in the dataset and attempting to find the corresponding 
individuals (the so called fishing attack).  
Once the data gathering phase is complete then the data have to be harmonised with 
the target dataset. This will require work both across all the data, and at the level of 
individual records, as in all likelihood there will be several issues to address to 
achieve this. Gathered data will often be coded differently to the target data. For 
example you might have gathered information about somebody’s job from social 
media, but how exactly would that be coded on the target dataset? There will be data 
divergence with the gathered information. For example the gathered and target data 
are unlikely to refer to the same set of time points so how likely is it that a given 
characteristic will have changed in the time differences and if so is that an important 
consideration? How confident are you in a piece of gathered information? For 
example Google Street View may show a motorcycle parked in the driveway of a 
target address. If you have a variable in your dataset indicating motorcycle 
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ownership, this is very tempting to adopt as a key piece of information, as it will be a 
highly skewed variable (most people do not own a motorcycle). But it may have 
belonged to a visitor, or the house might have changed ownership between the time 
of the Google visit and when the target dataset was created, or the bike might have 
been bought or sold in the interim. So when constructing your keys on a record-by-
record basis you need to take into account all the information that you have gathered 
about a particular identity, but some of it should be flagged as less reliable at this 
preparatory stage so that it can be treated more cautiously at the attack stage. 
Some scenarios simulate linkage between an identification dataset and a target 
dataset, rather than between gathered data and a target dataset. Here no data 
gathering is necessary but data harmonisation will still usually be necessary and 
issues of data divergence still critical, although the focus here will tend to be on the 
dataset as a whole rather than upon individual records.  
The details of the attack stage will also depend on the nature of the data and the 
scenario. But typically it will involve attempting to link the information that you 
have gathered at stage 1 to your dataset. Usually this will involve a mixture of 
automated and manual processes. In essence you try to establish negative and 
positive evidence for links between your attack information and records in the 
dataset.  
When you carry out the linkage you will quickly become aware that this is a non-
exact science and the task is rarely as simple as dividing the potential matches into 
two piles. There is the matter of your confidence in the matches. This could simply 
be a subjective estimate of how likely you think it is that a match is a true match or it 
could involve a more quantitative approach. This will partly depend on what type of 
data intruder you are simulating. Is this an expert carrying out a demonstrative 
attack or simply the next door neighbour being nosy? Table 3.3 shows what an 
output from this process might look like.  
We see from Table 3.3 that there are two individuals matched against record 42356 
and that the individual ‘Jane Indigo’ is matched against two records. Here the 
matcher has been unable to distinguish cleanly between two possible matches 
against a record but is fairly confident that one of them is correct. It may be 
important to record these, because a real intruder may (again depending on the 
nature of the scenario) have options for secondary differentiation which are not 
available in the simulation. In other words, he or she may take close matches and 
engage using a different approach from the original data collection activity (for 
  
example actually visiting a matched address and capturing further data by direct 
observation).  
Name Address 
Record 
No Confidence 
Effective 
Confidence 
Johnny Blue 10 Canterbury Gardens…. 10985 95% 95% 
Jamie Green 68 York Walk…. 45678 95% 95% 
William Pink 53 Winchester Lane…. 
42356 
90% 
60% 
Fred Purple 39 Winchester Street…. 30% 
Archibald Black 68 Canterbury Walk…. 671 85% 85% 
Jane Indigo 23 Richmond Gardens…. 
37 
80% 
40% 
9985 40% 
Patricia Vermilion 20 Winchester Drive…. 70637 60% 60% 
Wilma White 53 Lancaster Drive…. 68920 50% 50% 
Gertrude Gold 57 Privet Street…. 35549 40% 40% 
Brittany Magnolia 12 Acacia Walk…. 22008 30% 30% 
Petra Puce 75 Canterbury Street…. 68680 30% 30% 
Stephanie Red 11 Privet Drive…. 81994 30% 30% 
Simon Violet 136 Acacia Street…. 91293 20% 20% 
Estimated number of correct matches 7.05  
Table 3.3: An example output from a penetration test 
A second point to note is that no match has 100% confidence associated with it. This 
reflects the reality that we can never be completely certain that we are correct. There 
is always a possibility that (i) the dataset contains data for a person who is highly 
similar to our target – their statistical twin – or that (ii) the assumption that our 
target is in the data is incorrect. It is worth noting in passing that this is the flipside 
of not being able to reduce the risk to zero.  
Finally, once you have selected the matches, they need to be verified. This will often 
be carried out by a different person or organisation than the person doing the 
matching. If the matcher is carrying it out – at the risk of stating the obvious – they 
should only do this once they have decided upon their final list of matches.  
In interpreting the results of a penetration test one needs to exercise some caution. 
Although the simulation will be a more direct analogue of what an actual intruder 
might do than with data analytical approaches, there are still differences which will 
impact on the results. Elliot et al (2016) list the following:  
1. Ethical and legal constraints. Penetration tests are constrained ethically and 
legally; a real attack may not be.  
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2. Expertise variance. Typically the matcher will be an expert or at least skilled 
and knowledgeable about data. Even if they ‘dumb down’ their matching 
process in an effort to simulate a ‘naive’ intruder they will not be able to 
switch off their knowledge. This will particularly affect the estimation of 
match confidences. 
3. Time available for data gathering. In order to get a picture of the risk across 
the whole dataset, pen tests usually consider multiple individuals. Resource 
constraints mean that the amount of time spent gathering information on each 
of those individuals will be limited. A real data intruder may be able to 
achieve their goal with just a single correct match and therefore may be able 
to focus attention on a specific individual. 
4. Dataset specific results. Be careful about generalising any results to your data 
products and data situations in general.  
5. Difficulties in simulating real response knowledge. A real data intruder with 
response knowledge might have ad hoc knowledge with respect of their 
target that it is hard to simulate through gathered data. If one wants to 
simulate such an attack, one would need to co-opt data subjects and members 
of their social network into the study. This is an interesting possibility, but to 
our knowledge no such study has ever been carried out and realistically 
would be too resource intensive for practical risk assessment.  
6. Pen tests only give snapshots. The data environment is constantly changing 
and more specifically the availability of data that could be used to re-identify 
individuals is increasing. A pen test if done well may tell you a great deal 
about your risk now but that risk can and indeed will change. 
7. Arbitrary variation of data divergence. Typically in these exercises one is 
gathering current data to carry out the simulated attack whereas the target 
data are past data. Temporal data divergence can markedly reduce the 
accuracy of matches so the degree of divergence between the data collection 
for the target dataset and the data gathering for the simulated attack will 
impact on the results.  
Taking these considerations into account what sort of level of successful matching 
would one consider problematic? It is difficult to generalise this. But if you have 
produced a table like 3.3 and you see most of the high confidence matches are true 
matches then you have a problem and you need to rethink your data situation. But 
what if you have, say, a single correct match? The false positives are important here 
– are some of these high confidence matches? If so then the single correct match is 
swamped by false positives, in which case how could an intruder decide that that 
  
match was a correct one? Remember they will not have the advantage of being able 
to verify!  
One aspect to think about here is risk from the intruder’s perspective – could 
claiming a match that turns out to be incorrect backfire on them? If so then they 
might well be cautious before making a claim. Another aspect to bring to the table in 
your thinking at this stage is the sensitivity of the data. If you think the impact of a 
correct match is high then your tolerance for a single correct match will be lower 
than if the expected impact is low.  
Related to this is the importance of cross checking the correct match rate achieved 
against the rate estimated by the matcher. To derive the former, simply sum up the 
confidences (converted to proportions). So you can see in Table 3.3 the estimated 
number of correct matches is 7.05. If your number of correct matches varies 
significantly from this estimated figure then the matcher may have wrongly 
estimated their confidence level and it is worth considering calibrating the reported 
confidence levels so that the overall estimated number of matches is correct. The 
simplest method for doing this is to divide each confidence by the estimated number 
of matches and multiply by the number of correct matches achieved.  
Of course a real data intruder might hit on a match which by chance happens to be 
correct, and they may not care or even know about nuances such as confidence 
levels. Although you have to think about such eventualities, you cannot build your 
data sharing practices around them – the correct place to deal with them is in your 
breaches policy, which we discuss in component 9. 
A final question is what we assume the intruder knows about the disclosure control 
applied to the data. Nothing? The methods employed? The methods plus the 
parameters used? This will partly depend on the moment in the anonymisation 
process in which the penetration test is run, and the type of disclosure control that 
has been applied. If you have simply aggregated and deleted variables then we can 
assume that the intruder simply observes the effects of the control process. However, 
if data distortion has been applied then a sophisticated intruder will be able to use 
knowledge of the details of this if they are published. Note here that there is 
therefore an iterative relationship between this component and component 7, where 
disclosure controls are actually applied to the data. 
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Component 7: Identify the disclosure control processes that 
are relevant to your data situation. 
Disclosure control processes essentially attend to either or both of the two elements 
of your data situation: the data and their environment. If your risk analysis in 
component 6 suggests that you need stronger controls then you have two (non-
exclusive) choices: 
1. Change the data (specification) 
2. Reconfigure the data environment 
In section 2.5.2 we described the various disclosure control techniques, and their 
pros and cons.  
Changing the data  
Usually one starts from a fairly fixed proposal of what the release/share environment 
will be, defined in components 1 and 4. It may be that this fixed idea has to change 
but initially one has to work on changing the data. The most common place to start 
is aggregation.  
1. Keeping the use case in mind, can you lose detail on your key variables to 
reduce the measurable risk?  
2. If your data situation is sensitive, can you remove or reduce detail on 
sensitive variables? 
Often the answer is yes; you will lose some utility but not to the extent that the data 
lose most of their value.  
Variables that tend to be a focus here are spatial and temporal ones – typically place 
of residence and age. The latter is particularly important if the data is about multi-
member households. Other variables which can be considered are those with 
skewed distributions (where minority categories can be merged together). However, 
any variable that appears in your scenario keys should be considered.  
At this point you should also consider producing a sample rather than releasing all 
of the data. Any level of sampling will reduce the risk, but sample fractions that one 
would normally consider range from between 1% and 50%. Most census and social 
surveys microdata products are released as samples at the bottom end of this range 
and these are generally regarded as high utility products, and so for release use cases 
give some serious consideration to this possibility.  
One overarching advantage of metadata controls, such as aggregating scenario keys 
and sampling, is that you can easily rerun your risk measurements in order to see 
  
what impact a particular aggregation has on the overall level of risk. Doing this with 
data distortion controls is more difficult.  
In general, if it is possible to reduce the risk to an appropriate level through 
aggregation, variable deletion and sampling, then that should be the preferred 
approach. Applying data distortion controls affects the data utility in an 
unpredictable and non-transparent manner and leaves you with the difficult 
question about whether or not to release information about the distortion. 
However, if you have done all that you think you might be able to do with metadata 
level controls and the risk is still too high, then you will have to move on to data 
distortions or reconfigure the environment. If the latter is not possible because the 
use dictates a particular environment, then distortion of the data is left as the only 
possibility.  
Now you have to decide whether the distortion should be random or targeted. 
Random distortion in fact has relatively low impact on the risk –you will have to do 
quite a lot of distorting before you get a significant impact. Random distortion works 
by reducing the baseline confidence in any match. Targeted distortion potentially 
has a big impact on the disclosure risk. The point of targeting is to focus on the high 
risk records (those identified by your record-level risk metrics in component 6). So if 
you turn a sixteen year older widower into a sixteen year old single person then you 
have merged him into the crowd and the risk goes away. However, the big cost is 
that you alter variability and introduce bias. So our guidance is to do this only very 
sparingly.  
The second issue is that once you have distorted the data then the standard risk 
metrics will no longer work. There are techniques for measuring post-distortion risk, 
but these are experimental and complicated to implement. So there are two options: 
(i) you add in distortion to pick up a small amount of residual targeted risk when 
you are quite close to your acceptable level anyway or (ii) you carry out a pen test.  
In general, we would not advise using data distortion controls if you can avoid them 
and if you do you should consult an expert first. 
Reconfiguring the environment 
As described in chapter 2, reconfiguring the environment essentially involves 
controlling who has access, how they access the data and for what purposes. In some 
cases the environment is a fixed point of reference within the data situation – ‘we 
want to release an open version of this dataset’ or ‘we want to share these data with 
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organisation X’ – in which case your anonymisation solutions will have to be data-
focused and the environment will have been fixed as per components 1 and 4.  
In other cases it is possible to achieve anonymisation, at least in part, through 
reconfiguring the environment. Options to consider are: 
1. Allowing access only within your own secure environment. 
2. Specifying the requisite level of security for the data. 
3. Specifying that all analytical outputs must be checked and sanctioned by you 
before they are published. 
4. Specifying the people who may access the data. 
Placing or tightening controls on the environment will tend to have quite significant 
effects on the risk, often ruling out particular forms of attack, for example, and so if 
the data are sensitive they are certainly worth considering.  
3.3 Impact Management 
Much of what we have considered so far has framed risk management in terms of 
reducing the likelihood of an unintended disclosure happening, but it would be 
irresponsible not to prepare for the worst. Impact management puts in place a plan 
for reducing the impact of such an event should it happen. 
Component 8: Identify your stakeholders and plan how you 
will communicate with them 
Effective communication can help build trust and credibility, both of which are 
critical to difficult situations where you need to be heard, understood and believed. 
You will be better placed to manage the impact of a disclosure if you and your 
stakeholders have developed a good working relationship. 
About your stakeholders 
In component 4 we talked about the importance of communication and engagement 
with user groups. Your users are of course not the only group with an interest in 
your business or activity. Others who may be affected include data subjects, the 
general public, partner organisations, the media, funders and special interest groups. 
Depending on the circumstances and the public interest in your data, many if not all 
the stakeholders just listed are likely to have an interest in your data, their use and 
reuse, whether confidentiality is a high priority in your organisation, and whether 
assurances of confidentiality are well-founded. However, what they would like to 
  
hear about these topics may differ. For example, data subjects and the general public 
are likely to want to know the what of your processing activities, such as what data, 
in which environment(s). In contrast specialist interest groups and the media may 
also want to know about the how of your processing activities, such as how are they 
anonymised or how you determine an environment to be safe. The key is to engage 
(as well as communicate) with your stakeholders to determine what they would like 
to know about your processing activities, most obviously so that you can put your 
point of view across (and also, perhaps, adjust your practices in response to 
reasonable criticism), but also so that you understand their information needs 
immediately when you find you have to pick up the phone. You can do this in much 
the same way you engage with your user groups by, for example: 
o A web or mail survey: You could develop a ten or twenty-minute survey to 
be delivered via your website or through a mail-out. Bear in mind you may 
need to tailor the survey to different stakeholder groups.  
o Going out and talking: You may want to tailor the mode of discussion for 
particular target stakeholders, e.g. holding face-to-face meetings with funders, 
holding focus groups with representatives from the general public, etc. 
o A little research: One way to identify concerns is to look at the type of FOI 
requests you and similar organisations in your sector receive. Identify 
common themes and whether particular stakeholders are associated with 
particular themes, e.g. a member of the public or the media.  
Determining the next step once you know what your various stakeholders want to 
hear from you may or may not be straightforward. As we have already said, being 
open and transparent is always preferable but you may not be able to meet all your 
stakeholders’ requests for information, either because they impact on your 
disclosure control or because they create their own confidentiality issues.  
Communicating and engaging with stakeholders 
Plan out how you will talk to and engage with your various stakeholders. Below is a 
list of pointers that you may wish to capture in your plan (it is not an exhaustive 
list).  
Identify your key stakeholders 
This is an obvious point but you need to make sure you capture all those likely to 
have a stake in your data processing activities; this might be a wide range of groups. 
Common stakeholders include those we have listed above, although this will be 
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dependent on your activities, your organisation, the sector you belong to etc. So, for 
example, stakeholders in the health sector in the UK will include groups such as the 
Department of Health, the local authority or council, hospital trusts, patients and 
patients’ groups, service users, suppliers, funders, commissioning groups, quality 
assessors, special interest groups, community groups, the wider public health 
workforce, and the media. 
Be clear about your aims and objectives in talking to your stakeholders.  
This will help you ensure that your messages are clear and consistent. You may have 
multiple aims, such as: (i) to promote trust in your organisation’s handling of data, 
(ii) to build relations with relevant specialist groups, and (iii) to promote awareness 
about your reuse of data for public benefit. 
Your objectives should include details of how you will go about realising your aims. 
For example: 
o If one of your aims is to promote awareness in how you reuse data for public benefit 
your objectives might be:  
Objective 1: Produce and publish case studies detailing how the reuse of x, y 
and z data has benefited the general public.  
Objective 2: Gather and publish testimonials on how the reuse of x, y and z 
data benefited particular groups. 
Objective 3: carry out and publish a Privacy Impact Assessment.  
o If one of your aims is to promote trust in your organisation’s handling of data your 
objectives might be: 
Objective 1: Produce and publish a clear statement outlining your 
commitment to data confidentiality. 
Objective 2: Produce a report on your data share and release activities. 
Establish your key messages  
This is critical to the effectiveness of your communications. Your key messages need 
to be clear and concise and address the concerns of your stakeholders.  
About communication and public engagement activities  
Your communication and public engagement activities should have clear timescales 
and goals to allow you to evaluate their effectiveness.  
Examples of communications and engagement activities might include: 
  
o Press releases: A concise press release can help you reach a large audience 
with little financial outlay.  
o Social media: Regular and committed use of social networking, such as 
Facebook or Twitter, allows you to communicate immediately and in real 
time.  
o Actively maintain a website: This will allow you to provide consistent 
messages over time, accessible to all (or most of) your stakeholders.93 
o Involvement and consultation activities: Going out and meeting your 
stakeholders, holding focus groups, meetings, briefings and discussion 
forums etc., allows personal and face-to-face contacts to develop, which in 
many circumstances is more supportive of trust than a purely corporate 
outward face. 
One final and very general point about communication is that by promoting trust, 
building relations and promoting any good works you will be helping to associate a 
positive view with your organisation’s use of data. Promoting a positive view 
associated with your data products/organisation is important because you are 
operating in a complex global data environment over which you have limited 
control and bad news stories about data breaches and data security mishaps are all 
too frequent. If there has been a recent, widely-publicised data breach elsewhere in 
your sector, it may be that you, even though blameless, will be scrutinised by the 
media, or political campaigners, very closely for a period. If you have succeeded in 
establishing a positive view of your data practices, it may even mean that 
stakeholders who discover any problems with your data will be more likely to come 
to you quietly, enabling you to fix them, rather than immediately going public.  
Component 9: Plan what happens next once you have shared 
or released the data 
Having shared or released an anonymised dataset, do you need to do anything else 
in respect of those data? The simple answer is yes. It is our recommendation that you 
do not just release and forget about your data. Continuing advancements in IT 
capabilities, supporting ever-greater access to data and capacity for their analysis, 
and an ever increasing amount of available data, mean that there is always the 
potential for the data environment in which you have shared or released your data 
                                                          
93 Examples where a lot of thought has been given to the key issues of public benefit and trust can be 
found at www.adrn.ac.uk and www.datasaveslives.eu/. 
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to change. So whilst your data may be considered safe at the time of its release this 
may not be the case in the medium term. This is a view also taken by the ICO: 
‘Means of identifying individuals that are feasible and cost-effective, and are therefore 
likely to be used, will change over time. If you decide that the data you hold does not allow 
the identification of individuals, you should review that decision regularly in light of new 
technology or security developments or changes to the public availability of certain 
records.’ (ICO Determining what is personal data. Version 1.1, 2012, page 9).  
There are a number of measures you can take to monitor the data environment once 
you have shared or released your data. These measures should include (but are not 
limited to):  
1. Keeping a register of all the data you have shared or released. 
2. Comparing proposed share and release activities to past shares and releases 
to take account of the possibility of linkage between releases leading to a 
disclosure (as exemplified in section 2.3.4). 
3. Be aware of changes in the data environment and how these may impact on 
your data. This means (i) keeping abreast of developments in new 
technologies and security that may affect your data situation by, for example, 
reading technology journals/blogs, watching relevant podcasts and/or 
attending relevant events; (ii) monitoring changes in the law or guidance on 
data sharing and dissemination by engaging with relevant organisations such 
as the ICO and UKAN and (iii) keeping track of current and new public data 
sources by, for example, reviewing the information available on the Internet 
and through more traditional sources such as public registers, local 
community records, estate agents’ lists, professional registers, the library, etc.  
If possible you should also keep track of how your data is used. If you are 
controlling access this is fairly straightforward; if you are releasing an open dataset 
then you might want to consider a process whereby users register their intended use 
before downloading. This type of information is invaluable later when you are 
considering the next release, developing its use case (component 4) and considering 
the risk and utility trade-offs in components 6 and 7. 
If your organisation is large enough you may wish to appoint a Chief Data Officer to 
oversee these activities. Certainly you will need to ensure someone in your 
organisation takes responsibility for overseeing these measures. 
  
Component 10: Plan what you will do if things go wrong  
Sometimes, even when you follow all the recommended advice, things can go 
wrong. As identified in component 2 it is important that you have effective 
governance policies and procedures in place which essentially identify who does 
what, when and how, and generally support a culture of transparency. A natural 
extension of this is putting in place mechanisms that can help you deal with a 
disclosure in the rare event that one were to occur.  
Ensure you have a robust audit trail  
Being able to provide a clear audit trail taking into account all relevant 
anonymisation activities and processes will be crucial for the purpose of: 
(i) demonstrating that you have followed all correct procedures, and (ii) identifying 
where, if at all, in your processing activities you might need to make changes to 
prevent a similar occurrence. In practice this means keeping clear and up-to-date 
records of all your processing activities, detailing who did what, when and how. 
Some of this information can itself increase disclosure risk and thus these records 
may by default be internally facing. Not being transparent about the anonymisation 
process may, however, impact on utility and for this reason you may wish to 
provide a top level public narrative about your anonymisation processes.  
Ensure you have a crisis management policy 
A crisis management policy will ensure you deal effectively and efficiently with a 
data breach were one to occur. It should identify key roles and responsibilities and 
detail an action plan stating, step by step, the processes that should be followed in 
the event of a breach.  
There are (at least) two key tasks within crisis management: managing the situation 
and communicating it to stakeholders. These tasks, if taken on by more than one 
person, require close cooperation from the start right through to the post-breach 
review.  
Ensure you have adequately trained staff. 
You should ensure that all staff involved in your data processing activities are 
suitably skilled and experienced for the tasks they undertake and that they 
understand their responsibilities.  
You will in all likelihood need to conduct training to ensure staff are kept up-to-date 
with relevant anonymisation issues. This might take the form of:  
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o In-house training on the principles and procedures of your data processing 
activities. 
o External training on core factors such as anonymisation issues and 
techniques, data security, data protection law etc. 
Other ways to support the safe handling of data might include: 
o Organising regular team meeting/briefings to look at anonymisation issues 
such as ‘what are my responsibilities under a Data Share Agreement when 
processing data from another source?’ 
o Implementing a staff non-disclosure agreement to provide clear guidance to 
staff about their data confidentiality responsibilities inside and outside of 
their workplace and when employment at your organisation ceases.  
Managing the situation 
Set out a plan for managing the situation. The types of activities you will need to 
cover are outlined in steps 1 to 6 below. By establishing step-by-step what you will 
need to do will help you both better manage the situation and avoid having to make 
decisions in haste.  
In your plan you should identify the person who will take overall responsibility for 
managing the situation. You should also include a clear description of their 
responsibilities. 
In the event of a data breach your staff will need to know their roles and 
responsibilities. Your plan should make these clear. For example, when a member of 
staff first becomes aware of a breach what should they do? Who should they contact 
and how? What should they do if the person identified as the first point of contact is 
not immediately available?  
Communicating the situation 
Within your crisis management plan you will need to detail a strategy for 
communicating with key stakeholders, especially those who may potentially be 
directly affected by the breach, the ICO, the media and other interested parties. You 
should identify a spokesperson to represent you/your organisation to ensure your 
messages about the breach and your responses to it are clear and consistent. 
Transparency is always preferable but you will probably need time to get all the key 
information together so you may need an initial holding response to stakeholders 
such as ‘we are investigating the matter’. Nevertheless, it is important that you are 
  
more concrete and on the record about what you are doing as early as possible in the 
process.  
Steps in a crisis management plan 
More widely, the key point is that everyone in your organisation should know what 
your strategy is and their role in it. A plan for managing a data breach might include 
the following steps:94 
Step 1: Respond swiftly 
Include in the plan the first series of actions for a range of possible relevant 
situations and how they might be undertaken. For example, in the event of a breach 
relating to datasets published on (our) website immediately take the dataset down 
from the website. 
Step 2: Assess the impact  
Include in the plan how the potential impact might be assessed and recorded. The 
key questions here would be: 
o Can you guesstimate the potential for other copies of the data being in 
existence – e.g. from knowledge of users, website traffic? 
o What is the nature of the breach? 
o Are the data sensitive? 
o Is anyone, and if so how many are, likely to be affected by the breach?  
o What is the nature of the harm likely to be experienced? 
Step 3: Put measures in place to limit the impact 
Include a feedback loop so that once step 2 is completed you can reconsider if any 
further interim action can be taken. Think through the types of further action that 
might be required and plan how you would deliver them. 
Step 4: Notify the appropriate people.  
Include in the plan details about who should be notified about the breach, how and 
within what timeframe.95 
                                                          
94 Please also see the ICO’s guidance on managing a data breach; UK: Information Commissioner’s 
Office (2012b).  
95 For further information see UK: Information Commissioner’s Office (2016). We note that under the 
new EU regulations notification will be mandatory; European Commission (2015). 
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Step 5: Penalties 
Include in the plan details about any penalties associated with behaviours indirectly 
or directly leading to a breach. Make sure identified penalties are fair, consistent and 
enforceable.  
Step 6: Review the breach and your handling of it 
The aim here is to learn lessons from the event and put procedures in place to 
prevent a further occurrence. You should stipulate who will undertake the review 
and within what time frame.  
Ensure you undertake a periodic review of your processing activities 
A review process is likely to be most effective if it is undertaken periodically and not 
just when a crisis occurs. You should stipulate who is responsible for the review, 
when and how it will be undertaken and within what time frame. For this you might 
want to develop your own standardised form that captures your data processing 
activities and the criteria against which they will be assessed.  
3.4 Closing remarks 
In this chapter, we have described the anonymisation decision making framework as 
a practical tool for dealing with your data situation. As we said at the outset, the 
framework is not a simple checklist system but does provide structure which can 
reduce the complexity of the process of anonymising your dataset before you release 
or share it. Each of the components in the framework will require thought and 
planning to implement, but with appropriate resourcing can turn data sharing from 
a confusing and daunting process that puts you under pressure, into a practical and 
perhaps even exciting possibility for optimising the utility of your data. 
3.4.1 Further reading 
For the reader who is interested in going deeper into any of the topics that the 
framework covers there is a wealth of material available both in print and online. 
Around the particular issues to do with the technicalities of disclosure risk 
assessment and control there are several technical primers. The easiest of them is 
probably Duncan et al (2011) which starts with three conceptual chapters only a little 
beyond the material presented here before launching into more technical material. 
The most comprehensive treatment of orthodox data focused disclosure control can 
be found in Hundepool et al (2012). A good source for finding out about the state of 
the art in disclosure control is the Privacy in Statistical Databases series which is edited 
  
by Josep Domingo-Ferrer and colleagues and published every two years. The last 
edition was published in 2014.  
For treatments of the end to end anonymisation problem that particularly focus on 
health data we would recommend the reader looks at the work of Khaled El-Amam 
and colleagues, particularly the 2013 edited collection entitled Risky Business and two 
recent authored books Anonymizing Health Data (2014) and Guide to the De-
Identification of Personal Health Information (2013). These are primarily aimed at the 
North American market but like our own offering here there is much that is 
transferable to other jurisdictions. 
Discussions of the ethical and legal issues surrounding anonymisation and data 
sharing are numerous. We do particularly recommend Helen Nissenbaum’s (2010) 
book on contextual integrity. Also of note is her recent (2015) collaboration with Finn 
Brunton called Obfuscation which could be read as a call for data subjects to 
anonymise their own data and possibly serves as a warning of what is likely to 
happen if data holders do not get their privacy practices into a better space. 
On the specific issue of consent, this is very much an area of open debate. We refer 
the reader to articles by Singleton and Wadworth (2006), Iversen et al (2006) and 
Haynes et al (2007) for general discussions about the issue. More recently, Cruise et 
al (2015) discuss consent issues related to data linkage and Hallinan and Friedewald 
(2015) raise the import issue of whether consent can ever truly be informed – and the 
relevance of this to the new EU general data protection regulation.  
If you are considering how this all fits in with the new world of big data, Van Den 
Hoven et al (2015) is a good place to start. Julia Lane and colleagues’ (2014) edited 
collection is also very good for some serious thinking about the direction of travel. 
Other recent perspectives are provided by: Crawford and Schultz (2014), Boyd and 
Crawford (2012), Szonsgott et al (2012), Rubenstein (2013), Richards and King (2013), 
Narayanan et al (2016), and Matzner et al (2016). The volume, velocity and variety of 
opinions, perspectives and new ideas in this area mirrors the properties of big data 
itself. Suffice to say if you are dipping into this literature expect to come away with 
more questions than answers. 
3.4.2 Next steps for the framework 
We regard this framework as an organic open document. The data environment is 
constantly changing and new forms of data are appearing all the time. Therefore, we 
will be reviewing the framework and revising it on a regular basis. Please do use the 
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feedback form available from the UKAN website to provide input into this ongoing 
development.  
We will also be developing new case studies that explicitly use the framework and if 
you are interested in working with us to develop such a case study using your data 
situation then please do get in touch.  
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Glossary of Terms  
Additivity: A feature of tables of counts where the column and row totals are exact 
sums of the columns and rows they correspond to. Rounding and other forms of 
data distortion can violate additivity. 
Anonymisation: This is a complex process that transforms identifiable data into 
non-identifiable (anonymous) data. This usually requires that identifiers be 
removed, obscured, aggregated and/or altered in some way. It may also involve 
restrictions on the data environment. 
Analysis Server: A system – often virtual – where data users do not access data 
directly but instead submit analytical requests which are run (usually automatically) 
and then the users provided with the analytical output. That output may be checked 
for disclosiveness or the system maybe set up so as to only allow a restricted range 
of requests known to produce only safe output. 
Analytical Completeness: A measure of the capacity of a dataset (in terms of 
variables, variable codings and sample size) to deliver a given analysis. 
Completeness is measured relative to some reference dataset usually the dataset 
before disclosure control has been applied. 
Analytical Validity: A measure of whether a dataset produces the same result for a 
given analysis as a reference dataset (usually the dataset before disclosure control 
has been applied). 
Attribution: This is the process of associating a particular piece of data with a 
particular population unit (person, household business or other entity). Note that 
attribution can happen with re-identification (if for example all members of a group 
share a common attribute).  
Barnardisation: A form of noise addition for aggregate tables of counts where small 
numbers (usually -1, 0 and +1) are added to each cell. 
Confidence: a measure, often subjective, of the certainty with which an intruder (or 
matcher within a penetration test) believes that a match between a population unit 
and a data unit is correct.  
Confidentiality: The protection of the data/information from unwanted disclosure. 
With personal data this concerns the disclosure of identified or identifiable 
information.  
Data controller: An entity that makes decisions about the processing of some data. 
Note that being a data controller is not a singular role (in the manner of say a 
Caldecott guardian) but a relationship between an entity and the data they are 
controller of. 
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Data environment: This is an explanatory concept in the realm of data privacy. It is 
best understood as the context for any item of data.  
Data distortion controls: Any method of disclosure control which controls 
disclosure risk by manipulating the variable values at the level of individual data 
units. 
Data divergence: This represents the differences between two datasets (data-data 
divergence) or between a single dataset and reality (data-world divergence). Sources 
of data divergence include: data ageing, response errors, mode of collection, coding 
or data entry errors, differences in coding and the effect of disclosure control.  
Data intruder: A data user who attempts to disclose information about a data subject 
through identification and/or attribution (see statistical disclosure). Intruders may be 
motivated by a wish to discredit or otherwise harm the organisation disseminating 
the data, to gain notoriety or publicity, or to gain profitable knowledge about 
particular data subjects. The term also encompasses inadvertent intruders, who may 
spontaneously recognise individual cases within a dataset. Data intruders are 
sometimes referred to as attackers, snoopers or adversaries. 
Data processor: An entity that processes personal data on behalf of a data controller 
but does not make decisions about that processing. 
Data protection: This refers to the set of privacy-motivated laws, policies and 
procedures that aim to minimise intrusion into data subjects’ privacy caused by the 
collection, storage and sharing of data.  
Data release: Any process of data dissemination where the data controller no longer 
directly controls who has access to the data. This ranges from general licensing 
arrangements, such as end user licensing where access is available to certain classes 
of people for certain purposes, through to fully open data where access is 
unrestricted. 
Dataset: Any collection of data about a defined set of entities. Normally employed to 
mean data where data units are distinguishable (i.e. not summary statistics).  
Data share: A dynamic data situation where the data controller has made a decision 
to allow a fixed set of entities access to a given dataset.  
Data Situation: The relationship between some data and their environment.  
Data Situation audit: The initial stage of the anonymisation decision making 
framework that clarifies the nature of the data situation and the elements that 
require further analysis. 
Data subject: An individual to whom a particular piece of data relates.  
Data swapping: A method of statistical disclosure control which involves swapping 
the values of a key variable (most often geography) between records which are 
similar on some other set of variables (often household composition). 
  
Data unit: A case in a dataset; a set of data about a single population unit. 
Data user: An entity (person or organisation) that processes data. In the context of 
anonymisation it is usually employed to mean that the data are non-personal and 
therefore users are not data controllers or data processors.  
Data utility: A term describing the value of a given data release as an analytical 
resource - the key issue being whether the data represent whatever it is they are  
supposed to represent. Disclosure control methods can have an adverse effect on 
data utility. Ideally, the goal of any disclosure control regime should be to maximise 
data utility whilst minimising disclosure risk. In practice disclosure control decisions 
are a trade-off between utility and disclosure risk.  
De-identification: The removal or masking of formal identifiers within a dataset. 
Differencing: A re-identification attack whereby two different and overlapping 
codings for a variable (usually geography but in principal are variable) are overlain 
leading to intersecting categories which contain small numbers of cases. 
Disclosure control methods: These are a set of methods for reducing the risk of 
disclosure, such methods are usually based on restricting the amount of, or 
modifying the, data released.  
Disclosive data: Data are considered to be disclosive when they allow data subjects 
to be identified, (either directly or indirectly) and/or when they allow information 
about data subjects to be revealed. Data can be disclosive without any actual 
disclosures having happened. 
Disclosure risk: This is expressed as the probability that an intruder identifies 
and/or reveals new information about at least one data subject in the disseminated 
data. Because anonymisation is difficult and has to be balanced against data utility, 
the risk that a disclosure will happen will never be zero. In other words there will be 
a risk of disclosure present in all useful anonymised data.  
Direct identifier: Any data item that, on its own, could uniquely identify an 
individual case. It is sometimes referred to as a direct identifier, examples of which 
include a data subject’s name, address and unique reference numbers, e.g. their 
social security number or National Health Service number.  
Dynamic data situation: A data situation where data is being moved from one data 
environment to another. 
Equivalence class: A set of data units that are identical on a given set of variables.  
Equivalence class structure: A frequency table of equivalence class sizes. 
False positive: An incorrect match between two data units or between a data unit 
and a population unit. 
Formal Anonymisation: Any process which removes or masks direct identifiers on 
a dataset.  
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Formal identifier: Synonym of direct identifier. 
Functional Anonymisation: A holistic approach to anonymisation which asserts that 
data can only be determined as anonymised or not in relation to its environment. 
Guaranteed Anonymisation: A form of anonymisation where, given a set of 
assumptions, the risk of identification is zero. The most extreme form of this is 
where, given the environmental and data controls, an absolute risk of zero is claimed 
but this is widely thought of as a straw man. 
Harmonisation: The process of recoding a variable on a dataset so that it more 
directly corresponds to an equivalent variable on another dataset. 
Identifiable data: Data that contains indirect identifiers. 
Identified data: Data that contains direct identifiers. 
Impact management: A process which acknowledges that the risk of a disclosure 
from data that has been released or shared is not zero and therefore puts in place 
strategies to reduce the impact of such a disclosure should it happen. 
Indirect identifiers: These can in principle include any piece of information (or 
combination of pieces of information). For example, consider a combination of 
information for a ‘sixteen year old‘ and ‘widowed’; whilst age and marital status are 
not immediately obvious identifiers, our implicit demographic knowledge tells us 
that this combination is rare. This means that such an individual could potentially be 
re-identified by, for example, someone spontaneously recognising that this record 
corresponded to someone they knew.  
Informed consent: Basic ethical tenet of scientific research on human populations. 
Informed consent refers to a person’s agreement to allow personal data to be 
provided for research and statistical purposes. Agreement is based on full exposure 
of the facts the person needs to make the decision intelligently, including awareness 
of any risks involved, of uses and users of the data, and of alternatives to providing 
the data.  
k-anonymity: A criterion sometimes used to ensure that there are at least k records 
within a dataset that have the same combination of indirect identifiers. Sometimes 
termed as using a threshold of k (usually 3 or 5 is used). 
Key variable: A variable common to two (or more) datasets, which may therefore be 
used for linking records between them. More generally, in scenario analysis, the 
term is used to mean a variable likely to be accessible to the data intruder. 
License agreement: A permit, issued under certain conditions which enables a 
researcher to use confidential data for specific purposes and for specific periods of 
time. This agreement consists of contractual and ethical obligations, as well as 
penalties for improper disclosure or use of identifiable information.  
  
Metadata level controls: Disclosure control methods that work by restricting the 
data rather than distorting it. Examples are sampling, variable deletion and 
aggregation/recoding. 
Microaggregation: A form of disclosure control whereby data units are grouped 
based on a proximity measure of variables of interest, and the same small groups of 
records are used in calculating aggregates (perhaps group means or centroids) for 
those variables. The aggregates are released instead of the individual record values. 
Microdata: A microdata set consists of a set of records containing information on 
individual data subjects. Each record may contain hundreds or even thousands of 
pieces of information. 
Noise addition: The distortion of data through some random process. 
Open data: Data released without any access restrictions, usually by publishing on 
the Internet.  
Output statistical disclosure control: A process by which analytical outputs are 
manipulated so that they are non-personal. This is most relevant to data centres 
where access is controlled but the data are highly detailed and would be personal if 
released as open data.  
Overimputation: Replacing real values in a micro-dataset with ones that have been 
generated through a statistical model.  
Perturbation: Is a method for altering data in some way so as to control disclosure. 
Perturbative techniques include: data swapping, noise addition, rounding and 
barnardisation. 
Penetration test: An approach to disclosure risk assessment where one attempts to 
re-identify individuals within a dataset using other (possibly publically available) 
information.  
Personal data: Any information relating to an identified or identifiable data subject. 
An identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly. Where an 
individual is not identifiable, data are said to be anonymous. Under Data Protection 
Act (1998), this term can only refer to living individuals. However, under other 
legislation the definition is extended to deceased individuals. 
Personal information: A term used under Statistics and Registration Service Act 
(2007) – applying to that released by Office for National Statistics only – for 
information that either directly identifies an individual case or does so in 
conjunction with other information that is already in the public domain (published). 
Information for which identification requires privately held information does not 
constitute personal information. Personal information in this definition does include 
information about the dead as well as the living. 
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Population: the set of population units that a dataset is drawn from. The dataset 
could be a sample and so not all units within the population will necessarily be in 
the dataset.  
Population unique: A record within a dataset which is unique within the population 
on a given set of key variables.  
Population unit: An entity in the world. It is usually employed to mean the socio-
physical analogue of a corresponding data unit although in any given dataset a 
given population unit may not have a corresponding data unit.  
Privacy: A concept that is much discussed and debated and for which there is no 
unequivocal definition. It would be generally agreed that privacy applies to people 
whereas confidentiality applies to data. There is a definite relationship between 
confidentiality and privacy Breach of confidentiality can result in disclosure of data 
which harms the individual. This can be regarded as a violation of privacy because it 
is an intrusion into a person’s self-determination (of the way his or her personal data 
are used). Informational (or data) privacy therefore can be understood to encompass 
an individual’s freedom from excessive intrusion in the quest for information and an 
individual’s ability to choose the extent and circumstances under which his or her 
beliefs, behaviours, opinions and attitudes will be shared with or withheld from 
others.  
Pseudonymisation: A technique where direct identifiers are replaced with a 
fictitious name or code that uniquely identifies an individual; it is almost always 
used in conjunction with other anonymisation methods. 
Quasi-identifier: Synonym of indirect identifier. 
Record linkage: A process attempting to classify pairs of matches between different 
datasets.  
Re-identification: The discovery of the identity of individual(s) in a dataset by using 
additional relevant information. 
Remote access: On-line access to protected microdata.  
Respondent: Originally used to refer to a person who responds to a survey. A 
respondent might provide data about just themselves but sometimes about others 
(as well) and data could have been generated without the data subjects’ knowledge. 
So a respondent might not be a data subject and vice versa. 
Response knowledge: The knowledge that a given population unit is included in a 
dataset. This could be through private knowledge, e.g. that a friend or work 
colleague has mentioned that s/he responded to a particular survey or it could be 
through simple knowledge that a particular population unit is a member of the 
population and the data is a full dataset for that population (e.g. a census). 
Restricted access: A data protection measure that limits who has access to a 
particular dataset. Approved users can either have: (i) access to a whole range of raw 
  
(protected) data and process it themselves or (ii) access to outputs, e.g. tables from 
the data.  
Rounding: A method of statistical disclosure control where a figure is rounded off to 
a defined base; it is most commonly applied to tables of counts.  
R-U (Risk-Utility) map: A graphical representation of the trade-off between 
disclosure risk and data utility.  
Safe data: Data that has been protected by suitable Statistical Disclosure Control 
methods.  
Safe setting: An environment such as a data lab whereby access to a disclosive 
dataset can be controlled.  
Sample unit: A data unit in a dataset which is the sample of some population. 
Scenario Analysis: A framework for establishing the key variables that might be 
used by a data intruder to re-identify data units. 
Sample unique: A record within a dataset which is unique within that dataset on a 
given set of key variables.  
Sampling: This refers to releasing only a proportion of the original data records on a 
microdata file. In the context of disclosure control, a data intruder could not be 
certain that any particular person was in the file.  
Sampling fraction: The proportion of the population contained within a dataset. 
With simple random sampling, the sample fraction represents the proportion of 
population units that are selected in the sample. With more complex sampling 
methods, this is usually the ratio of the number of units in the sample to the number 
of units in the population from which the sample is selected. A low sampling 
fraction can provide some protection to a dataset where an intruder might not be 
able to infer that a sample unique is a population unique.  
Scenario analysis: A framework for analysing plausible data intrusion attempts. 
This framework identifies (some) of the likely factors, conditions and mechanism for 
disclosure.  
Secondary differentiation: A strategy adopted by a data intruder, to distinguish 
between multiple candidate matches between data units and population units. For 
multiple data units matched to a single population unit this involves identifying 
variables where the two records differ and then targeting resources on establishing 
the value of that variable for the population unit. For a single population unit 
matched against multiple population units this involves identifying which of the 
population units matches the data units on variables not included in the original 
match key.  
Sensitive variables: Variables contained in a data record that belong to the private 
domain of data subjects who would not like them to be disclosed. There is no exact 
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definition given for what is a ‘sensitive variable’. The Data Protection Act (DPA) lists 
twelve topics described as ‘sensitive personal data’ including: racial or ethnic origin, 
political opinions, religious beliefs, trade union membership, physical or mental 
health or condition, sexual life, and some aspects of criminal proceedings. However, 
there are other variables not in the DPA that might be deemed sensitive, such as 
those related to income, wealth, credit record and financial dealings. The context is 
important here; the distinction between sensitive and non-sensitive can depend on 
the circumstances. For example, one’s religion might be considered as a sensitive 
variable in some countries and not so in others. 
Special unique: A sample unique that has a high probability of being a population 
unique. This can be evaluated statistically and also through common sense 
knowledge. For example, intuitive knowledge of UK demographics will tell you that 
‘16 year old widowers’ are unusual. So if you have one in data for a particular 
geographical area then they may well be a population unique. 
Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC): An umbrella term for the integrated processes 
of disclosure risk assessment, disclosure risk management and data utility.  
Statistical disclosure: A statistical disclosure is a form of data confidentiality breach 
that occurs when, through statistical matching, an individual data subject is 
identified within an anonymised dataset and/or confidential information about them 
is revealed. A statistical disclosure may come about through: (i) the processes of re-
identification and attribution (i.e. the revealing of new information) or (ii) the 
process of attribution alone.  
Stream data: Data which is generated continuously either as an update or additively. 
Subtraction attack: An attack carried out on aggregated data which works by 
removing completely known units from the data. 
Suppression: A disclosure control process where parts of the data are made 
unavailable to the user. All metadata level controls could be viewed as a form of 
suppression but the term is more usually used to describe more targeted approaches 
like cell suppression and the removal of outliers and/or local suppression of 
particular values within microdata records. 
Synthetic data: Data that have been generated from one or more population models, 
designed to be non-disclosive. 
Tabular data: Aggregate information on entities presented in tables.  
Target dataset: An anonymised dataset in which an intruder attempts to identify 
data subjects. 
Target Variable: Within a scenario framework, information that an intruder would 
like to learn about a population unit or units. 
Top coding: An SDC method used with interval-scale or ordinal variables where 
values above a certain threshold are aggregated together in order to mask a sparse 
  
upper end of the distribution. Age and income are two variables that are typically 
treated in this way. 
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Appendix A: Standard Key Variables. 
Standard keys are generated by organisations carrying out ongoing data 
environment analysis (scanning the data environment for new data sources). You 
should be aware that standard keys are generic and are set up primarily for use with 
licence-based dissemination of official statistics and will not be relevant to every data 
situation. If you are using a highly controlled access environment, or at the other end 
of the scale open data, or if you have data that is unusual in any way, this may not 
be the method to use.  
However, the standard keys can be useful because if your data are not safe relative 
to these standards then in itself that indicates that you may have a problem, even 
before you consider non-standard keys.  
The sets of keys presented here are subsets of those generated by the Data 
Environment Analysis Service at the University of Manchester using the 
methodology reported in Elliot et al (2011). They are focused on demographics and 
socio-economic variables. It should be stressed that these lists are time-dependent 
and are very much subject to change as the data environment changes. However, 
they will serve as a good starting point for considering your own data situation and 
its key variables.  
Scenario Set A: Restricted access database linkage  
Scenario A1.1: Restricted access database cross match 
(general) 
This Scenario is based upon an analysis of the information commonly available in 
restricted access databases.  
o Home address 
o Age  
o Sex  
o Marital status  
o Number of dependent children  
o Distance of journey to work  
o Number of earners  
o Primary economic status 
o SOCmajor (Standard Occupational code) 
  
Attacker Profile: Person with access to restricted access dataset or hacker able to 
obtain such access. 
Scenario A1.2: Restricted access database cross match 
(general, extended) 
This scenario is based upon an analysis of the information commonly available in 
restricted access databases, a slightly extended version of B1.1 with additional, less 
common variables. Typical variables are: 
o Age  
o Sex  
o Marital status  
o Number of dependent children  
o Workplace (typically a geographical identifier) 
o Distance of journey to work  
o Number of earners  
o Tenure  
o Number of cars 
o SOCmajor 
o Primary economic status 
o Income 
Attacker Profile: Person with access to restricted access dataset or hacker able to 
obtain such access. 
Scenario A2.1: Restricted access database cross match (health) 
This represents an attack from a restricted access dataset which also contains health 
information. Such datasets are becoming more common. Typical core variables are: 
o Home address 
o Age  
o Sex 
o Marital status 
o Employment status 
o Ethnic group 
o Alcohol consumption 
o Smoker/non-smoker 
o Long term illness 
o Type of primary long term illness (possibly match against multiple variables) 
Attacker profile: Individual with access to restricted access dataset. 
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Scenario A2.2: Restricted access database cross match (health, 
extended) 
This represents an attack from an extended restricted access dataset which also 
contains health information. Such datasets are becoming more common. Typical core 
variables are: 
o Home address 
o Age  
o Sex 
o Marital status 
o Employment status 
o Ethnic group 
o Alcohol consumption 
o Smoker/non-smoker 
o Long term illness 
o Type of primary long term illness (possibly match against multiple variables) 
o Number of dependent children  
o Workplace (typically a geographical identifier) 
o Distance of journey to work  
o Number of earners  
o Tenure  
o Number of cars 
o SOCmajor 
o Primary economic status 
Attacker profile: Individual with access to restricted access dataset. 
Scenario A3.1: Restricted database cross match (personnel) 
This scenario is based on information commonly held in personnel databases. 
Typically this includes considerable detail on economic characteristics such as 
occupation, industry, economic status, basic physical characteristics (such as age, sex 
and ethnic group) and some information on personal circumstances (area of 
residence, long term illnesses, marital status and number of children). 
o Home address 
o Age 
o Sex  
o Marital status  
o Primary economic position (filter) 
o Occupation  
o Industry  
o Hours of work 
  
o Migration in the last year  
o Ethnic group 
o long term illness 
o Number of children. 
Attacker Profile: Person working in personnel office of large organisation. 
Scenario Set B: Publicly available information based 
attacks 
Scenario B1.1: Commercial database cross match (common) 
This scenario is based upon an analysis of the information commonly available in 
commercial databases. Typical variables are: 
o Home address 
o Age  
o Sex  
o Marital status  
o Number of cars  
o Number of dependent children  
o Tenure  
o Primary economic status 
o Social grade 
o Household composition 
Attacker Profile: Person or organisation with sufficient resources to purchase 
lifestyle database type information. 
Scenario B1.2: Commercial database cross match (superset, 
resource cost high) 
This scenario is based upon an analysis of the information available in commercial 
databases. This is effectively a superset of available variables which could be 
exploited by a well-resourced attacker who links multiple data sources together. 
o Home address 
o Age  
o Sex  
o Marital status  
o Number of cars  
o Number of dependent children  
o Tenure  
o Accommodation type 
o Primary economic status 
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o Social grade 
o Household composition 
o Religion 
o Number of rooms 
o Income 
o Transport to work 
o Highest qualification 
o Long term limiting illness 
o Workplace 
Attacker Profile: Person or organisation with sufficient resources to purchase 
multiple lifestyle databases. 
Scenario B2: Local search 
This scenario corresponds to what might be obtained through estate agent details 
combined with the electoral register. The variable age and ethnic group from the 
electoral register that could be used in a crude form are not included in this variant. 
Typical variables are: 
o Home address 
o Accommodation type  
o Sex  
o Lowest floor in household  
o Number of rooms  
o Presence of bath  
o Presence of central heating  
Attacker Profile: Anyone. 
Scenario B3: Extended local search 
This scenario corresponds to what might be obtained through estate agent details 
combined with the electoral register. The variables (new voter/adult) and ethnic 
group that could be used in a crude form from the electoral register are included in 
this variant. Typical variables are: 
o Home address 
o Accommodation type  
o Sex  
o Lowest floor in household  
o Number of rooms  
o Presence of bath  
o Presence of central heating  
o Ethnic group  
  
o Age group (new voter/adult) 
Attacker Profile: Anyone. 
Scenario B4.1: Public information (low resources, subgroup)  
This scenario imagines an intruder who is drawing on publicly available data 
sources focusing on a particular subgroup or groups, and who is constrained in 
his/her use of resources. 
o Home address 
o Ethnic group (crude) 
o Age 
o Sex 
o Qualifications  
o Occupation 
o Workplace 
Scenario B4.2: Public information (high resources, subgroup) 
This scenario imagines an intruder who is drawing on publicly available data 
sources focusing on a particular subgroup or groups, without effective resource 
constraints. 
o Home address 
o Ethnic group (crude) 
o Age 
o Sex 
o Qualifications  
o Occupation 
o Workplace 
o Tenure 
o Accommodation type 
Scenario B4.3: Public information (high resources, 
opportunistic targeting attack) 
This scenario imagines an intruder who is drawing on publicly available data 
sources, targeting a small number of individuals, who have visibility perhaps 
because of media coverage, without any resource constraints. 
o Home address 
o Ethnic group  
o Age 
o Sex 
o Qualifications  
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o Occupation 
o Workplace 
o Tenure 
o Accommodation type 
o Marital status 
o Country of birth  
o Religion 
o Nationality 
Scenario B5.1: Online data sweep (low resources, 
opportunistic targeting attack) 
This scenario envisages somebody trawling the net for available sources of 
information. The status of such information is questionable since much of it is 
deliberately self-published. For specific individuals the list of variables may be much 
longer than this. However, these will be commonly obtainable from online CVs and 
sites such as dating sites: 
o Home address 
o Ethnic group  
o Age 
o Sex 
o Qualifications  
o Occupation 
o Workplace 
o Marital status 
o Dependents (y/n) 
o Religion 
o Income 
o Language 
Scenario B6.1: Worker using information about colleagues 
This scenario is based upon a study of what people commonly know about people 
with whom they work. Typically this includes considerable detail on economic 
characteristics, basic physical characteristics and some very crude information about 
personal circumstances. Typical variables are: 
o Age  
o Sex 
o Ethnic group 
o Occupation 
o Workplace 
o Distance of journey to work 
  
o Industry 
o Hours 
o Economic status 
o Long Term illness 
o Number of children 
Attacker profile: Anyone working in a large organisation. 
Scenario B6.2: Nosy neighbour  
This scenario encompasses information that would be relatively easy to obtain by 
observation of one’s neighbours. Obviously this does not entail either a standard 
match or fishing type attack. In effect one would be fishing for one’s neighbours in 
the dataset. However if one found a match one could use information in the dataset 
to determine whether it is rare or not. Typical variables are: 
o Home address 
o Age  
o Sex  
o Marital status 
o Number of cars 
o Number of Dependent children  
o Number of elderly persons  
o Density (persons/rooms) 
o Ethnic group  
o Family type 
o Accommodation type  
o Lowest floor in household  
o Multiethnic household 
o Number of residents 
o Number of rooms 
Scenario B7.1: Combined public and visible sources 
This is essentially the combination of nosy neighbour with publicly available 
information scenarios. This is quite a resource intensive attack because it involves 
hunting for information on a small group of people in public records. It is not likely 
to yield the information below on all neighbours. 
o Home address 
o Age  
o Sex  
o Marital status 
o Number of cars 
o Number of dependent children  
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o Number of elderly persons 
o Density (persons/rooms) 
o Ethnic group  
o Family type 
o Accommodation type  
o Lowest floor in household  
o Multi-ethnic household 
o Number of residents 
o Number of rooms 
o Qualifications  
o Occupation 
o Workplace 
o Tenure 
o Country of birth  
o Religion 
o Nationality 
Scenario B7.2: Combined public, visible and commercial 
sources. 
This is essentially the combination of nosy neighbour with publicly available 
information together with a superset of commercially available data. This implies a 
very well-resourced attacker who is carrying out a deep information gathering 
exercise on a small targeted population. Note the list of variables is more extensive 
than might be obtained on any restricted access database. 
o Home address 
o Age  
o Sex  
o Marital status 
o Number of cars 
o Number of dependent children  
o Number of elderly persons  
o Density (persons/rooms) 
o Ethnic group  
o Family type 
o Accommodation type  
o Lowest floor in household  
o Multi-ethnic household 
o Number of residents 
o Number of rooms 
o Occupation 
o Workplace 
  
o Tenure 
o Country of birth  
o Religion 
o Nationality 
o Number of cars  
o Number of dependent children  
o Tenure  
o Accommodation type 
o Primary economic status 
o Social grade 
o Household composition 
o Income 
o Transport to work 
o Highest qualification 
o Long term limiting illness 
Scenario Set C: Collusive attacks 
Collusive attacks are ones where the data subjects collude in providing information 
about themselves. These do not intrinsically constitute a set against which a data 
controller is legally bound to protect. However, a successful collusive attack could 
still carry some risk, for example in terms of reputational damage. 
Scenario C1.1: Demonstrative political attack: restricted set 
The assumption underlying this scenario is that a political group, such as an anti-
government group, acts in collusion with a data subject for the purpose of 
embarrassing the Government by undermining its data collection/release activities. 
Imagine that the data subject provides the group with copies of the information they 
gave to the interviewers. This scenario could happen in a census, which is a major 
public investment. Here the data collection process is familiar to everyone, and 
colluding respondents could be prepared in advance, and be guaranteed to be in the 
collected data (and also in the outputs with a relatively high probability). In 
principle, a larger number of variables could be used, but in the restricted variant, 
we have avoided those that are difficult to code (such as occupation), on the 
assumption that the political organisation will attempt to minimise divergence to 
prevent the demonstration backfiring. We have also avoided those that give 
information about other individuals apart from the colluding agent, on the 
assumption that the use of such variables would go against the underlying rationale 
for the attack. 
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o Home address 
o Age  
o Sex  
o Education 
o Marital status  
o Primary economic status 
o Ethnic group  
o Religion 
o Country of birth  
o Migration in the last year  
o Tenure  
o Long term limiting illness 
o Self-reported health 
o Income 
Attacker Profile: Person or organisation with specific desire to cause political impact 
on the government. 
Scenario C1.2: Demonstrative political attack: extended set 
o Home address 
o Age  
o Sex  
o Marital status  
o Primary economic status 
o Ethnic group  
o Religion 
o Country of birth  
o Migration in the last year  
o Long term limiting illness 
o Self-reported health 
o Income 
o Number of rooms 
o Tenure 
o Housing type 
o Number of residents 
o Number of children 
 
Attacker Profile: Person or organisation with specific desire to cause political impact 
on the government.  
  
  
Appendix B: Instructions for 
Calculating the Number of Uniques in 
a File. 
These instructions assume that you have downloaded the appropriate data from the 
UKAN website (either Basetton.xlsx for Excel or Basetton.sav for SPSS) and have it 
open in the appropriate software. They also assume that you have a basic familiarity 
with the software package. The file is synthetic data but the data structure is that 
which might typically be found in a census, survey or administrative file.  
In both cases we are using an eight variable key which represents information that 
somebody might plausibly know about a neighbour. You can play about with 
different variable combinations to see the impact on the number of uniques. Nothing 
should be read into the specific details of the results (the data is not real) – the 
exercises simply serve to demonstrate the technique which you can then use with 
your own data. 
B.1 Instructions for Excel 
1. Sort the file by the following columns (checking the ‘my data has headers’ box is 
checked): sex, age, ethnic, accomtype, tenure, marstatus, ncars, cenheat. For each 
column, sort from smallest to largest. 
2. Enter the word ‘ccount’ into cell N1 
3. Enter 1 in cell N2  
4. Enter the following formula into cell N3 
=IF(AND(A3=A2,B3=B2,C3=C2,D3=D2,E3=E2,F3=F2,J3=J2,M3=M2),N2+1,1)96 
5. Fill down from N3 to N210745 
6. Select and copy column N  
7. Right click ‘Paste’ and pick the values option (ensuring the values are associated 
with the correct row as you carry out further sorting and calculations) 
8. Repeat the sort you did at stage 1, but adding in ccount to the end of the list 
sorted from largest to smallest. 
9. Enter the word ‘csize’ into cell O1 
                                                          
96 This formula construction is based on the version of Excel available in the UK. We understand that 
in some countries that semi colons and used rather than commas in formula. 
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10. Enter the following formula into cell O2: 
=N2 
11. Enter the following formula into cell O3: 
=IF (N3<N2,O2,N3) 
12. Fill down from O3 to O210745 
13. Switch to the output page tab 
14. In cell B2 type the formula 
=COUNTIF (Barsetton!O:O,1) 
B.2 Syntax for SPSS 
SORT CASES BY sex(A) age(A) ethnic(A) accomtype(A) tenure(A) marstatus(A) 
ncars(A) cenheat(A). 
 
COMPUTE eccount=1. 
IF (sex=lag(sex) & age=lag(age) & ethnic=lag(ethnic) & accomtype=lag(accomtype) & 
tenure=lag(tenure) & marstatus=lag(marstatus) & ncars=lag(ncars) & 
cenheat=lag(cenheat)) eccount=lag(eccount)+1. 
EXECUTE. 
 
SORT CASES BY sex(D) age(D) ethnic(D) accomtype(D) tenure(D) marstatus(D) 
ncars(D) cenheat(D) eccount(D). 
COMPUTE ecsize=eccount. 
IF (eccount<lag(eccount)) ecsize=lag(ecsize). 
EXECUTE. 
 
COMPUTE unique=0. 
VARIABLE LABELS unique 'Is the case unique?'. 
VALUE LABELS unique 0 'No' 1 'Yes'. 
IF (ecsize=1) unique=1. 
EXECUTE. 
 
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=unique 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
  
  
Appendix C: A Description of the Data 
Intrusion Simulation (DIS) Method. 
C.1 Introduction 
The concept behind the DIS method derived from concerns expressed by Elliot 
(1996) regarding the need to examine statistical disclosure risk from the viewpoint of 
the data intruder (intruder-centrically) rather than from that of the data themselves 
(data-centrically). A rational intruder would be indifferent to questions such as, for 
example, whether a record was sample or population unique, because s/he will 
know such attributions of status are unreliable and more importantly because s/he 
will have more pragmatic concerns, such as whether her/his actual matches are 
correct. The DIS method simulates the intruder perspective by focusing on the 
probability of a unique match being correct. The basic assumption is that the 
intruder has some information about a population unit and uses that information to 
attempt to find the record for that individual in a microdata file (which is a sample 
of the relevant population). If there is only one record in the dataset which 
corresponds to the information that the intruder has that is called a unique match. If 
that record is the correct record for that population unit that is called a correct 
match. These basic elements form the headline statistic of a DIS analysis; the 
probability of a correct match given a unique match: pr(cm|um). 
The basic principle of the DIS method is to remove records from the target microdata 
file and then re-sample them according to the original sampling fraction (the 
proportion of the population that are in the sample). This creates two files, a new, 
slightly truncated, target file and a file of the removed records which can then be 
matched against the target file. The method has two computational forms, the special 
form, where the sampling is actually done, and the general form, where the sampling 
is not actually performed, but its effect is derived using the equivalence class 
structure and sampling fraction. 
C.2 The special method 
The special DIS method uses a similar technique to Briggs (1992). 
1. Set counters U and C to zero. 
2. Take a sample microdata file (A) with sampling fraction S. 
3. Remove a random record (R) from A, to make a new file (A'). 
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4. Generate a random number (N) between 0 and 1. If N<=S then copy back R 
into A' with each record having a probability of being copied back equal to S. 
5. The result of this procedure is that B will now represent an arbitrary 
population unit whose probability of being in A’ is equal to the original 
sampling fraction. 
6. Match fragment against A’. If R matches a single record in S’ then add record 
1 to U if the match is correct add 1 to C.  
7. Iterate through stages ii-v until C/U stabilises. 
C.3 The general method 
A more general method can be derived from the above procedure. Imagine that the 
removed fragment (B) is just a single record. Clearly there are six possible outcomes 
depending on whether the record is resampled or not and whether it was a unique, 
in a pair, or in a larger equivalence class. 
Table 1: Possible per record outcomes from the DIS general method 
record is:  Copied back Not copied back 
sample unique correct unique match non-match 
one of a sample pair multiple match 
including correct 
false unique match 
one of a larger 
equivalence class 
multiple match 
including correct 
false multiple match 
 
Given this, one can derive the estimated probability of a correct match given a 
unique match from: 
   
Where U is the number of sample uniques, P is the number of records in pairs and 
 is the sampling fraction.  
For full statistical proof of the above theory see Skinner and Elliot (2002). For a 
description of an empirical study that demonstrates that the method works see Elliot 
(2000). For an elaboration using the special method for post-perturbation disclosure 
risk assessment see Elliot (2001). For an extension which takes account of general 
misclassification errors see Elamir and Skinner (2006)  
(1 )
U
U P

   

  
Appendix D: Instructions for 
Calculating the DIS Score. 
These instructions assume that you have downloaded the appropriate data from the 
UKAN website (either Basetton sample.xlsx for Excel or Basetton sample.sav for 
SPSS) and have it open in the appropriate software. The file is synthetic data but the 
data structure is that which might typically be found in a census, survey or 
administrative file.  
In both cases we are using an eight variable key which represents information that 
somebody might plausibly know about a neighbour. Nothing should be read into 
the details of the results (the data is not real) – the exercises simply serve to 
demonstrate the technique which you can then use with your own data. 
In both cases we are using a file where the sampling faction is 10%. 
D.1 Instructions for Excel 
1. Sort the file by the following columns (checking the ‘my data has headers’ box 
is checked): sex, age, ethnic, accomtype, tenure, marstatus, ncars, cenheat. For 
each column, sort from smallest to largest. 
2. Enter the word ‘ccount’ into cell N1 
3. Enter 1 in cell N2  
4. Enter the following formula into cell N3 
=IF(AND(A3=A2,B3=B2,C3=C2,D3=D2,E3=E2,F3=F2,J3=J2,M3=M2),N2+1,1) 
5. Fill down from N3 to N210745 
6. Select and copy column N 
7. Right click ‘Paste’ and pick the values option (ensuring the values are 
associated with the correct row as you carry out further sorting and 
calculations) 
8. Repeat the sort you did at stage 1, but adding ccount to the end of the list 
sorted from largest to smallest. 
9. Enter the word ‘csize’ into cell O1 
10. Enter the following formula into cell O2: 
=N2 
11. Enter the following formula into cell O3: 
=IF(N3<N2,O2,N3) 
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12. Fill down from O3 to O210745 
13. Switch to the output page tab 
14. In cell B2 type the formula 
=COUNTIF(BarsettonSample!O:O,1) 
15. In cell B3 type the formula 
=COUNTIF(BarsettonSample!O:O,2) 
16. Enter the sample fraction 0.1 into cell B4 
17. Enter the following formula into Cell B5 
=B2*B4/(B2*B4+B3*(1-B4)) 
D.2 Instructions for SPSS 
The syntax to use is shown below. When you have run it you will have a frequency 
table which will give you counts for the number of unique records and the number 
which are members of identical pairs. You simply need to insert those numbers into 
the standard DIS formula: 
Pr(cm|um) =   
Where U is the number of sample uniques, P is the number of records in pairs and 
 is the sampling fraction, in this case 0.1.  
SPSS syntax 
SORT CASES BY sex(A) age(A) ethnic(A) accomtype(A) tenure(A) marstatus(A) 
ncars(A) cenheat(A). 
 
COMPUTE eccount=1. 
IF (sex=lag(sex) & age=lag(age) & ethnic=lag(ethnic) & accomtype=lag(accomtype) & 
tenure=lag(tenure) & marstatus=lag(marstatus) & ncars=lag(ncars) & 
cenheat=lag(cenheat)) eccount=lag(eccount)+1. 
EXECUTE. 
 
SORT CASES BY sex(D) age(D) ethnic(D) accomtype(D) tenure(D) marstatus(D) 
ncars(D) cenheat(D) eccount(D). 
 
COMPUTE ecsize=eccount. 
IF (eccount<lag(eccount)) ecsize=lag(ecsize). 
EXECUTE. 
 
(1 )
U
U P

   

  
COMPUTE uniquepair=0. 
VARIABLE LABELS uniquepair 'Is the case unique or a one of a pair ?'. 
VALUE LABELS uniquepair 0 'Not unique or pair' 1 'Unique' 2 'One of a pair'. 
IF (ecsize=1) uniquepair=1. 
IF (ecsize=2) uniquepair=2. 
EXECUTE. 
 
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=uniquepair. 
 /ORDER=ANALYSIS. 
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Appendix E: Data Features Template. 
Feature type Question Answer/Actions 
Data Subjects 
Who are they?  
What is their relationship with the data?  
Data type 
Microdata, Aggregates or something 
else?  
Variable 
Types 
What common indirect identifiers do 
you have?  
What sensitive variables do you have?  
Data 
properties 
Is the data accurate?  
How old is the data?  
Is it Hierarchical or flat?  
Is it Longitudinal or Cross-sectional?  
Population or sample (what fraction)  
Anything else of note?  
  
 
